with the Commentary of Medhatithi 18 страница

↑

⇐ ПредыдущаяСтр 24 из 350Следующая ⇒

From all this it follows that when Gautama speaks of the Householder’s Life being ‘directly enjoined’ (by the Veda), what he means is that the words of the Veda enjoin it directly, without the intervention of any other process; that which is cognised immediately after the hearing of the words is said to be ‘directly known’; while after something has been cognised, if the reflection over the capacities of that thing leads to the cognition of another thing, this latter is not said to be ‘directly perceived.’ Thus everything becomes duly established.

-----------------------------------------------

[Having discussed the idea expressed by the expression ‘Smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām,’ the Author next proceeds to explain the words themselves] — ‘Smṛtiśīle tadvidām’ ‘the conscientious re-collection of those versed in the Veda,’ — The compound ‘smṛtiśīle’ stands for ‘Smṛti and śīla.’ — ‘Śīla’ has been explained as the abandoning of love and hate; and this is a ‘root of a Dharma,’ — not like the Veda and Smṛti, which are ‘root of Dharma’ in the sense of being the source of knowledge of Dharma, — but in the sense that it is a means of accomplishing Dharma; for by abandoning love and hate one acquires merit (Dharma).

Question: — “Dharma has been described as what leads to welfare; and certainly the abandoning of love and hate is itself of that character (of Dharma); so that there being no difference between the two (i .e., between Dharma and the abandoning of love and hate), how can it be said that the said abandoning accomplishes Dharma?”

Answer: — We have already pointed out that the authors of Smṛtis use the term ‘dharma s,’ ometimes in the sense of acts which form the subjects of Injunctions and Prohibitions (i.e., meritorious and unmeritorious deeds), and also sometimes in the sense of that peculiar thing (force, i.e., merit) which proceeds from the performance of acts and continues to exist until it has brought its reward (to the doer). That there is such a thing as this latter can be believed only on the authority of the scriptures. If the sacrificial performance were to disappear without bringing about any such force, then, bow could its results appear at some remote period of time? It is this peculiar something that is meant by the term ‘dharma’ here [when it is said that ‘the abandoning of love and hate accomplishes Dharma.’] And certainly the said ‘Śīla’ is the ‘root’ of ‘Dharma’ in this sense; so that there is nothing incongruous in this. The use of the word ‘Dharma’ in this sense is common; e.g., in the verse — ‘Dharma is the only friend that accompanies one even on death’ (Manu, 8.17). Since the act disappears immediately after it has been done, bow could it continue to exist at any other time (as mentioned in this verse)?

Some people bring forward the following objection: —

“As a matter of fact, everything that is enjoined in the Veda and in the Smṛtis is the source of Dharma; and since ‘Śīla’ also is included among the acts thus enjoined, there is no point in mentioning it separately. In fact Manu himself is going to enjoin it in the following verse — ‘Day and night one should take care to subdue the senses’ (7.41), — and again — ‘When the mind has been subdued, the two groups of five become subdued.’ And it is this ‘subjugation of the mind’ which constitutes the ‘abandoning of love and hate,’ as we shall explain later on.”

Some writers answer this by saying that ‘Śīla’ has been separately mentioned with a view to indicate its superior importance; it is something that comes useful in the performance of all acts; and is important also by itself; being just like the Agnihotra and such other acts; and further, it is a ‘Dharma’ for all castes and conditions. It is for these reasons that it has been specifically mentioned in the present verse, which sets forth the most general conception of Dharma.

Our explanation however is as follows: — ‘Śīla’ stands for Samādhi, ‘composure of the mind;’ the root ‘Śīl’ signifies ‘composing,’ and ‘composure’ is a property of the mind; so that ‘Śīla’ here stands for the withdrawing of the mind from other things and concentrating it upon what is enjoined in the scriptures.

The copulative compound (‘Smṛtiśīle’) connotes interdependence; hence what is meant to be the ‘source of Dharma’ is ‘Smṛti’ (Recollection) and ‘śīla’ (composed mind, Conscience) as interdependent; and ‘śīla’ does not stand for being the means of accomplishing Dharma (as explained by some people, above). The sense therefore comes to be that what is the ‘source of Dharma’ is Conscientious Recollection, and not mere Recollection. Hence, even though some persons may be ‘versed in the Veda,’ yet any recollection that they may have at a time when they are not duly attentive to the subject cannot be regarded as a valid source of knowledge of Dharma; and this for the simple reason that unless people have fixed their attention upon what is prescribed in the scriptures, they are liable to fall into error.

