with the Commentary of Medhatithi 242 страница

↑

⇐ ПредыдущаяСтр 248 из 350Следующая ⇒

Bṛhaspati (22-33). — ‘By punishment of the wicked and release of the virtuous, the renown and religious merit of the King is increased.’

Gautama (12-52). — ‘Or pardon may be granted in accordance with an assemblage of persons learned in the Vedas.’

VERSE 8.313

Section XLIII - Theft (steya)

यः क्षिप्तो मर्षयत्यार्तैस्तेन स्वर्गे महीयते ।
यस्त्वैश्वर्यान्न क्षमते नरकं तेन गच्छति ॥३१३॥

yaḥ kṣipto marṣayatyārtaistena svarge mahīyate |
yastvaiśvaryānna kṣamate narakaṃ tena gacchati ||313||

He who, on being abused by men in distress, forgives, becomes exalted to heaven, by that act; while he who, through kingly pride, does not forgive, goes, by that act, to hell. — (313)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘Men in distress,’ — i.e., the man who is punished, or his relations.

‘Abused’ — reproached.

‘Forgives’ — does not become angry.

‘By that act’ — by the act of forgiving.

‘Becomes exalted to heaven’ — the root ‘maha’ (in ‘mahīyate) belongs to the ‘Kaṇḍvādi’ group, hence the ‘ya’ in the middle of the word. The meaning is that ‘in heaven he gains an exalted position.’

For this reason, without showing any anger, he shall forgive.

If, however, under the influence of pride, thinking himself to be all-powerful, he does not condone the abuse, then, by that act he goes to hell.

The term ‘men in distress’ includes the young and the infirm also; since the present verse is supplementary to the foregoing (where these latter have been mentioned). — (313)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

This verse is quoted in Kṛtyakalpataru (14a).

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verses 8.312-313)

See Comparative notes for Verse 8.313.

VERSE 8.314

Section XLIII - Theft (steya)

राजा स्तेनेन गन्तव्यो मुक्तकेशेन धावता ।
आचक्षाणेन तत् स्तेयमेवङ्कर्माऽस्मि शाधि माम् ॥३१४॥

rājā stenena gantavyo muktakeśena dhāvatā |
ācakṣāṇena tat steyamevaṅkarmā'smi śādhi mām ||314||

The wise thief shall approach the king, with flying hair, confessing the theft, with the words — ‘I have done this, punish me’; — (314)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

In as much as nothing is specified, the ‘thief’ here is to be understood as one who has stolen gold; specially as it is only in the case of such a thief that other Smṛti-texts have laid down the ‘approaching of the king.’ The present text itself cannot be taken as an injunction laying down the act of ‘approaching’; because the subject-matter of the present context consists of the injunction of punishments for theft, as clearly declared above in Verse 301 — ‘I am now going to expound the law relating to punishments for theft.’ Hence the present can only be taken as a re-iteration of the act of ‘approaching’ (enjoined elsewhere); hence it must mean that ‘one who has stolen gold should approach the king’ — ‘with flying hair.’

‘Wise’ — courageous.

Another reading for ‘dhīmatā,’ ‘wise,’ is ‘dhāvatā,’ ‘running.’ ‘confessing’ — proclaiming his crime on the road — ‘i have done this’ — act of stealing brāhmaṇa’s gold — inflict upon me the proper punishment.’ — (314)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

(verses 8.314-315)

Cf 11.199-201.

These verses are quoted in Aparārka (p. 1078): — and in Mitākṣarā (2.267, where only 315 is quoted).

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verses 8.314-315)

[ See Manu 11.100-101.]

Gautama (12.48). — ‘A man who has stolen gold shall approach the King, with flying hair, holding a club in his hand, and proclaim his deed.’

Baudhāyana (2.1.16-17). — ‘A thief shall go to the King with flying hair, carrying on his shoulder a club of sindhuka wood, and say ‘strike me with this.’ Then the King shall strike him. They quote the following verse: — “A thief shall go to the King carrying a club on his shoulder and say to him, Punish me with this, O King.”’

Āpastamba (1.25.4). — ‘A thief shall go to the King with flying hair, carrying a club on his shoulder and tell him what he has done. The King shall give him a blow with that club. If the thief dies, his sin is expiated.’

Vaśiṣṭha (20.41). — ‘If a man has stolon gold belonging to a Brāhmaṇa he shall run with flying hair to the King, exclaiming “Ho! I am a thief, Sir, punish me.” The King shall give him a weapon made of udumbara wood, with that he shall kill himself. It is declared in the Veda that he becomes purified by this death.’

