The external things are not non-existent, because our consciousness bears testimony to their existence. — 201.

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SUTRA II. 2. 28.

नाभाव उपलब्धेः॥२.२.२८॥

nābhāva upalabdheḥ ..2.2.28..

.. Na, not. … Abhavah, non-existence of the external things. … Upalabdheh, because they are perceived, because we are conscious of them.

COMMENTARY

As it is the consciousness alone by which we judge the existence or the non-existence of a thing, we must admit that the external things are existent, because our consciousness says they are existing. Moreover, the very words we use show that we admit the existence of external things. We say «the knowledge of a jar», a sentence which assumes that knowledge is different from the jar. No theory is worth consideration by the wise which goes against the testimony of one’s consciousness. The Yogachara may say: «I do not affirm that I have no consciousness of an object, I also feel that the object appears as an external tiling, but what I affirm is this, that I am always conscious of nothing directly but of my own ideas, and hence the so-called appearance of the external things is the result of my own ideas». To this we reply that the very fact of your consciousness proves that there is an external object giving rise to the idea of externality.

(«That the outward thing exists apart from consciousness, has necessarily to be accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. No body when perceiving a post or a wall is conscious of his perception only, but all men are conscious of posts and walls and the like as objects of their perception.)» — Dr. Thibaut.

Moreover, in the sentence ‘I know the pot’ there are three things given, the knower the «I», the knowledge and the object of knowledge. The verb to know is an active verb requiring an agent as well as an object, the whole world believes it so and makes others believe it also. Therefore, to say that there is only knowledge, but no object of knowledge, is merely to court ridicule and derision. Consequently, it is established that an object is separate from knowledge.

Says an objector: «If a jar and the rest are separate from the knowledge of them, how is it that this knowledge arises in cognition». If you say that it shines forth in consciousness, then by the knowledge of the one jar we ought to know every tiling external, for all external things have the common attribute of being different from knowledge, being the other. If one thing which is non-knowledge is known, every non-knowledge must be known. To this we reply, it is not so. All external objects, no doubt, have this thing in common that they are different from the percipient subject. They all come under the category of non-self or object. Certainly, we know everything as non-self by knowing one non-self. That is to say, the general relation of the non-self to the self, is known by knowing one non-self. But there are many non-selves and their special relation to the self are different; one object is yellow, another is red and it cannot be said that the knowledge of the yellow object is the same as that of the red object For yellowness and redness are two different ideas altogether, and there must be two external objects to give rise to two different ideas.

Ideas and things certainly are concomitant, they always go together. But this concomitance, instead of proving that things are unreal and that ideas only are real, proves just the contrary. For the very fact that they go together shows that they are different things and not one. Moreover, the Lord Buddha, while denying the reality of external things admitted the separate existence of the external world. For he says, ‘The form which is perceived internally appears like an external object’. He uses the word Hike’ an external object, which shows that he admitted the reality of the external objects. Otherwise he would not have used this word. For no one makes a comparison with a thing which is absolute unreality. No one says he is like the son of a barren woman, or like the mare’s nest.

Note: The following quotation from Shankara is clearer: «Nobody when perceiving a post or a wall is conscious of his perception only, but all men are conscious of posts and walls and the like as objects of their perception. That such is the consciousness of all men, appears also from the fact that even those who contest the existence of external things bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an internal object of cognition appears something like the external. For they practically accept the general consciousness which testifies to the existence of an external world, and being at the same time anxious to refute it they speak of external things as ‘like something external’. If they did not at the bottom of their hearts acknowledge the existence of the external world, how could they use the expression «like something external». No one says, «Vishnumitra appears like the son of a barren mother. If we accept the truth as it is given to us in our consciousness, we must admit that the object of perception appears to us as something external, not like something external.

Now the author refutes the theory that ox tern al objects need not exist at all, because all different ideas can well be explained as originating from Vasanas without the necessity of believing in the real existence of any external objects. The opinion of the Yogacharas is that all practical thought and intercourse are possible without assuming the existence of things, in addition to the ideas. As in dream a person has intercourse and practical communication with other things and objects, while they are nothing but his own ideas, similarly in the waking state also, without any external things, the manifoldness of ideas may be explained through the Vasana. This view is refuted in the next Sutra.

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