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Sarvajñanārāyaṇa on Manu, 2-0. — In cases where we find no guidance either from Vedic texts or Smṛti or the Śīla of learned men, we have to be guided by the ‘Ācāra,’ Practice, of ‘Sādhus,’ persons engaged in the performance of acts in accordance with the Veda. ‘Ācāra’ really stands for the recalling and practising of what has been done by the good men of the past, i.e., Usage or Custom. — This is regarded as inferior to ‘Śīla’ on account of the possibility of suspicion regarding the correctness of tradition upon which it is based.

Kullūka on Manu, 2-6. — ‘Ācāra’ stands for the practice of dressing oneself in blankets or tree-bark and so forth.

‘Sādhūnām’; of the good, i.e., righteous persons.

Rāghavānanda on Manu, 2-6. — Such practice as binding of the bracelet at marriage and so forth, which is current among ‘Sādhus,’ i.e., people free from ill feeling.

Nandana on Manu, 2-6. — Nandana takes ‘Ācāra’ by itself offering no remarks about it, and construes ‘Sādhūnām’ with ‘Ātmanastuṣṭi.’

Viśvarūpa on Yājña, 1-7. — ‘Sadāchāra’ stands for those religious or spiritual (as distinguished from temporal or worldly) acts that are done by such men as are free from selfishness and devoid of hypocrisy and other defects. This is mentioned apart from ‘Smṛti,’ (1) because there is no compilation of the said practices, as there is of the ordinances; and (2) the trustworthiness of practices is doubtful, which is not the case with Smṛti.

Aparārka on Yājña, 1-7. — ‘Sadāchāra’ is the practice of cultured people, i.e., such people as are free from ill-will, vanity, possessed of sufficient funds (i.e., not in want of living), not greedy, free from hypocrisy, haughtiness, avarice, stupidity and anger; those who have studied the Veda and its supplements in the right manner, and are expert in making deductions therefrom (Baudhāyana), — the supplements being the Itihāsas, Purāṇas, and also Grammar and the other subsidiary sciences; ‘those expert in making deductions therefrom’ are those versed in the Smṛtis, — the latter being regarded as indicative of the Veda. When the texts speak of ‘Sadāchāra’ as an authority what they refer to is the fact that the customs obtaining in Brahmāvarta and other civilised lands are all based on the Veda (and not that custom qua custom is to be accepted as in itself authoritative): any custom that is repugnant to any clear text of the Veda is to be rejected. Vaśiṣṭha’s declaration that ‘all the customs current in Āryāvarta are authoritative’ means that most of them are so; as is clear from another declaration of his to the effect that customs of the cultured are to be accepted as authority only on points where no Veda or Smṛti texts are available.

Mitākṣarā on Yājña, 1-7. — ‘Sadāchāra’ — practice of the cultured, not of the uncultured.

Vīramitrodaya on Yājña, 1-7. — ‘Sadāchāra’ is thus defined in the Viṣṇupurāṇa: “Good men, free from all defects, are called Sat, and their practice, Ācaraṇa, is what is called ‘Sadāchāra.’” It is the sole authority in regard to the Holākā and such observances.

Vīramitrodaya-Paribhāṣā, pp. 8-29. — Gautama declares that such local, tribal and family customs as arc repugnant to the scriptures are not authoritative; — ‘Scripture’ here stands for ‘Veda, Smṛti and Purāṇa.’ This Ācāra stands for positive virtues, as distinguished from ‘Śīla’ which stands for the negative ones. If we connect ‘Sādhūnām’ with ‘āchāraḥ,’ then the meaning comes to be that the practices of even those not learned in the Veda are to be accepted as authoritative, when these are men free from all weaknesses and defects; it is in this sense that in the case of Śūdraṣ, the practices of one’s ancestors become an authoritative source of knowledge of Dharma.

Parāśaramādhava, p. 100. — ‘Sadāchāra’ — e.g., Holākā, Udvṛṣabha and the like. Those who ‘expound’ or ‘determine’ these are the elders of each family or tribe.

Madanapārijāta, pp. 11-12. — Dharma depends upon ‘Ācāra’ — [But this term is used here in a very wide sense, being defined as] — ‘Ācāra is the name of that course of conduct which is enjoined in Śruti and Smṛti and which is prescribed by the Good.’ — This āchāra is to be learnt from persons born in Madhyadeśa and other countries: — (a) the tract of land between Sarasvatī and Dṛṣadvatī — Brahmāvarta; (b) between Himalaya and Vindhya and between Gaṅgā and Yamunā, West of Prayāga — Madhyadeśa; (e) between Himalaya and Vindhya and the Eastern and Western Oceans — Āryāvarta.