Viṣṇu (52.1). — ‘He who has stolen gold must bring a club to the King, proclaiming his deed.’

Yājñavalkya (3.257). — ‘The man who has stolen gold belonging to a Brāhmaṇa shall present to the King a club, proclaiming his deed; he becomes purified if the King kills him with it, or pardons him.’

Nārada (Theft, 27). — ‘For stealing more than a hundred palas of gold, silver, or other precious metals, or line clothes, or very precious gems, corporal punishment or death shall be inflicted.’

Nārada (Theft, 46). — ‘The thief must approach the King with flying hair running and proclaiming his deed, saying “thus have I acted, chastise me.” By so doing, he is cleared from guilt, because he has confessed his deed. The King therefore shall touch him with the club or dismiss him.’

Bṛhaspati (22.27-28). — ‘For the stealing of women, men, gold, gems, the property of a deity or Brāhmaṇa, silk and other valuable things, the fine shall he equal to the value of the article stolen; or double the amount shall be inflicted by the King as fine; or the thief shall be executed, to prevent a repetition of the offence.’

Saṃvarta (Aparārka, p. 1079). — ‘Then the King himself shall strike the thief with a club; if the thief is alive after this, he becomes freed from the sin of stealing.’

VERSE 8.315

Section XLIII - Theft (steya)

स्कन्धेनादाय मुसलं लगुडं वाऽपि खादिरम् ।
शक्तिं चोभयतस्तीक्ष्णामायसं दण्डमेव वा ॥३१५॥

skandhenādāya musalaṃ laguḍaṃ vā'pi khādiram |
śaktiṃ cobhayatastīkṣṇāmāyasaṃ daṇḍameva vā ||315||

 — Carrying on his shoulder a pestle, or a Club of khadira wood, or a spear sharp at both ends, or an iron staff. — (315)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

Some people hold that the weapons to be carried have been mentioned in the particular order in view of the caste of the thief.

But this is not right; as in that case there would be no justification for the term ‘or’; and further, people do not recognise this as the expiation meant for the Brāhmaṇa thief, as we shall explain in the section on ‘Expiation.’

It is only the club, and not the pestle, that is to be taken as qualified by the epithet ‘of khadira wood’ — (315)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

(verses 8.314-315)

See Comparative notes for Verse 8.314.

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verses 8.314-315)

See Comparative notes for Verse 8.314.

VERSE 8.316

Section XLIII - Theft (steya)

शासनाद् वा विमोक्षाद् वा स्तेनः स्तेयाद् विमुच्यते ।
अशासित्वा तु तं राजा स्तेनस्याप्नोति किल्बिषम् ॥३१६॥

śāsanād vā vimokṣād vā stenaḥ steyād vimucyate |
aśāsitvā tu taṃ rājā stenasyāpnoti kilbiṣam ||316||

The thief becomes absolved from the theft, either through punishment or through acquittal. By not punishing the thief, the king imbibes the guilt of the thief. — (310)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘Through punishment’ — with the stroke of the pestle and other things, the thief of the Kṣatriya and lower castes ‘becomes absolved’ from the guilt; — or ‘through acquittal’ — i.e., by being let off, being addressed with the words — ‘Go, you have been forgiven.’

In regard to the Brāhmaṇa thief, under 11.100 below, ‘immolation’ and ‘austerities’ have been prescribed. But as a matter of fact, there can be no ‘immolation’ of the Brāhmaṇa; and ‘austerity’ being an expiatory rite, the ‘approaching’ of the king could not be with a view to any such austerity. Hence the ‘acquittal’ here spoken of must also refer to the Kṣatriya and other castes.

But there can be this ‘acquittal’ only after the fine has been realised; because of what is said in the second half of the verse. And when the man has become absolved through this acquittal, his non-punishment cannot render the king open to censure.

It might be argued that — “Punishment and acquittal both being sanctioned by law, the blame spoken of lies on the king in that, ease with reference to which punishment has been enjoined.”

But this would make the injunction optional; and it is not right to assume as optional what has been declared to be absolute. In fact Vaśiṣṭha and others have laid down the law in general terms: — ‘The thief contaminates with his guilt the king who acquits him; but if the king kills the guilty thief, since he kills him legally, no blame attaches to him’; — and it cannot be right to regard this as optional.

