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This is quoted in the Smṛticandrikā (Saṃskāra, p. 13); and in the Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Saṃskāra, p. 156).

 

Comparative notes by various authors:

Vaśiṣṭha, Dharmaśāstra — ‘Dharma is that which is enjoined in Śruti and Smṛti.’

Jaimini, Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra, 1.1.2. — ‘Dharma is that which is described in the Veda as conducive to good.’

Kaṇāda, Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra, 1.2.2. — ‘That is Dharma which brings about prosperity and the highest good.’

Āpastamba, Dharma-Sūtra, 1.20.7. — ‘That the doing whereof gentlemen praise is Dharma, and that which they deprecate is Adharma.’

Kumārila, Ślokavārtika, 2.14. — ‘The fact of these acts being conducive to good is, in every case, learnt from the Veda; and in this sense are they regarded as Dharma; and for this reason Dharma is not perceptible by the senses.’

Viśvāmitra (quoted in Parāśaramādhava, p. 80). — ‘That the doing of which men learned in the scriptures praise is Dharma; that which they deprecate is called Adharma.’

Under all these definitions ‘Dharma’ is the name of the ‘meritorious act’; but the term has also been used in the sense of the merit acquired by the doing of the act.

Nyāya view (quoted in Vīramitrodaya-Paribhāṣā, p.29). — ‘Dharma is that quality of man which is brought about by the performance of the enjoined act: Adharma is that quality of man which is brought about by the performance of the forbidden act.’

 

 

VERSE 2.2 [Selfishness Deprecated]

Section II - Selfishness Deprecated

 

कामात्मता न प्रशस्ता न चैवैहास्त्यकामता ।
काम्यो हि वेदाधिगमः कर्मयोगश्च वैदिकः ॥२॥

kāmātmatā na praśastā na caivaihāstyakāmatā |
kāmyo hi vedādhigamaḥ karmayogaśca vaidikaḥ ||2||

 

It is not right to be absorbed in desires — “But there is in this world, no absolute absence of desire; for the study of the Vedas itself is prompted by desire, as also every act prescribed in the Veda.” — (2)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

The man for whom desire for reward forms the sole motive to act is said to be ‘absorbed in desires’; and it is this character that is expressed by the abstract noun; the term ‘ātman’ in this compound denoting preponderance.

‘It is not right?,’ — i.e., it is deprecated.

[An objection is raised] — “This deprecation leads us to infer that the said absorption in desires is prohibited. — This means that the text contains the prohibition of all such sacrifices as the Saurya and the like, which are performed with a desire for a definite reward. Or, why should we specify the Saurya and other sacrifices? All performance of actions is for the accomplishment of a desirable end; no one acts simply for the accomplishing of the act itself; in fact there is no action without results. As for the assertion (contained in 4.63) that ‘one should not act aimlessly’ [which might be taken to imply that there are aimless actions, such as] pouring libations on extinguished fire, or seeking for information regarding what is happening to kings and places of other countries, — in reality, in these cases also there is some result following from the act; and all that is meant by calling them ‘aimless’ is that they do not bring about any important results, in the shape of attainment of Heaven, acquisition of village-property and so forth, which are useful to men in the invisible and visible spheres. It might be argued that — ‘It may be that the action brings about a reward; what is meant is that the man should have no desire for that reward; even though, in the very nature of things, the reward will follow.’ Even so the Saurya and other sacrifices would be without rewards; that alone is regarded as ‘reward’ which is actually desired; so that there could be no ‘reward’ for one who has no desires. In the ordinary world, we do not find any such activity as is absolutely independent of a desire for reward. Nor have we any such Vedic declaration as that ‘in connection with Vedic actions alone there should be no desire for reward.’ On the contrary, all Vedic acts have been prescribed as bringing definite rewards; so that if desire for rewards is interdicted, it would mean that the acts would not be done; and this would militate against the spirit of the Vedas. As regards the compulsory acts (prescribed in the Veda), there is no possibility of rewards in their case. Then again, since the prohibition in the text is a general one (and not restricted to Vedic acts only), it would lead to the cessation of all ordinary activity of the world, and would thus run counter to visible practice also, and it comes to this that no one should do anything, all should sit silent.”

To the above objection we make the following reply: —

(1) It has been argued that the Text implies the prohibition of the Saurya and such other sacrifices, which are admittedly prompted by desire for rewards; as regards this, the author is himself going to say (in Verso 5) that ‘the man fulfils the desires he may have entertained’; if he had meant to prohibit (by the present verse) such acts, how could there be any ‘entertainment’ or ‘fulfilment’ of desires?