As regards the particle ‘ca’ found in the verse, this ‘should be construed after the term ‘tadvidām,’ ‘of people versed in the Veda’; and it is due to the exigencies of metre that it has been placed before that term. This particle has a copulative force; and since nothing that has gone before can be copulated, it serves to bring in here the epithet ‘sādhūnām’ (good, righteous) that comes next. So that there are three qualifications intended here: the ‘Recollection’ that is authoritative is of such persons as (1) are learned, having learnt the soiences from a qualified teacher ( ), (2) are attentive to what is prescribed in the scriptures (śīla) and (3) are in the habit of acting up to the injunctions of the scriptures (sādhu, good, righteous). It has been declared that all these qualifications existed in Manu and other writers (of Smṛtis). If it were not so, then it would never have been possible for their words to have been accepted by the wise.

“If this is what is meant, it should be stated dearly, in the form ‘the words of Manu and others, are the sources of Dharma’; what is the use of setting forth the characteristics (of the writers)?”

True; but there might be persons who may not agree to the words of Manu and others being authoritative; and it is with reference to such persons that the text has set forth the well-established grounds for regarding them as trustworthy. Even, at the present day, a man who is possessed of the qualifications mentioned in the text, has his words accepted with the same amount of trust and confidence as the words of Manu and others; as we find in cases where learned men pronounce their opinion upon the precise character of the expiatory rite to be performed by one who has committed a certain sin. In fact a person possessed of the said qualifications has ever been recognised as constituting the ‘pariṣad’ ‘court,’ by himself alone: ‘The Brāhmaṇa should act up to that Dharma which even a single person learned in the Vedas should declare to be Dharma’ — says Manu (12.113). For these reasons, there can be no reasonable ground for enumerating the names of ‘Recollectors,’ as ‘Manu, Viṣṇu, Yama, Aṅgiras’ and so forth. For we find that many such persons as Paiṭhīnasi, Baudhāyana, Pracetas and the rest are recognised by the wise and learned as reliable ‘Recollectors,’ and yet these names are not found in any of the lists (supplied by various Smṛtis).

What thus the words ‘Smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām’ mean is that ‘when a person is found to be recognised and spoken of by all wise and learned persons as endowed with the said qualifications, and they also accept a certain work as really by that person, — the word of such a person (and of the work composed by him), even though proceeding from a human source, should be recognised as an authoritative source of the knowledge of Dharma. So that even at the present day if there were a person possessed of the said qualifications, and he were to compose a work by reason of just those qualifications, then for later generations they would be accepted to be just as authoritative as the words of Manu and others. People of the present generation — who would be contemporaries of the said writer — would not derive their knowledge of Dharma from the words of such a writer, because the sources of information available to him would be all available to them also. Hence it is that until a teacher of the present day clearly indicates the source from which he has derived a certain information, learned people do not accept his word as reliable. When however he has pointed out his source and his work has been accepted as authoritative, then at some future time if the case of his work be found to be analogous to that of the Smṛti rules regarding Aṣṭakā and other acts (whose basis in the Veda we of the present day cannot find), it would be only right to infer its authoritative character from the fact of its being accepted by the wise and the learned (which fact could not be explained except on the basis of its being duly authoritative).

