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tapo vācaṃ ratiṃ caiva kāmaṃ ca krodhameva ca |
sṛṣṭiṃ sasarja caivaimāṃ sraṣṭumicchannimāḥ prajāḥ ||25||

Being desirous of bringing into existence these creatures, he created this entire creation (comprising) austerity, speech, happiness, desire and anger. — (25)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘Happiness’ — Satisfaction of the mind ‘Desire’ — Longing or Love; the rest are well known.

‘He created this creation’ comprising the things mentioned and others of the same kind. — The term ‘this’ refers to the creation of things mentioned in this verse as also that described in the foregoing verses.

‘Being desirous of bringing into existence these creatures’ — such, for instance, as the Devas and Asuras, the Yakṣa, the Rākṣasa, and Gandharva and other beings, the vehicle of these beings, in the form of the body equipped with the soul and characteristics, and also Dharma; these he created first of all.

“What sort of verbal expression is this — ‘he created the creation’?” It means exactly what is meant by the expression ‘he wrought or did the creation’; as a matter of fact, all verbal roots express some particular form of action, denoted by the root ‘Kṛ’; e.g., ‘cooks’ is synonymous with ‘does the cooking; ‘sacrifices’ is the same as ‘does the sacrificing’; in the expression under question the peculiar form of the action (of creation) having been already expressed by the verbal noun (‘creation’), the root contained in the verb (‘created’) comes to denote only the action. To guard against such an expression living open to the charge of being a needless repetition, involved in the action being spoken of by means of the root in the verb, after it has been already expressed by the verbal noun, — we may take the mention of the verb to be for the purpose of expressing the tense and the voice (which could not be expressed by the verbal noun). — Or, the term ‘creation’ may be taken as standing for the particular created things known by the ordinary means of knowledge and forming the object of the general act of creating expressed by the verb ‘created’; such usage being analogous to the expression ‘svapoṣam puṣṭaḥ,’ ‘reared the rearing by oneself’ (where the rearing qualified by ‘self’ forms the object of the verb ‘reared’, which denotes rearing in general). — (25)

VERSE 1.26 [Differentiation of Virtue and Vice]

Section XIV - Differentiation of Virtue and Vice

कर्मणां च विवेकार्थं धर्माधर्मौ व्यवेचयत् ।
द्वन्द्वैरयोजयच्चैमाः सुखदुःखादिभिः प्रजाः ॥२६॥

karmaṇāṃ ca vivekārthaṃ dharmādharmau vyavecayat |
dvandvairayojayaccaimāḥ sukhaduḥkhādibhiḥ prajāḥ ||26||

For the due discrimination of actions, he differentiated Virtue and Vice; and he connected these creatures with such pairs of opposites as Pleasure-Pain and the like. — (26)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘He differentiated Virtue and Vice’ — He fixed their character by due distinction, i.e., as distinct from each other; in such form — ‘this is Virtue, that is Vice.’

Objection: — “In reality however, there is no such hard and fast distinction; there are several actions that partake of the nature of both and are both virtuous and vicious (sinful); for instance, they say that the actions (of sacrifice) laid down in the Veda are of mixed character, being accomplished, as they are, by means of animal-slaughter; the sacrifice for instance, is by itself a virtuous or meritorious act, but by reason of animal-slaughter forming one of its factors, it is vicious or sinful.”

It is in view of this objection that the text has added the phrase — ‘For the due discrimination of actions’; — the term ‘action’ here stands for the actual process, the performance of actions; as a matter of fact, the same act, if performed in a different manner, acquires an entirely different character; i.e., an act which is virtuous (when done in one way) becomes vicious (when done in another way), and vice versâ; e.g. the act of animal-slaughter itself; animal-slaughter, when done apart from a sacrificial performance, is vicious, sinful, — forming as it does the subject of such Vedic prohibitions as ‘One should not kill any animals’; but when done within the sacrificial altar, during the Agnīṣomīya offering, it in virtous, meritorious — being an act that forms the subject of injunctions. Similarly, Austerity (in itself) is virtuous; but when it is performed through hypocrisy, or by a person unfit for performing it, it is vicious. Similarly again, for women, intercourse with the husband’s younger brother is sinful; but when under orders from her elders, a woman desiring children has intercourse with her brother-in-law, who is besmeared with clarified butter &c. (as laid down in the scriptures), it is virtuous. Thus then, even though the action be one and the same, there is a distinction based upon the way in which it is actually performed. The sameness of the action however is only apparent; in view of other sources of knowledge the acts (done in different ways) are different.