(2) The second point urged is that, since the text does not specify Vedic acts alone, the interdict would apply to ordinary actions also. But the required specification has already been made by the text (in the preceding verse), where it says — ‘Learn that Dharma’; which shows that it is Dharma (and not the ordinary activity of the world) that forms the subject-matter of the present discourse.

(3) The third point raised is that — “in as much as no rewards are mentioned in connection with the compulsory acts, there can be no possibility of any desire for rewards in the case of these; so that no useful purpose could be served by the prohibiting of such desires.” —

Now in answer to this we make the following observations: —

(a) By reason of no rewards being spoken of, no one would ever undertake the performance of any compulsory act, unless he were a person thoroughly conversant with the scriptures (and hence realising the importance of compulsory duties):

and (b) in the case of the Saurya and such other acts as have rewards mentioned in connection with them, finding that men are prompted to their performance by desire for those rewards, people might be led to the generalisation that whatever one is to do should be done with the desire for a definite reward; and thus come to undertake the performance of the compulsory acts also only through a desire for reward, oven though no such reward has been spoken of in the scriptures.

And it is with a view to preclude these possibilities that the text lays down the interdict. Though the general rule is that —

(a) an act which is mentioned as leading to a definite result can only be performed with a view to that result,

(b) while that which is laid down in the scriptures as not bringing any reward, and in connection with which one cannot assume a reward according to the principle enunciated in relation to the Viśvajit -sacrifice [Pūrvamīmāmsā-Sūtra, 4.3. 15-16; that where no reward is mentioned, the attainment of heaven should be regarded as the reward], can never be performed otherwise (than in the purely disinterested manner), — yet there may be persons who are conversant with this principle; and it is to these persons that the text addresses the exhortation; specially as it would be rather difficult to carry conviction to such persons by mere reasoning; and the requisite knowledge is conveyed in a simpler and easier manner by means of direct advice.

It is for this reason that the author has, in a friendly spirit, conveyed a teaching which is thoroughly established by proofs.

Though the word ‘Kama’ is generally found to be used in the sense of sexual desire, yet, since in the present context that sense is not applicable, it has to be taken as synonymous with ‘icchā’ (Desire) and ‘abhilāṣa,’ (Longing). So that in view of what follows, the meaning of the text comes to be that ‘one should not undertake the performance of all acts simply with a desire for reward.’

The opponent, taking the ‘absorption in desires’ to mean mere presence of desire in general, urges the following objection: —

“But there is in this world, no absolute absence of desires; that is, as a matter of fact, in this world, there is no activity for one who is entirely without desire. To say nothing of such acts as cultivation of land, trade and the like, which are done by men of experience, — even the ‘study of the Veda,’ the learning of the Veda, which the boy is made to do by his father and others, being even chastised by them, even this is not possible without some desire; reading consists in the uttering of words; and utterance never proceeds, like the sound of thunder, without desire. — ‘Well, if the Boy desires to read, why is he beaten?’ — It is by beating that his desire is aroused; the only difference is that in connection with things that the person likes, the desire arises of itself (and does not need an incentive in the shape of the beating). — Similarly ‘the acts prescribed in the Veda,’ — as compulsory in connection with the Darśapūrṇa nāṣa and other sacrifices are not possible without desire. There is no possibility of a man giving away to Deities things that belong to himself, unless there is a desire in him for doing so. Hence the prohibition of ‘absorption in desires’ becomes an interdict upon all acts prescribed in the Veda and iu the Smṛtis.” — (3)

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

Much ingenuity has again been displayed to show that verses 2 — 5 are a ‘later interpolation.’ Burnell remarks that it must be so, because ‘in the old Vedic religion, all ceremonies and sacrifices were avowedly performed in order to gain desired objects of various kinds.’ He evidently forgot that what is expounded by Manu is not exactly what the writer speaks of as ‘the old Vedic religion.’

‘Na praśastā’ — Because leading to new births, and obstructing Final Release.

Medhātithi, (p. 50, 1. 27) — Viśvajit-nyāya — see Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 4.3.15 — 16.

 

Comparative notes by various authors:

Bhagavadgītā, 3.5. — ‘Apart from action done for sacrifice, all action tends to the bondage of men.’

Bhagavadgītā, 5. — ‘Renouncing the fruit of the act, if one engages himself in it with a concentrated mind, he attains eternal peace; doing it without concentration, and drawn by desire to the fruit of the act, he becomes bound.’

Ibid, 6.27. — ‘If one performs an act as a duty, without any regard for its fruit, etc.’

