The fact of memory- or recollection also proves that things are not momentary. — 198.

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SUTRA II. 2. 25.

अनुस्मृतेश्च॥२.२.२५॥

anusmṛteśca ..2.2.25..

… Anusmriteh, because of the memory, or recognition. .. Cha, and.

COMMENTARY

Anusmritih or remembrance is the idea or Cognition of what was previously perceived. It is also called recollection or recognition. In recollection we recognise the thing that was perceived in the past, and assert about it, «this is the thing that was seen before». This at least proves that the person who recollects cannot be a momentary thing. Therefore, all things are not momentary. You cannot say that this recognition of the thing, is only the recognition of similarity, as when we say «this is the Ganges» or «this is the flame which we saw before». In the case of the Ganges and the flame, no doubt, it is a false assumption to say, it is the same as it was before, for the water in the river is not the same, nor the particles which constitute the flame. In their case, there is no oneness of the object. The perception is merely of similarity. But unless there be one permanent knowing subject, who can perceive the similarity, in the past with the present, he cannot assert «this is the Ganges or this is the flame which was in the past». In other words, the knowing subject must be permanent and not momentary. It may be possible, that sometime doubts may arise as regards an external object, and one may not be able to assert whether it is identically the same object which was perceived in the past or something similar to it. But with regard to the Self, the cognizing subject, there can never arise any such doubt «whether I am the same who was in the past». For it is impossible that the memory of a thing perceived by another should exist in one’s own self. Nor can you say, that there is unity of succession, and that one impression vanishes after giving birth to a similar impression, and this current of impressions gives the notion of unity. For if successions of impressions are identical with the preceding ones, then it practically comes to the same thing as the admission of a permanent chain of similar impressions, and this permanent chain may well be called Atma, and thus it would also refute the Buddhistic theory. But if it is not admitted, then the fact of recollection or remembrance cannot be explained. Moreover, what do you mean by «momentariness»? Do you mean by it that which is related to a moment, or that which originates or is destroyed in a moment? It cannot be the first, for even a permanent object must be related to a moment, for many moments must pass over it. Nor can it be the second, for we do not perceive objects coming into existence in a moment or vanishing in a moment. Thus the theory of momentariness of all things is refuted. These very arguments refute also the theory of Drishti-srishti. For this theory, which posits that creation is constant and going on at every moment and depends upon one’s seeing it, is only the theory of momentariness in another garb. Consequently things are not momentary.

The author next takes up the theory of the Sautrantikas and proves its untenableness. They maintain that objects leave their ideas in our consciousness — ideas of their having certain colour, form, etc., and though they may vanish and exist no more, they exist in our consciousness as ideas, and are inferred as such. Therefore, the ideas are only existing things, and their manifoldness is caused by the manifoldness of external objects. This view is set aside in the next Sutra.

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