Further, the term ‘action’ may be taken as standing for the effects of the actions, — the cause being figuratively spoken of as the effect. Thus the meaning comes to be as follows: — ‘He differentiated actions for the due discrimination of the effects of actions.’

In view of the question as to what is the ‘discrimination of the effects of actions,’ it is added — ‘he connected them with pairs of opposites, in the shape of Plensure-Pain and the like’; — ‘Pleasure’ being the effect of ‘Virtue’ and ‘Pain’ of ‘Vice.’ It is thus that people performing both kind of actions become associated with these pairs of opposites; by performing virtuous acts they become associated with pleasure, and by performing vicious acts they become connected with pain.

The term ‘dvanḍva’, ‘Pair of opposites,’ is, by usage, applied to such mutually contradictory sources of pain as ‘Heat-Cold,’ ‘Rain-Hot weather,’ ‘Hunger-Satiation,’ and so forth.

The phrase ‘and the like’ refers to the general and special forms of the said sources of pain. For instance, the terms ‘Pleasure-Pain,’ in their general form are denotative either of ‘Heaven-Hell,’ or of ‘excessive joy and sorrow’; while in their special form, they stand for the ‘obtaining of heaven, of landed property, of sons, of cattle and so forth (‘Pleasure’) and the ‘being deprived of these’; all these being implied by the terms ‘Ādi,’ ‘and the like.’

The creation of Actions having been described before (in Verse 18 et seq.), what is described in the present verse is that Prajāpati brought about the distinction in their actual performance, as also the discrimination of their effects; thus there is a difference between what was said before and what is said now. — (26)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

The term ‘dharma’, as Burnell rightly remarks, stands for a man’s whole duty, including both secular and religious duty.’

The other ‘Dvandvas’ are Kāma (Desire) — Krodha (Anger) — Rāga (Attachment) — Dveṣa (Hatred) — ‘Kṣut (Hunger) — Pipāsā (Thirst) — Harṣa (joy) — Viṣāda (Sorrow)’ and so forth.

VERSE 1.27 [Creation of Gross and Subtile things]

Section XV - Creation of Gross and Subtile things

अण्व्यो मात्रा विनाशिन्यो दशार्धानां तु याः स्मृताः ।
ताभिः सार्धमिदं सर्वं सम्भवत्यनुपूर्वशः ॥२७॥

aṇvyo mātrā vināśinyo daśārdhānāṃ tu yāḥ smṛtāḥ |
tābhiḥ sārdhamidaṃ sarvaṃ sambhavatyanupūrvaśaḥ ||26||

The evanescent subtile constituents of the half-ten (Elemental Substances) that have been described, — along with those, this whole (world) comes forth, in due order. — (27)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

This verse sums up what has gone before.

‘Of the half-ten’ — i.e., of the five elemental substances; — ‘the subtile,’ — minute, — ‘constituents,’ — parts; i.e., the ‘Rudimentary substances’; these are ‘evanescent’; — they are called ‘evanescent’ (liable to destruction) in the sense that, being liable to undergo modifications, they take up grosser forms. — ‘along with those,' ‘this whole’ — world, — ‘comes forth,’ — is produced; — ‘in due order,’ — in proper sequence; i.e., from the subtile the gross, and from the gross the grosser; or in the order in which they have been described (in the foregoing verses). — (27)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

‘Vināśinyaḥ’ — because liable to change into gross substances (Medhātithi, Govinda and Kullūka); or because they are products (Rāghavā.)

The commentators are at some pains to explain the incongruity of the inter-position of the present verse in the middle of what purports to be a connected account of the process of creation. Medhātithi says the verse serves the purpose of summing up what has been said so far; — Govindarāja and Kullūka make it serve the purpose of setting aside the notion that the creation was accomplished by Brahman without the help of the ‘principles’; — and Nārāyaṇa holds that it is meant to lay stress upon the non-eternality of atoms; — Nandana has solved the difficulty by placing this verse after verse 19.