-----------------------------------------------

‘Ācārascaiva sādhūnām’ ‘The practice of Good Men’; — the particle ‘ca’ connects the epithet ‘vedavidām’ (of persons versed in the Veda) with this phrase also. These two qualifications (‘goodness’ and ‘Vedic learning’) indicate the ‘Śiṣṭa,’ ‘the cultured man.’ The ‘practice of cultured men’ also is ‘source of Dharma.’ — ‘Practice’ means conduct, behaviour. When, in regard to any action, there are no Vedic or Smṛti statements, but cultured men are found to regard it as ‘Dharma’ and do it, — then that act also should be accepted as ‘enjoined by the Veda,’ just like the act prescribed in the Smṛti. To this category belong such acts as the following — (a) the tying of the bracelet and such other auspicious rites performed during marriage, etc., (b) the worshipping of famous trees, Yakṣas, road-crossings and such things, varying in various countries, done by the girl on her day of marriage, (c) the number of hair-locks kept on the head, varying with different countries; (d) the exact manner of attending on guests, teachers and other respectable persons, consisting in the addressing of sweet and agreeable words, saluting, rising to receive and so forth; for instance, it is customary with some people to recite the Pṛṣṇi-sūkta with grass in hand, when banding over the horse consecrated for the Aśvamedha sacrifice. It is such customs that are meant by ‘Practice’ here. It is not possible to collect in any compilation all such practices, there being endless forms of them, varying with the diversities in the nature of men, caused by such variable circumstances as the calm or disturbed condition of their mind and so forth. The same act that may have been found, on several, occasions, to be pleasing (to one person), may, on another occasion, turn out to be unpleasant (to another person). For instance, a house-holder may be in the habit of being in constant attendance upon his guests; — this may be quite pleasing to one guest, who may be pleased at finding the man attending upon him like a servant; but the same close attendance becomes unpleasant to another guest, who may feel — ‘the feeling of restraint caused by this man’s constant presence is so galling that I do not find an opportunity to sit at ease.’ Hence, in corroboration of such ‘Practices’ it is not possible for us to assume Vedic texts, corroborating them either collectively or individually. The Aṣṭakā and such other acts, on the other band, have a fixed form; and hence we have Smṛti rules regarding their performance. This is what constitutes the difference between ‘Recollection’ and ‘Practice’ (Smṛti and Ācāra).

-----------------------------------------------

‘Ātmanastuṣṭireva ca’, — ‘Self-satisfaction also’ — ‘is source of Dharma’ is to be construed here also. This ‘self-satisfaction’ also is meant to be of those only who are ‘learned in the Veda and Good’ (‘Vedavidām sādhūnām’). The fact of this ‘Self-satisfaction’ being ‘source of Dharma’ has been held to be based upon the trustworthy character (of the people concerned). When such persons as are possessed of the stated qualifications (of being good and learned) have their mind satisfied with a certain act, and they do not feel any aversion towards it, that act is ‘Dharma.’

“But it may happen that a man’s mind is satisfied with a prohibited (sinful) act; and this would have to be regarded as Dharma. Again, a man may have hesitation (and doubt) regarding what is enjoined in the Veda; and this latter would h ave to be regarded as n ot‘ Dharma.’”

(a) As a matter of fact, the ‘self-satisfaction’ of the high-souled and extremely good men endowed with the said qualifications, is possessed of such tremendous force that, under its influence ‘Dharma’ may become ‘Adharma’ and ‘Adharma’ become ‘Dharma’; but this cannot be so in the case of men tainted with love and hate, etc. Whatever goes into a salt-mine, becomes transformed into salt; similarly everything is rendered pure by the unpremeditated ‘self-satisfaction’ of persons learned in the Veda. [The mere fact of an act being prohibited does dot make it Adharma ] for though the ‘holding of the Ṣoḍaśi vessel’ has been prohibited at the Atirātra sacrifice, yet when the holding comes to be done, in accordance With a Vedic injunction, it is not sinful. But in the present case, there is no question of option, as there is in the case of the ‘holding of the Ṣoḍaśi’. What happens in this case is that the Prohibitions take effect in regard to all cases except the one that falls within tho purview of the said ‘self-satisfaction.’

(b) Or (the second answer to the objection is that), people like those mentioned in the verse can never feel any self-satisfaction at what is ‘Adharma.’ The mongoose bites only that herb which is an antidote of poison, and not any other herb; hence the notion that ‘whatever herb is bitten by the mongoose is destructive of poison.’

(c) (Thirdly) The revered teachers have explained as follows: — What is meant is that, in cases of optional alternatives, that alternative should be adopted in regard to which the mind feels satisfied. It is in accordance with this that the Author will say later on, in connection with the purification of things and expiatory rites — ‘the penance should be performed until the mind may feel satisfied.’

(d) Or, what is said in the Text may be taken as ruling out the unbelieving Atheist; as a matter of fact, the Atheist does not feel any ‘self-satisfaotion’ in doing even those aots that are enjoined in the Veda; hence such acts though done by him are absolutely useless.

(e) Or, what the Text teaches is that in the performance of all acts, one should have a tranquil mind; i.e., at the time of doing anything one should keep his mind free from anger, stupefaction, grief and so forth, and should remain happy. Hence like ‘Śīla’ this also is laid down as pertaining to all acts.

