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Public diplomacy and ZOPA in the Bosnian conflict: how public announcements affect bargaining range in the negotiationsПоиск на нашем сайте
Smirnov Egor Vladimirovich Saint Petersburg State University School of international relations 4th year undergraduate student Vlasov Nikolay Anatolievich Public diplomacy: the effectiveness of models and strategies This article is aimed at defining how relevant parties to the conflict made attempts via public statements to change the zone of possible agreement in the Bosnian crisis from 1993 to 1994 during the negotiating process (the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY): the first Geneva conference from January to May 1993, the second Geneva conference from July to September 1993, and the third Geneva conference from December 1993 to February 1994) in order to convince other parties or to shape one`s image. I would like to present a general view of the conflict structure. The considered conflict was limited within the former territory of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in spatial terms and from 1992 (as a result of self-declared newly independent Bosnia and Herzegovina international recognition) to 1995 (as a result of the Dayton agreement signing) in temporal terms. Primary actors in general were the pro-Serbian government (Republika Srpska) with its guerillas and the support from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (a secondary warring party), the nationalist Bosnian government with its military forces and the support from international community, and the belligerent Croatian militias with the support from Croatia (a secondary warring party). Secondary supporting parties that encouraged Bosnians and Croatians were the UN Security Council, the European Community, the USA, and Russia. Important third parties were international mediators (David Owen, Cyrus Vance and Thorvald Stoltenberg) and the UN Protection Force. I define main issues that form the object of incompatibility as territory, power, cultural independence, religious independence, free use of national language. The most important aspects of the social environment were the issue of international recognition, European integration, the 1990s as gold era for humanitarian interventions, religious and linguistic tensions between parties to the conflict, state of economic sanctions against pro-Serbian forces, identification of Serbians with the crimes of the Yugoslav regime, the demise of the Soviet Union and socialist system, dominance of the USA in world politics, a weak position of Russia, liberal democracy perceived as a statebuilding concept. The zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) is a method, which is employed in studying a conflict or in negotiations, to visualize or reveal the “zone” of negotiators’ relevant positions concerning the bargaining issue in order to define common grounds for a deal. It implies the disclosure of a relationship between parties` perceptions regarding the negotiated topic. This zone may reflect two opposite conditions, which limit and anticipate the result. The important notions to mention are the “reservation point” and the “target point”. The field between these two points reflects a “bargaining range” (or range of preferences). This study is aimed at defining how parties to the conflict used their opportunity to make public announcements in order to force their opponents to accept one`s position by influencing their opponent`s public opinion or in order to shape its image in the perception of other parties. It can thus show that a party to the conflict intended to shape ZOPA in another way. The study focuses only on public statements (press releases, announcements, declarations, opinions) that were expressed during the negotiation process in a broader sense (with attention to preliminary and conclusive remarks). International mediation itself is usually aimed at reconciliation of the parties to the conflict. It implies that 1) parties express a consent to invite a mediator 2) an impartial mediator analyses parties` positions and interests, objects of incompatibility, provides good services, maintain the negotiations (while defining its procedural matters), 3) and even suggests its proposals to the parties that may be designed for making mutually accepted agreement as for the considered Bosnian case. International mediation in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia was aimed at reducing the repercussions from its spill-over effects on Europe and easing tensions between hostile parties to make a peaceful resolution to the conflicts. As for the Bosnian case the fact that ICFY was progressing prepared the conflict to be ripe for a unilateral military decision. Scrutinizing the example of Bosnia, there were a lot of attempts to resolve the conflict via international mediation and important point here to mention is that these suggestions that were produced with the help of mediators might meet the success and acceptance from primary parties to the conflict. However, international mediators in Bosnia tackled an intractable problem that the ceasefire was not reached and the negotiations were conducted in parallel with military actions. Moreover, international mediators lacked of influence over the American position, especially after the change of power in Washington in 1993. The interests and goals of mediators differed from the American ones after the inauguration of Bill Clinton. In the case for conflicts in former Yugoslavia the application to the position of the USA was compulsory because the USA enjoyed patronage over the Bosnians and in this sense the American position towards the bargaining issue was extremely important, though it was not expressed directly. When first round of negotiations started in January 1993 international mediators David Owen and Cyrus Vance presented parties (primary parties to the conflict) their settlement plan (Vance-Owen plan) that consisted of constitutional principles, maps and ceasefire agreement. The bargaining range included the acceptance of federation form for the united country, relocation of military forces and redistribution of land between autonomous provinces on the basis of the national majority present in region. The resistance points were the central government`s sovereignty of foreign policy and expansion of its territory (Bosnians), actual independence of provinces from centre and maintenance of its territory (Serbs), and establishment of an autonomous province itself (Croatians). During the first round several important public statements were made to shape ZOPA. Cochairs of the mediation process stated that “there is no possibility to establish three territory isolated states” and that a centralized government “will not correspond with their interests after termination of slaughterous civil war that divided the country at the moment”. These statements defined the perception of negotiations possible results and influenced ZOPA. Then the new US administration made critical public announcements concerning the plan, shaped the image of Serbs as aggressors and suggested a military decision of the conflict. The US expressed its support for official Bosnia and affected self-perception of Bosnian population. It altered ZOPA in a manner that Bosnians that demanded territorial concessions and failed to get them via the negotiations found themselves in the situation when a military decision became the best alternative to a negotiated result. That is why the resistance point of Bosnians changed from some Serbian concessions to acceptance of all concessions by Serbs. This study scrutinizes similar examples. 1. A Manual for UN Mediators: Advice from UN Representatives and Envoys. UNITAR. 2010 – 61 p. 2. Points of International Negotiation. Network Perspectives 43. December 2016. – 53 p. 3. Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: peace talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina. 26 March 1993. – 43 p. 4. Butler M. Chapter 6. Mediation. – 117-143 pp. 5. Гуськова Е.Ю. История югославского кризиса (1990-2000) – М.: Русское право/Русский Национальный Фонд. 2001. – 720 с.
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