Nṛsiṃhaprasāda-Saṃskāra. — “It is difficult to believe that the endless practices or customs that have grown, and are still growing up from time to time, should be all based upon Vedic texts. Even Manu’s declaration cannot be taken as testifying to the authority of each and every custom. For if their authority rested upon the trustworthy character of the ‘cultured’ persons among whom it is current, then there would be an interdependence; the people would be ‘cultured’ because they follow those practices and the practices would be authoritative because they are followed by those persons. Further, customs and practices are found to vary in different parts of the country; and certainly all of these cannot he authoritative.”

It is not each and every practice of the ‘cultured’ that we regard as authoritative; that alone can be regarded as a trustworthy guide which is done by the cultured people as ‘Dharma,’ that which they do knowing it to be ‘righteous.’ And certainly the many misdeeds of well-known great men that are cited could not have been done by them as ‘dharma’; when the learned regard an act as ‘dharma’ they must do so on the strength of some Vedic text known to them; hence these Practices and Customs also must be inferred to have their source in the Veda.

Smṛticandrikā, p. 5. — ‘Ācāra’ stands for the tying of the bracelet and such practices.

Ibid, p. 6. — The ‘Śiṣṭaṣ,’ ‘cultured,’ are defined by Manu (12-109) —

dharmeṇādhigato yaistu vedaḥ saparibṛṃhaṇaḥ |
te śiṣṭā brāhmaṇā jñeyāḥ śrutipratyakṣahetavaḥ ||

The paribṛṃhaṇa of the Veda being the subsidiary sciences, Itihāsa and Purāṇa. Says Bṛhaspati —

itihāsapurāṇābhyāṃ vedaṃ samupabṛṃhayet |

[This occurs in the Mahābhārata also.]

On questions where we find no Śruti or Smṛti text we are to be guided by the opinion of the ‘Pariṣad,’ ‘Assembly.’ Says Manu (12.108) —

amāmnāteṣu dharmeṣu kathaṃ syāditi ced bhavet |
yaṃ śiṣṭā brāhmaṇā brūyuḥ sa dharmaḥ syādaśaṅkitaḥ ||

This ‘Assembly’ should consist of at least 10 ‘cultured’ men — as declared by Gautama —

anāmnāte daśāvaraiḥ śiṣṭairūhavadbhiḥ alubdhaiḥ praśastaṃ kāryam |

That is, what these people say is ‘good’ should be done. Baudhāyana also prescribes the same number — daśāvarā pariṣat |

Yājñavalkya says —

catvāro vedadharmajñāḥ parṣat traividyameva vā |
sā brūte yaṃ sa dharmaḥ syādeko vā'dhyātmavittamaḥ ||

by which the Assembly should consist either (1) of four men versed in the Veda and the Dharmaśāstra, or (2) of those men each versed in three Vedas, or (3), of only one man who is the best ‘knower of the philosophy of the Self.’

Manu also (12.110 and 112) fixes the number at (1) ten or (2) three of those who are fully learned in the three Vedas.

The opinion of this ‘Assembly’ is as authoritative as the Veda itself, — says Yama.

Manu (4.178) sanctions the authority of ‘Family Custom’ —

yenāsya pitaro yātā yena yātāḥ pitāmahāḥ |
tena yāyāt satāṃ mārgaṃ tena gacchanna riṣyati ||

But this can be a guide only in matters where the scriptures are found to he at variance with one another; — as is clear from the words of Sumantu —

yatra śāstragatirbhinnā sarvakarmasu bhārat |
tasmin kulakramāyātmācāraṃ tvācared brudhaḥ ||

Saṃskāramayūkha, p. 1. — That ‘Sadāchāra’ is authoritative which is not repugnant to Veda and Smṛti texts.

(D) Śīla — Samyak-Saṅkalpaja-Kāma (Mentioned in Manu 2-6.)

Medhātithi on Manu, 2.6. — Medhātithi takes the two terms ‘Śīla’ and ‘Smṛti’ as interrelated, — the two together standing for ‘conscientious recollection’ (see under ‘Smṛti’), so that according to him ‘Śīla’ is not a distinct means of knowing Dharma. He also suggests another explanation of ‘Śīla’ by which it pertains to all acts; the meaning being that whatever one does one should do with the mind free from all ‘love and hate.’