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

Cf. Āpastamba, 1.1.11.1 — 3; Gautama, 1.1 — 4 and 28. 48; Vaśiṣṭha, 1. 4 — 6; Baudhāyana, 1.1.1.1 — 6; Yājñavalkya, 1.7.

The meaning of ‘Śīla’ and ‘Ācāra’ separately has been the source of much misunderstanding. The difficulty has been solved by Medhātithi taking the term ‘Smṛtiśīle, as standing, not for ‘Smṛti’ and ‘Śīla,’but for ‘Smṛti’ as qualified by ‘Śīla,’ this being ‘freedom from hatred and attachment;’ ‘Smṛti — Śīla’ stands for that ‘Smṛti,’ recollection, which the learned have when their mind is calm and collected, not perturbed by passions of any kind. The reason suggested by Buhler is not satisfactory.

Kullūka has explained ‘Śīla’ as standing for the virtues enumerated by Hārīta — ‘Brāhmaṇa-like behaviour, devotion to gods and Pitṛs, gentility, kindness, freedom from jealousy, sympathy, absence of cruelty, friendliness, agreeable speech, gratefulness, being prepared to grant shelter, mercy, and calmness.’ Nārāyaṇa puts it vaguely as ‘that to which learned men are prone.’

‘Self-satisfaction’ — This is meant to apply to cases where the scriptures provide options (Medhātithi, Govindarāja and Kullūka); — or to cases not covered by any of the aforesaid sources (Nārāyaṇa and Nandana).

In connection with this verse, the student desirous of carrying on further investigation, is advised to read Kumārila’s Tantravārtika, Adhyāya I (Translation — Bibliotheca Indica).

Medhātithi (p. 57, l. 8) — ‘Viśvajitā’ — See Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 4.3.15 — 10.

Medhātithi (p. 57, l. 20) — ‘Kvachidarthavādādeva’ — for an example, see Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.4.29.

Medhātithi (p. 60, l. 29) — ‘Kartṛsāmānyāt’ — This refers to Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.3.2.

Medhātithi (p. 62, l. 2) — ‘Yathā āghāre devatāvidhiḥ — Śabara on Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 2.2.10 says —

[ādhāre] māntravarṇako devatāvidhiḥ | ita indra ūrdhvo'dhvaro divi...indravāna svāhesyādhāramādhārayati — ityevamasāvādhāro yadyasyendro devatā

Medhātithi (p. 60, ll. 7-8) ‘Tulye śrautatve’ — Though in regarding both the Śruti-rule and the Smṛti-rule to be equally ‘Śrauta,’ ‘Vedic’ — Medhātithi apparently accepts the view of Kümārila as against Śabara (according to whom’ the Smṛti-rule is not Śruti, but stands on a distinctly inferior footing), — ultimately his view comes to be the same as Śabara’s — viz., that in case of conflict between Śruti and Smṛti, the latter is set aside in favour of the former; while according to Kumārila, there is option.

Medhātithi (p. 63, l. 1) — ‘Viśvajityodhikāravat’ — See Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 6.7.18 — 19. In connection with the Viśvajit sacrifice we have the text — ‘one should give away his entire property, sarvasva.’ The conclusion is that the injunction of the giving away of one’s entire property having been already found in connection with the Jyotiṣṭoma, — at which one is bound to pay as fee either 1,200 gold pieces or his entire property, — what the mention of the giving of entire property at the Viśvajit means is that at this latter sacrifice, the fee must consist of the entire property, and not of 1,200 gold pieces; and this has been taken to imply that the man who seeks to perform the Viśvajit must possess more than 1,200 gold pieces.

Medhātithi (p. 64, 1. 4) — ‘Indriyāṇām &c’ — The first part of this quotation occurs in Manu 7. 44; but the second half is from some other work.

This verse has been quoted in the Vidhānapārijāta (vol. II, p. 511) in support of the authority of Sadāchāra, as bearing upon the propriety of tasamudrādhāraṇa; — also in the Smṛtikaumudī (p. 1) which remarks that the Practice of cultured men is authoritative only when it is not repugnant to Śruti and Smṛti.

The Aparārka (p. 82) quotes the verse in support of the view that the Practices of Good Men also, as distinct from the Smṛti, are an authoritative source of our knowledge of Dharma. It is interesting to note that it reads vedavitsmṛtiśīlatā in place of ātmanastuṣṭireva ca.