Ibid, 9.20. — ‘Men learned in the three Vedas, drinking Soma, having their sins washed off, perform sacrifices and seek to go to heaven; having reached the sacred regions of Indra, they enjoy, in heaven, pleasures fit for the gods.’

Sūtasaṃhitā, 3.4. — ‘It is only the unfortunate people who, imbued with due faith, betake themselves to acts prescribed as leading to certain desirable results; those are extremely fortunate who engage themselves only in those daily and occasional acts that are obligatory; for these latter liberation is obtained without effort; doing with due faith, as they do, every act simply because it is enjoined by the scriptures.’

Āpastaṃba, Dharmasūtra, 1.20.1-2. — ‘One should not do his duties with the view to attain worldly ends; — those that bring no fruits are conducive to good.’

Ibid, 1.21-5. — ‘Having fully comprehended the nature of acts, one should undertake that which he likes.’

 

 

VERSE 2.3 [Pūrvapakṣa continued]

Section II - Selfishness Deprecated

 

सङ्कल्पमूलः कामो वै यज्ञाः सङ्कल्पसम्भवाः ।
व्रतानि यमधर्माश्च सर्वे सङ्कल्पजाः स्मृताः ॥३॥

saṅkalpamūlaḥ kāmo vai yajñāḥ saṅkalpasambhavāḥ |
vratāni yamadharmāśca sarve saṅkalpajāḥ smṛtāḥ ||3||

 

Desire has its root in Thought; Sacrifices proceed from Thought; Vows and Restraints — all these have been described as originating in Thought. — (3)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

Thought is the root of sacrifice and other acts, as also of desire; when a man is going to perform a sacrifice, or any act, he must think of it: and when the thinking has been done, there must follow, from the said Thinking, Desire, — however undesirable this latter may be; for instance, when a man, going to cook, lights fire, there arises, from the fire, the undesirable smoke also. Thus it is impossible that sacrifices should be performed and there should be no desire at all.

Question. — “What is this Thought, which is the root of all action?”

Answer. — We explain it as follows: — Thought is that function of the mind which precedes Desire and Resolution; all these three are functions of the mind, and they are at the root of all activity. As a matter of fact, no physical activity is possible without Thought. What happens in the case of all activity is that — (a) first of all we have the Thought or Idea of the exact nature of a thing, and what is meant by ‘Thought,’ in the present context is the cognition that one h as of a certain thing as capable of accomplishing a definite desirable purpose; — (b) after this follows a longing, a wish; and this is ‘desire’; — (c) after the desire has arisen in the form ‘how may I obtain it,’ the man resolves, determines, that he shall act (towards the obtaining of the thing); and this is ‘Resolution.’ It is only after these three mental operations have been gone through that the man proceeds to that external activity which would accomplish the desired end. For instance, when a man is hungry, (a) he thinks of — has the idea of — the action of eating, — (b) then he desires ‘may I eat,’ — (c) then comes the resolution ‘I shall desist from all other activity and take to eating,’ — (d) then he says to the persons in charge of the place where the act of eating is to be done — ‘make ready,’ ‘set the kitchen going.’ [ Objection ] — “If this is so, then Sacrifices and other acts do not proceed from mere Thought, but from Thought, Longing and Resolution; then why is it said that Sacrifices proceed from Thought?”

[ Answer ] — There is no force in this objection, since Thought is the prime cause. It is in view of this that the author is going to assert (in the next verse) that ‘there is no action done by one who is entirely without desires.’

Votes — A ‘vow’ consists in a mental resolve, in the form ‘this shall be done by me as long as I live’; to this class belong the vows of the Snātaka.

Restraints — are negative in their character, — such as desisting from, killing and so forth.

[The meaning of all this is that] without thought there is neither activity towards what ought to be done, nor desisting from what is prohibited and ought not to be done.” — (3)

 

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

‘Saṅkalpamūlaḥ kārnaḥ’ — Nandana explains this as — ‘The desire for rewards is the root of the will to act.’

‘Vratāni’ — The term stands for all those duties that one makes up his mind to perform all through life, — according to Medhātithi, Govindarāja and Nārāyaṇa; — ‘the vow of the Religious Student’ — according to Nandana.

‘Yamadharmāḥ’ — ‘The prohibitive rules’ (Medhātithi, Govindarāja and Nārāyaṇa); — ‘the rules pertaining to the Recluse and the Renunciate’ (Nandana).

 

Comparative notes by various authors:

Yājñavalkya, 1.7 . — ‘ The desire that has its source in proper reflection is the source of Dharma.’

Āpastaṃba, Dharmasūtra, 1.5. — ‘They teach that whatever one determines and thinks of with the mind, or speaks of with speech, or sees with the eyes, — he becomes that same.’

