udāsīnānāmapi caivaṃ siddhiḥ ..2.2.27..

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udāsīnānāmapi caivaṃ siddhiḥ ..2.2.27..

.. Udasinanam, of persons who are perfectly indifferent and non-active, .. Api, also, .. Cha, and. .. Evam, thus, .. Siddhih, accomplishment.

27. If things were all momentary, then even persons who are non-active, will accomplish all their objects without any exertion. — 200.

COMMENTARY

If things originate from non-existence, because every tiling is momentary, then persons who never exert will accomplish their objects by their mere laziness, because effects are produced without any real cause. In the theory of universal momentariness, the tiling does not exist in the next moment, and so there can be no effort to attain a thing desired or to ward off a thing not desired, for there would remain no motive for such exertion, because the good things would be obtained without exertion, and evil warded off similarly. A believer in this doctrine would never exert either to attain heaven or release. But the Buddhists, however, are inconsistent in their actions, for believing in the momentariness of all objects, they still exert for Moksha. As a matter of fact, every one believes that in order to attain an end he must employ appropriate means and exert properly. Consequently these two schools merely tend to delude mankind. For they lay down practices for the attainment of heaven and final release for souls which in their theory are momentary, and believing that entity can arise from non-entity, they still exert for the realisation of their objects, and as if they believed that the world originated not from a non-entity, but from the Skandhas which (according to them) are real substances. Their theory being thus self-contradictory deserves no serious consideration.

Note: This refutation of the Vaibhasika and the Sautrantika system proceeds upon a misconception of the true doctrine taught by these schools. They are not so absurd as the Brahmanical commentators have made them out. It is very doubtful whether the Sutras themselves refer to these doctrines, for they do not employ any words which can lead to the existence of these doctrines. Badarayana wrote long before the rise of these modem Buddhistic schools and it is not likely that he would have referred to them. If the Sutras are interpreted as referring to these schools which arose in quite historical times — some five hundred years after Christ, then we are faced with the difficulty of assuming that Badarayana wrote after 500 A. C.

Adhikarana IV — Yogachara theory considered

The Vaibhashikas and the Sautrantikas being thus refuted, now come forward the Yogacharas. They say that the Lord Buddha assumed the existence of external things, and in his system of Vaibhasika and Sautrantika he showed the relation of those things with thought, merely out of deference to those weak-minded disciples of his, who were attached to external things. As a fact, the Lord did not believe in the reality of the external world. His highest doctrine is represented by the Yogachara system, according to which the Vijnana Skandha or cognition alone is real.

According to this system, an object like jar, etc., which is perceived in cognition, is nothing more than cognition. The Vijnana modifies itself into the form of the object. You cannot say that without external objects the worldly business cannot be transacted, for to this we reply that in dream also there are no external objects, and still all activities are performed with the thought objects. Even those who believe in the reality of external objects, have to admit that those objects are cognized in so far as the mind becomes modified in the shape of those objects. If it were not so there would not arise phrases like, ‘I know the jar, I know the cloth’ Thus all worldly activities can well go on with more cognition, and all practical thought and intercourse are rendered possible by cognition alone. What is then the necessity of assuming an external object corresponding to these ideas? Nor can it be objected that thought forms of internal cognitions being very minute and subtle, cannot have the form of the large and big things like a jar or a mountain. But a little consideration will show that we cannot object that how can a small thing like the mind contain big things like these. Mind or idea itself is the power of illumination. It illumines or shines forth, it has a form and because it has a form, it has the possibility of shining forth in the shapes of all these objects. (And the smallness of the mind is no reason against its containing large objects, for a small object like the retina of the eye contains within it all the visible external world). Says the objector, if there were no real external objects what causes the mind to assume the manifold shapes? To this we reply, the mind assumes different shapes owing to the different Vasanas or desire-impressions submerged in it. (Just as these Vasanas or desire-impressions left in the mind create the dream world in sleep, so the external world in the waking consciousness is also the result of the Vasanas). The manifoldness of cognition is thus caused by the manifoldness of the Vasanas, and this we can easily find out by a little thinking. For wherever there is Vasana there is a change of mental form, corresponding to the Vasana, but whenever the series of Vasanas are stopped, the mind also stops. Moreover, you also admit that the cognition and the object of cognition are always co-existent, and that the act of perception is one. we never see an object without the corresponding conception of it, consequently there is no necessity of admitting the existence of an external object corresponding to the internal idea. But as a matter of fact the object of knowledge is identical with cognition, and is not separate from it. We are conscious of only one form, namely, the idea, though this idea appears to us at the same time as an external object The latter, however, is an error. And since we are always conscious of ideas and things together only, it is useless to assume that the thing is something different from the idea. Thus the ideas only exist.

Doubt: Now arises the doubt, is everything merely an idea, and is it possible to have practical thought and intercourse without external objects, just as it is done in dream?

Purvapaksha: Yogacharas say, all practical purposes are well rendered possible by admitting the reality of ideas only, for no good purpose is served by the additional assumption of external objects corresponding to internal ideas.

Siddhanta: The external world really exists as is shown by the author in the next Sutra.

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