It is quoted in the Smṛticandrikā (Saṃskāra, p. 5), which adds the following explanation: —

Veda is the means of knowing Dharma; so also are the ‘Smṛti’ and ‘Śīla’ — i.e. freedom from love and hate, — of persons learned in the Veda; — ‘āchāra’ such as the tying of the bracelet and so forth; — and ‘ātmatuṣṭi’, i. e., when there are several options open to us, it is our own satisfaction that should determine the choice of one of them; — also in the Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Saṃskāra, p. 17b); — and in Hemādri (Vrata, p. 17).

This is quoted in the Vīramitrodaya (Paribhāṣa, p. 10), which adds the following notes: —

‘Vedaḥ’ is the collection of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa texts, as defined by Āpastamba; — ‘akhilaḥ’, the actual texts available, as also those presumed on the strength of ‘transference’ and that of ‘Indicative Power’, ‘Syntactical Connection’, ‘Contest’, ‘Position’ and ‘Name’ (Jaimini iii); — or ‘akhilaḥ,’ ‘entire,’ may be taken as meant to preclude the notion that the said authority belongs only to the three Vedas, and not to the Atharva’, which is based upon such assertions of Āpastamba and others as ‘Yajña is enjoined by the three Vedas’. That the ‘Atharva is an authority for Dharma is due to the fact that it prescribes the performance of the Tulāpuruṣa and other propitiatory rites for all castes, even though it does not deal mainly with the performance of the Agnihotra or other Śrauta rites. — When the text says that these are the means of knowing ‘Dharma’ Right, it implies that they are the means of knowing also what is ‘Adharma,’ ‘wrong’ it being necessary for the scriptures to furnish an idea of all that is wrong and hence a source of impurity of the mind, which obstructs the acquiring of true knowledge. — ‘Mūlam’, ‘Source’, the means of knowing; — ‘Todvidām’, those learned in the Veda; this implies that in the case of ‘Smṛti’ and the rest, tḥe authority is not inherent in themselves, but due to their being based upon the Veda —

‘Smṛti’ the Dharmaśāstra compiled by Yājñavalkya and others. — ‘Śīla’ implies the thirteen qualities enumerated by Hārīta — viz., Faith in Brahman, Devotion to Gods and Pitṛs, Gentility, Harmlessness, Freedom from jealousy, Freedom from harshness, Friendliness, Sweetness of speech, Gratefulness, Kindness for sufferers, Sympathy, Calmness. This ‘Śīla’ differs from ‘Ācāra’; it stands for the negative virtues, the avoidance of wrong, while the former stands for the positive active virtues; the doing of right. — ‘Ācāra’, the tying of the bracelet during marriage and so forth. — ‘Sādhūnam atmanastuṣṭiḥ’, whenever doubt arises regarding what is right, what determines the question is the ‘self-satisfaction’ of those that are ‘Sādhu’ i. e., have their minds replete with the knowledge of the Veda and the impressions gathered therefrom; i. e., that course is to be accepted as ‘light’, which commands the unanimous approval of the said persons; — such is the explanation suggested by the Kalpataru. In support of this view we have the following passage from the Taittirīya, relating to cases of doubt regarding Dharma, — ‘Thou shouldst behave in that manner in which behave those Brāhmaṇas who are impartial, honest, steady, calm and righteous.’ This implies the authority of the Pariṣat ‘Assembly’. — Or ‘sādhūnām’ may be construed with ‘āchāraḥ’, which would imply the authority also of those ‘good men’ — men free from all evil qualities, — who are not ‘learned in the Veda’; so that for superior Śūdras, the practices of their forefathers would be authoritative. — ‘Self-satisfaction’ is the determining factor in the case of options; but this is an authority for the man himself, not for others.

Comparative notes by various authors:

(Verses 6, 10 and 12)

Baudhāyana, Dharmasūtra, 1.1.6. — ‘Dharma has been enjoined in each Veda.’ ‘The second source of knowledge consists of the Smṛtis.’ ‘The third is what proceeds from the cultured, i. e., those persons who are free from jealousy and selfishness, fairly well off, free from avarice, haughtiness, greed, delusion, and anger.’ ‘Those persons are cultured who have studied the Vedas along with their supplements and who are versed in the art of making deductions from them; those are the persons from whom the direct knowledge of Śruti can be derived.’

Gautama, Dharmasūtra, 1.1-2. — ‘Veda is the source of Dharma’: ‘the Smṛti and Śīla of persons learned in the Veda.’