Sarvajñanārāyāṇa on Manu, 2.6. — In cases where neither Vedic nor Smṛti tests are available one’s duty can be determined on the basis of the ‘Śīla’ of a large number of persons learned in the Veda, i.e., their ‘natural inclination,’ ‘temperament.’ In support of the authority of this we have the Vedic text which declares that ‘whatever the learned man feels is to be regarded saintly’; — wherever this is not available, we have to he guided by the ‘āchāra,’ practice, of ‘Sādhus.’

Kullūka on Manu, 2.6. — ‘Śīla’ stands for ‘devotion to Brahman’ and such other qualities enumerated by Hārīta (ride above). According to Govindarāja however it stands for ‘freedom from love and hate.’

Rāghavānanda on Manu, 2.6. — ‘Śīla’ is conduct, action, of those learned in the Veda, i.e., those who know that the injunctions contained in the Veda are to he acted up to; or it may stand for the thirteen qualities spoken of by Hārīta (see above).

Nandana on Manu, 2.6. — Nandana defines it as ‘that excellent quality of the soul which makes a man respected among the wise,’ as defined in the Mahābhārata; as an example is cited that magnanimity which was shown by Yudhiṣṭhira when he asked for the life of his stepbrother Nakula before that of his brother Bhīma and Arjuna, when all of them had been devoured by the alligator.

Yājñavalkya, 1.7. — speaks of Samyakṣaṅkalpajaḥ kāmaḥ, determination or judgment after full reflection.

Aparārka on Yājña, 1-7. — This means ‘that desire to act in a certain way which arises from rightful volition,’ i.e., the determination to attain a certain object by a definite means in accordance with the Scriptures.

According to Viśvarūpa this helps only in determining one out of a number of optional alternatives.

Vīramitrodaya on Yājña, 1-7. — ‘Samyakṣaṅkalpa’ is such volition as is free from love, hatred and such aberrations. ‘Kāma’, a well-considered vow. Or this may be the same as what Manu has called ‘Śīla,’ which has been described in the Mahābhārata as consisting in knowledge and sympathy, in thought, word and act, towards all living beings; — this is called a ‘source of Dharma’ in the sense that it is helpful in the man possessed of this quality being better able to understand what is said in the Veda. Hārīta has described ‘Śīla’ as consisting in the following ten qualities: — ‘Devotion to Brāhmaṇas, Gods and Pitṛs, sympathy, freedom from jealousy, kindly disposition, friendliness, sweet words, mercy and calmness.’ This is to be accepted as authoritative only in regard to those cases of doing (such acts as the helping of a Brāhmaṇa) which are not covered by the Vedic injunctions bearing on the subject. According to others, however, it is the authority in regard to such determinations as ‘I shall not drink water except with food.’

Another interpretation of the whole verse . — ‘ Samyak’ qualifies ‘Śruti,’ and means ‘duly understood’; and it also qualifies ‘Smṛti,’ where it means ‘based upon the Veda’; —

‘Svasya’ is to be taken by itself and construed with ‘āchāraḥ’ the meaning being ‘the practice or custom of one’s own ancestors’: — ‘priyam ātmanaḥ’ means ‘self-satisfaction’; ‘Samyakṣaṅkalpajaḥ kāmaḥ’ means the desire to act in a certain way after proper reflection; this would vary with different individuals; some men would be satisfied with the mere assertion of a trustworthy person,while others would want corroborative texts.

Mitākṣarā on Yājña, 1.7. — Such desire as is not repugnant to the scriptures, e.g., in such cases as the determination not to drink water except with food.

Vīramitrodaya-Paribhāṣā, p. 10. — This means a ‘well-considered vow’ such as ‘I shall not drink water except with food’; or it may stand for the ‘desire to do good and so forth which arises from a proper, i.e., philanthropic, determination’; in this sense it stands for the same thing as the ‘Śīla’ in Manu’s text.

Vīramitrodaya-Paribhāṣā, pp. 8-25. — The term ‘Śīla’ stands for the thirteen qualities enumerated by Hārīta. It stands, it will be seen, for the negative virtues, and is as such distinguished from ‘Ācāra,’ practice or custom, which stands for the positive ones.

On Yājña. 1.7 the Vīramitrodaya identifies the Śīla of Manu with the ‘Samyakṣaṅkalpajakāma’ of Yājñavalkya.

Smṛticandrikā, p. 5. — ‘Śīla’ connotes freedom from love, hatred and so forth.