It is true that the injuring of a living being is in one place forbidden: the assertion ‘one should not injure any living being,’ forbidding such injury as might he inflicted under the influence of some passion. In another place it is sanctioned, as for instance, in connection with the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice.

But in the case in question the act of ‘punishing’ cannot, in the face of the direct injunction of it, be held to be forbidden by the declaration regarding ‘acquittal.’

How can it be regarded as not forbidden? The general prohibition ‘injure not a living being’ cannot be set aside, except when there is a direct injunction of such injury (in any particular case).

It might be argued that — “The case in question does not fall within the scope of the prohibition; since it is conducive to the fulfilment of a particular act that has to be done.”

But, in the absence of a distinct injunction, how can it be believed that a certain injuring is conducive to the fulfilment of an act?

It may be held that this would he learnt from worldly experience.

But in that case, the act being an ordinary worldly one, — how could any prohibition affect it?

Let us consider the nature of the main act in question. If it is Vedic, then the injuring of animals which forms part of that act must also derive its sanction from the Veda. Because the principal and its subsidiary both must derive their sanction from the same source. If, even in the case of a Vedic act, a mere desire for gain forms the motive, then, in that case, the injuring of the animal becomes a worldly act. So that, in the case of the injuring of human beings by the king inflicting punishments, the act forms part of that action of ‘protecting the people’ which is undertaken, by way of livelihood; and as such it cannot form the subject of any Vedic Injunction. In fact, even if the injuring formed part of a prescribed act, it could not form the object of prohibition; as it would stand on the same, footing as the Śyena sacrifice. The act of injuring again does not form a necessary factor even in the worldly act (of protecting); for it is not impossible to carry on the work of protection without inflicting injury; — the same purpose being served by reprimanding and other similar means also.

It is not necessary that the motive behind the principal act and its subsidiaries should he of the same kind. If it were, then there would be no difference in the nature of the immolations of the two animals offered to Agni-Soma (?). So that even when the principal act is prompted by a desire for gain, it may be possible to regard its subsidiary as prompted by an Injunction.

The act of ‘injuring’ under consideration however cannot be regarded as prompted by an Injunction; as by its very nature, the act of ‘protecting,’ as also that of ‘injuring,’ is ‘worldly.’ If they were prompted by an Injunction, then there would be an option between its prohibition (by the general prohibition of all injury) and its injunction as part of the act of ‘protecting,’ — just as there is in the case of the holding and not-holding of the Śoḍaśī vessels.

Others hold that the verse consists of two distinct sentences; — the first half of the verse describing the way in which the thief becomes absolved from guilt, and the latter indicating the impropriety involved in the king’s failure to punish the thief, So that in a case where the king lets off the thief, thus voluntarily incurring the sin of not punishing him, — the thief does become absolved from his guilt.

Similarly when a Brāhmaṇa-thief surrenders himself, if he is killed, he does become absolved from guilt; since we have the text — ‘Becoming the target of armed men, etc.’ (11.73). And even though in striking the Brāhmaṇa the king may be going against the prohibition — ‘For the Brāhmaṇa there shall be no corporeal punishment’ (Gautama, 12.46), — yet there can be no doubt that the Brāhmaṇa, thus punished, becomes absolved from his guilt.

‘By not punishing’ — not striking him with the pestle or other things — he becomes contaminated with the guilt of the thief. — (316)

Comparative notes by various authors:

Saṃvarta (Aparārka, p. 1079). — (See above.)

Bodhāyana (2.1-17). — ‘Whether he be punished or be pardoned, the thief becomes freed from his guilt. But if the King does not punish him, the guilt of the thief falls upon him.’

Vaśiṣṭha (20.41). — ‘It is declared in the Veda that the thief becomes purified by death caused with the club offered to him by the King.’

Gautama (12.44-45). — ‘Whether he be slain or pardoned, he becomes purified of his guilt. If the King does not strike him, the guilt falls on the King.’

Āpastamba (1.25.4-5). — ‘... If the thief dies, his sin is expiated. If he is forgiven by the King, the guilt falls upon him who forgives him.’

Viṣṇu (52.2). — ‘Whether the King kills the thief with the club, or dismisses him unhurt, he becomes purified.’

Yājñavalkya (3.257). — (See under 314-315.)