Bhagavadgītā — ‘Desires have their source in the will,’

 

 

VERSE 2.4 [Pūrvapakṣa concluded]

Section II - Selfishness Deprecated

 

अकामस्य क्रिया का चिद् दृश्यते नैह कर्हि चित् ।
यद् यद् हि कुरुते किं चित् तत् तत् कामस्य चेष्टितम् ॥४॥

akāmasya kriyā kā cid dṛśyate naiha karhi cit |
yad yad hi kurute kiṃ cit tat tat kāmasya ceṣṭitam ||4||

 

No action is ever found in this world to be done by a man entirely without desires; whatever a man does is. the outcome of desire. — (4)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

The preceding verse has described the fact that such activity and cessation from activity as are laid down in the scriptures are dependent upon knowledge; and the present verse speaks of similar dependence in the case of ordinary acts of the world; this is the difference between the two verses.

‘Iha’ means ‘in this world’; — ‘Karhichit’ means ‘ever,’ ‘at any time.’ During the waking state, action is ever found in this world to be done by any person who is without desire for performing that action.

Whatever act, scriptural or temporal, — the permitted or the prohibited — is done is the outcome of desire. Since desire is the cause of all activity, every act is called the ‘outcome of desire.’

Thus the position becomes extremely difficult: ‘It is not right to be absorbed in desires’ (as declared in Verse 2), and yet there is no activity without desire. — (4)

 

Comparative notes by various authors:

Āpastaṃba, Dharmasūtra, 1.2.7. — ‘Having fully understood the nature of actions, one should perform that which he wishes.’

 

 

VERSE 2.5 [Answer to the above Pūrvapakṣa]

Section II - Selfishness Deprecated

 

तेषु सम्यग् वर्तमानो गच्छत्यमरलोकताम् ।
यथा सङ्कल्पितांश्चैह सर्वान् कामान् समश्नुते ॥५॥

teṣu samyag vartamāno gacchatyamaralokatām |
yathā saṅkalpitāṃścaiha sarvān kāmān samaśnute ||5||

 

Behaving in the right manner, in regard to these (desires), a man attains the position of Immortals; and even in this world he obtains all the desires that he may have thought of. — (5)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

To the above Pūrvapakṣa, the Author replies in this verse.

[What is meant is that] one should behave in the right manner in regard to these — desires.

“What is this right behaviour?”

It consists in doing an act exactly in the manner in which it is found mentioned in the scriptures. That is, in regard to the compulsory acts one should not think of rewards at all, for the simple reason that no rewards have been mentioned in connection with them; while in regard to the voluntary acts, there is no prohibition of thinking of rewards, for the simple reason that these acts are actually mentioned as bringing definite rewards; in fact what we know of these acts from the scriptural injunctions is that they are the means of obtaining certain rewards; so that the performance of these by a man who has no desire for those rewards would be doing something that is not enjoined in the scriptures at all. As regards the compulsory acts however, to think of rewards would be a pure mistake; for when the acts have not been prescribed as leading to any results, no results could proceed from them by merely the man’s seeking for them.

By doing so [ i.e., by behaving rightly in regard to desires] one goes to — attains — the position of Immortals. ‘Immortals’ are the Gods; their ‘position’ is Heaven; and by reason of the Gods residing in Heaven, the term ‘position’ is applied to the gods themselves, the position being identified with the occupier of the position; just as we have in the expression ‘the elevated sheds are shouting’ [where the ‘sheds’ stand for the men occupying them]. Hence the compound ‘Amaraloka’ is to be expounded as a Karmadhāraya — ‘the immortal positions’; and with the abstract affix ‘tat' we have the form ‘amaralokatā’ So the meaning is that ‘he obtains the character of a divine being,’ ‘he attains divinity.’ The author has made use of this expression in view of metrical exigencies.

Or, the compound ‘amaralokatā’ may he explained as one who sees — ‘lokayati’ — the gods — ‘amarān’; the term ‘loka’ being derived from the root ‘loka’ with the passive affix ‘aṇ’ (according to Pāṇini 3.2.1); and then the abstract affix tal added to it; so that the meaning is that ‘he becomes capable of seeing the Gods’; and this also means that he attains heaven.

Or again, the expression may mean that ‘he is looked upon as a God’ — ‘amara iva lokyate’ — among men.