Āpastamba, Dharmasūtra, 1.2-3. — ‘The convention of persons knowing Dharma is authoritative’: ‘and also the Vedas.’

Vaśiṣṭha, Smrti, 1.4-6. — ‘In the absence of Śruti and Smṛti, the custom of the cultured is authoritative’: ‘those persons are cultured whose mind is free from selfish desires’: ‘that is to be regarded as Dharma which is not prompted by a selfish motive.’

Yajñavalkya, Smṛti, 1-7. — ‘Śruti, Smṛti, the practice of good men, self-satisfaction determination based upon right volition, — these four are the source of Dharma.’

Āpastamba, Dharmasūtra, 1.4.7. — ‘The Śruti is more authoritative than custom which derives its authority only from assumption (of corroboration of Śruti).’

Ibid, 30.9. — ‘In cases of conflict, what is stated in the Śruti is more authoritative.’

Jaimini, the writer of the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra (1.1.2), has emphatically declared that the Vedic Injunction is the only trustworthy source of our knowledge of Dharma, i.e., of what is right, i.e., what is conducive to good, temporal and spiritual (Vaiśeṣika-Sütra 1.1.2); though he knew of the later ‘lawbooks, Smṛtis, and customs,’ yet he had no hesitation in declaring that these are to be relied upon only so far as they are not repugnant to anything declared in the Veda.

Coming to the strictly legal writers we find — 1. Baudhāyana, (1.1.1-6) naming — (a) Veda, (b) the Smṛti, and (2) ‘Śiṣṭāgama,’ — the ‘Āgama,’ teaching, of the ‘Śiṣṭas’ ‘cultured’ men; — i. e., ‘those who are free from ill-feeling, devoid of vanity, possessed of sufficient grain, not greedy, devoid of hypocrisy, haughtiness, avarice, stupidity and anger; — those who have studied, in the right manner, the Veda along with its supplements and are well versed in making deductions out of them.’

[There is no mention of ‘custom’ here at all. It is ‘scripture’ pure and simple; but no longer the Veda only, but also the Smṛtis, and the deductions therefrom and teachings based thereupon by persons with very special qualifications.]

Parāśara, 1.20. — ‘At the beginning of each Kalpa, there appear Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva......... the propounders of (1) Śruti, (2) Smṛti and (3) Sadāchāra.’

kalpe kalpe kṣayotyattau brahmaviṣṇumaheśvarāḥ |
śrutismṛtisadācāranirṇetāraśva sarvadā ||

To the same end we have Āpastamba (1.1.2-3) declaring that the ‘convention or opinion of those versed in Dharma’ and ‘also the Veda,’ are the authority. It only means that when those learned in Dharma are agreed in regard to the righteousness of a certain course of action, that is to be accepted as authoritative.

This is made clear by Vaśiṣṭha (1.4-6) — ‘In the event of the aforesaid’ (i.e., Śruti and Smṛti) not being available, the practice of cultured men is the authority, — the cultured man being defined as one who is entirely unselfish, having no desires of his own.

The same opinion is expressed more definitely by Gautama (1.1. 1-2) — ‘Veda is the source of Dharma, also the Smṛti (Recollection) and Śīla of those learned in the Veda.’

[In all this ‘custom’ begins to be admitted; but only that of the ‘cultured.’]

The next step in advance is taken by Manu (2.6) —

vido'khilo dharmamūlaṃ smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām |
ācāraśvaica sādhūnāmātmanastuṣṭireva ca ||

Also Vyāsa —

dharmamūlaṃ vedamāhuḥ grantharāśimakṛtrimam |
tadvidāṃ smṛtiśīle ca sādhvācāraṃ manaḥpriyam ||

By this the sources of Dharma are (1) Veda, (2) Smṛti, (3) Sadāchāra and (4) ‘Svasya priyam.’

[What is exactly meant by these terms we shall see later on.] The same is recapitulated in Manu (2.12) —

vedaḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyamātmanaḥ |
etaccaturvidhaṃ prāhuḥ sākṣāddharmasya lakṣaṇam ||

This is slightly improved upon by Yājñavalkya (1.7) —

śrutiḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyamātmanaḥ |
samyaksaṅkalpajaḥ kāmo dharmamūlamidaṃ smṛtam ||

Познавательные статьи:



Формы дистанционного обучения

Передача мяча двумя руками снизу

Значение правильной осанки для жизнедеятельности человека

Основные ошибки при выполнении передач мяча на месте