(E) Ātmanastuṣṭi — Svasya Priyam

Medhātithi on Manu, 2.6. — This ‘self-satisfaction’ is meant to be of those only who are ‘learned in the Veda and good’ (‘Vedavidām sādhūnām’), the idea of this being that the ‘source of Dharma’ is based upon the trustworthy character of the persons concerned. When the ‘learned and good’ feel satisfied regarding the righteousness of a certain action, that action must be accepted as right; because such men can never feel satisfied with anything that is wrong. The older treatises however have explained the meaning to be that in oases of optional alternatives that alternative should be adopted in regard to which the man’s own mind feels satisfied. There is yet another explanation by which what is meant is that ‘whenever one is doing anything he should keep his mind tranquil and calm’ and in this sense like ‘Śīla,’ ‘freedom from love and hate,’ this ‘self-satisfaction’ also pertains to ‘all acts.’

Sarvajñanārāyaṇa on Manu, 2.6. — In cases where we have no other means of ascertaining the right course of action, we are to he guided by ‘self-satisfaction’; i.e., we should do that the doing of which makes us feel easy at heart and satisfies the conscience. This is inferior to ‘Śīla’ and ‘Ācāra’ as it pertains to the mind of a single individual and hence is lacking in that corroboration by others which is available in the case of the other two.

Kullūka on Manu, 2.6. — ‘Self-satisfaction’ is authoritative only in regard to the choice of alternatives.

Nandana on Manu, 2.6. — Nandana construes this with

‘Sādhūnām,’ by which explanation the meaning is that the self-satisfaction of exceptionally righteous persons is to be regarded as trustworthy.

Viśvarūpa on Yājña, 1.7. — ‘Self-satisfaction’ meant here is such as is not incompatible with Vedic texts, and is not due to restlessness; — the taking to renunciation, for instance, during a time when the family is in trouble, would not be ‘lawful,’ even though one may feel self-satisfaction in it......‘Svasya ca priyam ātmanaḥ’ may also mean ‘Liberation.’

Mitākṣarā on Yājña, 1.7. — ‘Self-satisfaction’ serves to determine which one of several sanctioned alternatives has to be adopted, e.g., the performance of Upanayan in the 7th or the 8th year.

Aparārka on Yājña, 1.7. — It is that which brings satisfaction to one’s own mind. This is to be accepted as authority only in regard to cases that are distinctly declared to be subject to such authority, in such texts as ‘when one feels that there is a load in his mind until a certain act is done, that act he shall do.’

Vīramitrodaya on Yājña, 1.7. — ‘Svasya priyam’ means ‘self-satisfaction’; i.e., the satisfaction regarding the propriety of a certain act, in the mind of such men as arc steeped in Vedic tradition. This same idea is expressed by Bhaṭṭa Kumārila in the verse etena vaidikāneka ‘Trustworthiness belongs to the self-satisfaction of such persons as have their minds steeped in the moral grandeur of the Veda.’ This ‘self-satisfaction’ must be that of the enquirer himself, and he cannot go about seeking for that of all Vedic scholars. This is the sole authority in regard to such questions as to whether or not the performance of the expiation of a certain sin shall be repeated; this having been declared by Bṛhaspati: — ‘One should go, on doing an act until his mind becomes lightened,’ — i.e., free from the incubus of the sinful act committed. Others, however, have held that ‘self-satisfaction’ is what determines which of the several equally authoritative alternative courses of action one shall adopt.

Vīramitrodaya-Paribhāṣā, pp. 8-25. — ‘Sādhūnām’ in Manu has to be construed with ‘tuṣṭiḥ’; the sense being that when there is a doubt as to what is ‘right,’ that course of action is to be accepted as ‘right’ with regard to which there is satisfaction among ‘good men,’ i.e., men whose minds are steeped in Vedic lore. Such is the explanation given by the Kalpataru; this view has the support also of a Taittirīya text, which says — ‘When there are doubts regarding what is right, one should act in the manner that those Brāhmaṇas act who are impartial, judicious, trustworthy and highly righteous.’ This implies the authority also of the Pariṣad, ‘Council’ or ‘Assembly.’ This ‘self-satisfaction’ is authoritative only in the determining of one out of a number of optional alternatives, and there too it is authority only for the man himself; and the ‘self-satisfaction’ of one man can have no authority for another.

Nṛsiṃhaprasāda-Saṃskāra - M S. — Mere self-satisfaction is not authoritative. What is meant is that when a cultured and learned man feels satisfied that a certain course of action is righteous, that satisfaction itself is to be regarded as a trustworthy guide.