Nārada (Theft). — ‘By going to the King and confessing his guilt, the thief becomes purified. The King shall touch him with a club, or dismiss him; in either case he becomes purified. Those men who have received a punishment from the King for an offence committed by them, proceed to heaven, free from sin, as if they were virtuous men who have acted well. Whether he be punished or released, the thief is freed from his crime; if, however, the King does not punish him. the guilt of the thief falls on the King himself.’

VERSE 8.317

Section XLIII - Theft (steya)

अन्नादे भ्रूणहा मार्ष्टि पत्यौ भार्याऽपचारिणी ।
गुरौ शिष्यश्च याज्यश्च स्तेनो राजनि किल्बिषम् ॥३१७॥

annāde bhrūṇahā mārṣṭi patyau bhāryā'pacāriṇī |
gurau śiṣyaśca yājyaśca steno rājani kilbiṣam ||317||

The Embryo-killer expurgates his guilt on him who eats his food, the misbehaving wife on her husband, the disciple and the sacrificer on the preceptor, and the thief on the king. — (317)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘Annāda’ — one who eats food.

‘Bhrūṇahā’ — he who has killed a Brāhmaṇa.

This latter ‘expurgates’ throws upon ‘the man who eats his food’ — ‘the guilt,’ of killing the Brāhmaṇa; just as when the dirty cloth is washed in water, its dirt becomes thrown into the water.

This is a purely valedictory declaration. The meaning is that the guilt becomes separated from the Brāhmaṇa-killer, and attaches itself to the other man.

On the ‘pati’ — the husband — ‘the mishaving’ — adulterous — ‘wife’ — if he condones the act. Here also the guilt disappears from the wife and attaches itself to the husband.

‘On the preceptor, the disciple and the sacrificer’; — if the disciple transgresses the laws relating to sun-rise, etc., and the preceptor condones it, the guilt becomes thrown upon the latter. Similarly the ‘sacrificer’ on the officiating priest; since the latter is a ‘preceptor’; that is why the ‘officiating priest’ has not been mentioned separately.

Similarly ‘the thief on the King,’ — if he is not punished by the King.

If the sacrificer, in course of the sacrificial performances, transgresses the rules, and does not adhere to the advice of the officiating priest, — then he should be abandoned by the latter; and he is not to be chastised and beaten, in the manner of a disciple.

In regard to the ‘man who eats his food’ and the rest, the present text should not he taken as laying down an injunction; the whole of it is purely declamatory. — (317)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

Mss. N and S place 317 and its Bhāṣya after 318 but both add a note to the effect — ‘ayam shloko rājabhirityasmāt pūrvam lekhanīyaḥ’, ‘this verse should be written after the verse rājabhiḥ &c.’ This is apparently a corrector’s note on the mistake committed by a copyist.

This verse is quoted in Vīramitrodaya (Āhnika, p. 509), which adds the following note: — ‘Kilviṣam’ is to be construed with each of the four — ‘annāda’, ‘pati’, ‘guru’ and ‘rājā’ — and ‘mārṣṭi’ means ‘passes on.’

It is quoted in Prāyaścittaviveka (p. 146), which explains ‘mārṣṭi’ as ‘transfer’; — and in Hemādri (Śrāddha, p. 781).

Comparative notes by various authors:

Vaśiṣṭha (19.44). — ‘They quote the following verse: — “The slayer of a learned Brāhmaṇa casts his guilt on him who eats his food; a misbehaving wife on her husband; a student and a sacrificer on the teacher and the officiating priest; and a thief on the King.” The guilt falls on the King who pardons an offender, if he causes him to he slain, he destroys sin in accordance with the sacred law.’

Āpastamba (1.19.15). — ‘They quote the following: — “The murderer of a Brāhmaṇa learned in the Veda heaps his guilt on his guest; an innocent man on his calumniator; a thief set at liberty, on the King; and the petitioner, on him who makes false promises.”

VERSE 8.318

Section XLIII - Theft (steya)

राजभिः कृतदण्डास्तु कृत्वा पापानि मानवाः ।
निर्मलाः स्वर्गमायान्ति सन्तः सुकृतिनो यथा ॥३१८॥

rājabhiḥ kṛtadaṇḍāstu kṛtvā pāpāni mānavāḥ |
nirmalāḥ svargamāyānti santaḥ sukṛtino yathā ||318||

Men who, having committed crimes, have been punished by Kings, become freed from guilt and go to heaven, just like well-behaved good men. — (318)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

It has been said above that by suppressing criminals the King protects the well-behaved. This same idea is further clearly stated.