This whole passage is mere declamatory Arthavāda; and if does not lay down Heaven as the result actually following from the action spoken of; because as a matter of fact, the compulsory acts do not lead to any results at all, while the voluntary acts are prescribed as leading to diverse results. So that what the ‘attaining of heaven’ spoken of in the text means is the due fulfilment of what is enjoined in the scriptures; which is only an indirect way of saying that ‘that particular end is attained with a view to which the action was done.’ Thus in the case of the compulsory acts, the end in view would be either the avoiding of the sin (that might be incurred by the omission of the act), or the due fulfilment of what has been enjoined in the scriptures; and in the case of the voluntary acts, the end is the attaining of rewards thought of, i.e., those contemplated as mentioned in the scriptures; when a man is going to perform an act, he thinks, in his mind, of that reward which has been mentioned in the scriptures as following from that act; having thought of that reward, he has a desire for it — ‘May I obtain this reward by the doing of this act’; and then he obtains all those desires — i.e., the desirable things.

In the manner above described we have set aside the difficulty (that had been set up by the Pūrvapakṣa); for what the text prohibits is not the desire for each and everything, but the entertaining of desires only in connection with the compulsory acts; and in regard to these also there must be desire for the obtaining of things necessary for the due performance of them.

The Brahmavādins (Vedāntins) however regard the words ‘it is not right to be absorbed in desires’ as a prohibition of the Saurya and all such other acts as are laid down as bringing rewards; and their reason is that all actions done with a view to rewards become setters of bondage; and it is only when an act is done without any thought of rewards — doing it simply as an offering to Brahman — that the man becomes released. This is what the revered Kṛṣṇa-Dvaipāyana has declared in the words (a) ‘May there be no action done with a view to rewards’ (Bhagavadgītā, 2.47), — and again, ‘The perform nce of an act becomes vitiated, (a) by the incompleteness of accessories, (b) by the illiteracy of the performer, and (c) by the thought of rewards.’

Various explanations have been offered of the present verse; but we have omitted them because they are of no importance.

 

Comparative notes by various authors:

Vaśiṣṭha, Smṛti, 1-2. — ‘The righteous man who acts with full knowledge is highly praised among men and after death, attains heavenly regions.’

Āpastaṃba, Dharmasūtra, 1.5.2-9. — ‘When the religious student acts with concentrated mind, then alone are his aots fruitful.’

Ibid, 2.2.2. — ‘For all castes, the highest happiness is attained only when they are engaged only in their own duties.’ Ibid, 2.23.7. — ‘Thus alone are all desires fulfilled.’

Ibid, 2.23-12. — ‘They win Heaven till the very dissolution.’

Gautama, Dharmasūtra, 11-31. — ‘Men of all castes and in all life-stages, adhering to their own duties, on death, enjoy the fruits of their acts, and then become born in a pleasant country, and in families of high castes, excellent learning, character and intelligence.’

Gautama, 27-54. — ‘One who knows his duty wins by his knowledge and adherence, the heavenly regions.’

Baudhāyana, Dharmasūtra, 1.3.13. — ‘In this manner great sages attain the highest position of Prajāpati.’

 

 

VERSE 2.6 [Sources of Knowledge of Dharma]

Section III - Sources of Knowledge of Dharma

 

वेदोऽखिलो धर्ममूलं स्मृतिशीले च तद्विदाम् ।
आचारश्चैव साधूनामात्मनस्तुष्टिरेव च ॥६॥

vedo'khilo dharmamūlaṃ smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām |
ācāraścaiva sādhūnāmātmanastuṣṭireva ca ||6||

 

The entire Veda is the root-source of Dharma; also the Conscientious Recollection of righteous persons versed in the Veda, the Practice of Good (and learned) Men, and their self-satisfaction. — (6)

 

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

[The opponent raises an initial objection] —

“What is the relevanoy of what is stated in this verse? It is Dharma that has been declared as the subject to be described; and Dharma can be described only by means of Injunctions and Prohibitions. Now as regards the fact of the Veda being the source of Dharma, this cannot form the subject of any injunction such as ‘the Veda should be known as the source of Dharma, as the authoritative means of ascertaining Dharma because this fact can be known without its being enjoined in so many words; certainly the fact of the Veda being the source of Dharma does not stand in need of being notified by any injunctions of such writers as Manu and others; in fact the authoritativeness of the Veda regarding matters relating, to Dharma is as self-evident as that of Direct Perception, — being based upon the facts that (1) it brings about cognitions that are never sublated, (2) that it is not the work of any person, and as such it is entirely free of any suspicion of falsity that might be due to the defects of such authors, and (3) that the words of the Veda itself are free from all defects.

“It might be argued that — ‘what the text does is to refer to the well-established fact of the Veda being authoritative, with a view to indicate that the Smṛtis of Manu and others are based upon the Veda.’



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