Smṛticandrikā, p. 5. — This is authority only in determining one of several optional alternatives.

Comparative Authority

Manu, 2.10. — ‘The Veda is to be known as Śruti, R evealed Word, and the Dharmaśāstra, Legal Ordinances, as Smṛti; in all matters these two do not deserve to be criticised.’

According to Medhātithi, ‘Custom’ also is included under ‘Smṛti’ here. Kullūka does not accept this view; according to him the text puts the Smṛti distinctly above Custom, which means that Custom contrary to Smṛti is to he rejected.

Manu (2.14) says — ‘Whenever there is conflict between two Vedic texts, both are to be regarded as lawful’; the same with two Smṛti texts, adds Medhātithi; i.e., the two courses of action laid down by the conflicting texts are to be treated as optional alternatives.

Viśvarūpa on yājñavalkya, 1.7. — According to Manu, in all purely spiritual matters the Veda is the highest authority; the Smṛti-writers themselves regard the authority of the Smṛti as extremely weak in comparison with that of the Śruti; all which leads to the conclusion that when Smṛti conflicts with Śruti, it is to he rejected.

Aparārka on Yājña, 1.7. — In the determining of Dharma, says Vyāsa, the Veda is the only pure source of knowledge, ‘pure,’ i. e., whose authority is beyond suspicion; — all the rest are ‘mixed’ — i. e., their authority is open to doubt. Hence that is the highest Dharma which is learnt from the Veda; what is declared in the Purāṇa anil other works is the lower Dharma. All other works of human origin are to be rejected in the matter of Dharma. Vaśiṣṭha says that “Dharma is that which is prescribed by Śruti and Smṛti; and it is in the absence of these that the ‘Practice of the Cultured’ is to be accepted as authoritative.”

Saṃskāramayūkha, p. 1. —

The order is

Śruti,

Smṛti,

Sadācāra,

Svasya Priyam,

Samyakṣaṅkalpaja-kāma.

Among Smṛtis Manu is most authoritative, as says Aṅgiras — manvarthaviparītā tu yā smṛtiḥ sā na śasyate (i.e., not to be honoured). Also the Veda itself — yad vai manuravadat tad bheṣajam | Smṛticandrikā, pp. 15-17. — Says Manu (2.14) — tu yatra syāt tatra dharmāvabhau smṛtau, i.e., where two Śruti texts are mutually contradictory, both are right; i.e., the two courses laid down are to be treated as optional alternatives. The same rule applies to cases of conflict between two Smṛti texts; says Gautama tustyabalavirodhe vikalpaḥ. — When there is conflict between Śruti and Smṛti the latter is to be rejected; so also when Custom conflicts with Smṛti, the former is rejected, as is clear from Vaśiṣṭha’s words — śrutismṛtivihito dharmaḥ tadabhāve śiṣṭācāraḥ pramāṇam. The same applies to the opinion of the Assembly also. When there is conflict between Manu and another Smṛti, the former is to be accepted; as says Aṅgiras: —

yat pūrvaṃ manunā proktaṃ dharmaśāstramanuttamam |
na hi tat samatikrasya vacanaṃ hitamātmanaḥ ||

Also Bṛhaspati —

vedā(du|rtho)panibaddhatvāt prādhānyaṃ tu manoḥ smṛtaṃ |

In cases where the same act is prescribed in equally authoritative texts in two different forms, we have to accept the more elaborate of the two and reject the simpler.

Vīramitrodaya-Paribhāṣā, pp. 25-29. — When there is a conflict between two Vedic texts, both are to be regarded as equally authoritative, and in actual practice the two courses of action are to be treated as optional alternatives. Similarly when there is a conflict between two Smṛti texts or between two ‘customs.’ When there is conflict between a Vedic text and a Smṛti text, preference is to he given to the former as possessed of inherent authority, while the latter owes its authority to an assumed Vedic text. When there is a conflict between a Smṛti text and a Custom, the Smṛti is to he regarded as the more authoritative; e.g., the custom of the marrying of the maternal uncle’s daughter cannot he accepted as authoritative when it is found to be in conflict with the distinct Smṛti text forbidding that practice.