Those on whom punishments have been inflicted by the King, — such men ‘having committed crimes, become freed from guilt,’ by the punishment meted out by the King; i.e., their sin becomes set aside.

Their sins set aside, they go to heaven, by virtue of those acts of theirs which entitle them to enter heaven. A serious crime stands in the way of the fruition of meritorions acts.

Like the men who are ‘well-behaved’ — those who constantly perform meritorious acts; and are hence ‘good’ — righteous.

The difference between the two is that in the case of the good men, there has been no guilt at all, while in the case of criminals, it has come about, but has been destroyed by the punishment; so that in the former case there is prior negation, while in the latter there is negation by destruction.

The use of the term ‘men’ in the text indicates that what is stated here does not refer to thieves only.

The term ‘punishment’ however continues to stand for corporeal punishment., and hence does not go beyond the sense in which it has been used in the present context.

Punishment in the form of fine’s comes useful to the king, — that being his means of livelihood; but in the ease of corporeal punishment it cannot be denied that if it is useful to any one; it must be so to the person punished; because the hurt inflicted therein affects the man’s skin.

In this connection, people may have the following idea: — “Protection of the people is not possible without hurting (criminals), and protection serves the purposes of the king; how then can the corporeal punishment be held to serve the purpose of the person punished?”

Is this argument meant to deny the palpable fact that protection is useful for the protected people? Certainly it cannot be said that the king employs all his officers only for the purposes of his own protection. If again, the corporeal punishment served the useful purpose of ‘protection’ only, it could not he regarded as useful for the person punished. Further, why should ‘protection’ of the people be not possible without the ‘hurt’ (involved in the punishment)? If the hurt is inflicted with the idea that if the man were not punished, he would repeat the act, — this purpose could be served even by reprimanding and such other means. If the idea he that on seeing him punished others would desist from similar acts, — the suffering meant to be caused could be brought about even by lines. Then again, even though criminals are punished, thousands of men are found to do the same act again and again.

From all this it follows that the corporeal punishment, while ‘ending to ‘protection’ (of the people), has to be regarded as serving the purpose of purifying the person punished. It is for this reason that there are rules laid down regarding the cutting off of limbs and other forms of corporeal punishment. All this produces an invisible effeet in the persons punished, and at the same time serves the purposes of the king (in the form of protection).

Thus it is established that the criminals become absolved from guilt only when there is corporeal punishment, and not when they are only fined.

It is for this same reason that in connection with the most heinous offenders, whoso entire property has been confiscated, and who have, by way of punishment, been made to stand in water, — branding has been prescribed, with a view to guard against people associating with them. If they became purified by the fine, any such branding would be futile.

In the present context, the special rules that have been laid down in regard to the criminal who has surrendered himself, and has not been arrested and brought up for trial, may refer to thieves only; but what is said in the present verse is meant to apply to all corporeal punishments. — (318)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

This verse is quoted in Mitākṣarā (3.259), which notes that this refers to the death-penalty; — and in Prāyaścittaviveka (p. 120), to the effect that punishment serves to absolve one from the sin of the crime.

Comparative notes by various authors:

Vaśiṣṭha (19.45). — ‘Men who have committed offences and have received from Kings the punishment due to them, go purified to heaven and are as holy as the virtuous.’

VERSE 8.319

Section XLIII - Theft (steya)

यस्तु रज्जुं घटं कूपाद्द् हरेद् भिन्द्याच्च यः प्रपाम् ।
स दण्डं प्राप्नुयान् माषं तच्च तस्मिन् समाहरेत् ॥३१९॥

yastu rajjuṃ ghaṭaṃ kūpādd hared bhindyācca yaḥ prapām |
sa daṇḍaṃ prāpnuyān māṣaṃ tacca tasmin samāharet ||319||

When one steals the rope or the water-pot from the well, or damages a water-drinking establishment, he should be punished with a fine of one ‘māṣa,’ and should restore the article to the place. — (319)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

A place where people drink water is called ‘prapā,’ ‘water-drinking establishment,’ the place where water is stored after having been drawn from a reservoir.

The exact nature of the substance is not stated — of what substance the fine of a ‘māṣa’ shall consist. It should he regarded as being copper or silver.

The article — rope and the rest — ho shall restore ‘to the place’ and not to the king. — (319)

Познавательные статьи:



Как правильно слушать собеседника

Типичные ошибки при выполнении бросков в баскетболе

Принятие христианства на Руси и его значение

Средства массовой информации США