There is a further distinction among authorities of the same class also. For instance, between two Vedic texts, if one is of doubtful import while the meaning of the other is clear, then the latter is to be given preference. If one treats of a more important matter than the other, it is to be given preference; e.g., if one deals with something to be done, while the other, with a minor detail of the act, the former is to set aside the latter. What occurs in the opening sentence sets aside what occurs in the concluding sentence; e.g., the opening sentence speaks of the ‘three Vedas,’ and the concluding sentence speaks of the ‘Ṛk Verse’ as to he recited ‘loudly,’ the signification of the word ‘Ṛk’ in the latter is sublated by that of the word ‘Veda’in the former, and the ‘loudness’ becomes connected with the three Vedas, and not with the Mantras of the Ṛk Veda only. If what is said in one text is beset with more difficulties than what occurs in another, then the former is to be rejected; e.g., one text lays down that a man who accepts the gift of horses should perform as many sacrifices as the horses he receives; while another speaks of Prajāpati having given a horse to Varuṇa and performed a sacrifice to this deity — by which the giver and not the receiver, is to perform the sacrifice; — now if we accept the former, i.e., if we accept the view that the sacrifice is to be performed by the receiver of the gift, then we shall have the following difficulties in the construing of the latter text: (1) it will be necessary to take the Dative in ‘Varuṇāya’ (‘to Varuṇa’) as standing for the Ablative (‘from Varuṇa’), and (2) to take the verb ‘given’ as standing for ‘accepted’; while on the other hand, if we accept the latter text, according to which the sacrifice is to be performed by the giver of the horse, then the only difficulty involved in the construing of the former text is to take the verb ‘accept’ as standing for ‘give’; and hence it is the former text that is rejected, and the conclusion is that the giver of a horse is to perform sacrifices. Where one thing is enjoined in connection with a particular Veda, this is given preference over what would apply to that same, in accordance with what has been prescribed in connection with another Veda; e.g., in connection with the Yajurveda we have the injunction that its Mantras are to be recited in an undertone; in accordance with this rule one may be led to think that the chanting of the Vāravantīya (Sāma-hymn) is to be done in an undertone; but this is precluded by the ‘high pitch’ that has been enjoined in connection with the chanting of the mantras of the Sāma-Veda. What is enjoined in regard to the particular ‘Vedic Recensional School’ to which the performer’s family belongs is given preference over what may have been enjoined in connection with another school. The general law is superseded by the particular, and so on.

In the case of Smṛtis also, — the ‘orthodox’ Smṛti sets aside the ‘heterodox,’ — among the ‘orthodox’ Smṛtis also, if a certain course of action is sanctioned by one, hut condemned by another, the latter sets aside the former, and the action in question is to he avoided. What is laid down in reference to imperceptible transcendental effects sets aside what is enjoined for temporal or worldly ends; e.g., the law prohibiting the killing of the Brāhmaṇa sets aside the law that ‘one may kill a person who is threatening to kill,’ as the latter course of action is meant only to serve the perceptible purpose of saving one’s life.. The Smṛti that is based upon a Vedic Arthavāda is set aside by that which is based upon a Vedic injunction; e.g., the law sanctioning the killing of the cow in honour of an honoured guest, — being based upon an Arthavāda passage commendatory of the ‘churning’ or ‘rubbing’ of sticks, — is set aside by that which prohibits the said killing, — this latter being based upon the Vedic injunctive passage — ‘Kill not Aditi, the hornless cow.’

Among ‘Custom,’ ‘self-satisfaction’ and ‘well considered vow,’ — the preceding is more authoritative than the following; as declared by the Mitākṣarā.

In some cases what is sanctioned by higher authority is rejected by what is said by a lower authority; e.g., the drinking of wine (at the Sautrāmaṇi sacrifice), even though enjoined by the Veda, is not considered right, in view of its prohibition during Kali - Yuga contained in the Smṛti.

Any Smṛti that goes against the ordinances of Manu is to be rejected — as declared by Bṛhaspati (see above). This is the view of the Kalpataru also. — Customs, local, tribal as well as family, are to be rejected if repugnant to the Veda or the Smṛti or the Purāṇa.

As between Śruti and Smṛti, the conclusion arrived at is thus expressed by Vyāsa: — ‘That law which is deduced from the Veda is the higher, while that declared in the Purāṇa and other Smṛtis is the lower; which means that in cases of conflict our first duty is to do what is laid down in the Veda, and the doing of what is declared in the Smṛti can be justified only as a substitute, i.e., to be adopted only when there is no possibility of the other being adopted. And this for the simple reason that according to Manu (11.30), if one follows the ‘second best’ course when the best course is possible, his action becomes futile; so that tho conclusion indicated by this is that even in cases of conflict tho Smṛti does not entirely lose its authoritative character; all that happens is that the course of action sanctioned by it is rendered fruitless by reason of the superiority of authority attaching to the Vedic text to the contrary.

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