VERSE 1.28-29 [Creation dependent upon ‘Karma’]

Section XVI - Creation dependent upon ‘Karma’

यं तु कर्मणि यस्मिन् स न्ययुङ्क्त प्रथमं प्रभुः ।
स तदेव स्वयं भेजे सृज्यमानः पुनः पुनः ॥२८॥

yaṃ tu karmaṇi yasmin sa nyayuṅkta prathamaṃ prabhuḥ |
sa tadeva svayaṃ bheje sṛjyamānaḥ punaḥ punaḥ ||28||

Each being, when created again and again, naturally conformed to that same act to which the lord had, at first, directed him. — (28)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

The meaning of this verse is as follows: — Even though Prajāpati, being the supreme director of the creation of things, can create living creatures just as he chooses, yet, as a matter of fact, he creates them, not without reference to the actions done by them during the preceding cycles; he makes the creature born in that family of creatures which is indicated by the act done by it during the previous cycle, — and never in any other family; if the creature has, in the past, done a good act, it is led to be born in a family in which it would be enabled to experience the good results of that act, — in such families for instance, as ‘God,’ ‘Man’ and so forth; if, on the other hand, the acts of the creature have been bad, it is born in such families as ‘animals,’ ‘evil spirits’ and the like. What happens is that at the beginning of each new creation, the acts done by creatures in the previous cycle come out, after having, during Dissolution, lain latent within their source; just in the same manner as the Elements, the Organs and the Constituent Attributes come out at the beginning of each creation, after having lain latent within their source, in the Boot Evolvent. And the reason for this lies in the fact that the law relating to the ‘residue of the past’ (affecting the future) applies with equal force to the case in question also.

Question: — “If the coming into existence (of a creature) is dependent upon its own past acts, where then does the almighty power of Prajāpati come in? Of what sort too would be the almighty power which is dependent upon extraneous influences?”

Answer: — It is only when the said almighty power is there and (active) that the world comes into existence; how then can the said power he said to have no effect at all? In fact, neither continuance, nor production, nor dissolution (of the world) is possible except when that power is present, — the power of God being ever present, at all times. In reality, what lead to a creature being born are (1) acts done by itself, (2) the will of Prajāpati and (3) the evolution of the Root Evolvent. It is by all this set of causes that this world is produced, exists and becomes dissolved. The mere fact of Prajāpati being influenced by the things does not deprive him of his almighty power. The case stands upon the same footing as a king bestowing upon his servants and dependents the rewards for acts done by them; exactly in the same manner Prajāpati assigns to each creature what is in accordance with its previous acts; and yet neither the King nor Prajāpati cease to be ‘all-powerful.’

Objection: —

“The meaning assigned to the verse does not appear to be its right meaning at all. What appears to be its right meaning is that the Creator is entirely independent in assigning their work to the creatures. The verse thus means as follows: — ‘Every creature conformed to, — i.e., carried on — that same action — in the form either of doing harm to others, or its contrary, — to which the Lord had directed it at — at the beginning of creation’; that is, man does not have recourse to actions, cither entirely on the advice of his father and other elders, or by his own will; in fact, whatever good or bad action he performs, he does wholly in accordance with Prajāpati’s directions, entirely uninfluenced by the advice of any other person.

‘When created again’ — i.e., when born again, whether in another cycle, or in this same cycle, — it is Prajāpati alone who directs all animate beings to be the doers of actions; hence even past good and bad acts arc done by them only in obedience to the directions of Prajāpati; this has been thus declared: — ‘They become agents without being masters of their own actions; to the good or the bad act they are led on by God’; and again ‘this ignorant creature has no control over his pleasure and pain; it is only as led on by God that he goes to heaven or to hell.’”

To the above we make the following reply: — If the suggested explanation were accepted, (1) it would mean the abandoning of the idea of an inseparable connection between Actions and their results, — (2) it would also mean that all human effort is useless (everything being determined entirely by the independent will of God), — (3) and it would mean that the injunctions of the Agnihotra and such acts, as well as the worshipping of Brahman, are entirely futile; in fact it would come to this that actions for visible or invisible results would be undertaken by only such men as are ignorant of the nature of God; while those who are of opinion that the doing of actions and the enjoying of their results are dependent on the will of God would never engage in any form of activity; they would keep away from activity under the impression that ‘even though an action may be done, its result may not follow (if God so wished it), and even though we may not do the act, we may enjoy its results (if God so willed it).’ Especially because the desire for being the doer of a certain act does not arise in the man forcibly through the prompting of God, as illness arises from unwholesome food; on the other hand, if the said desire is held to be determined by the connection between the action and its result, — the idea being that ‘this result follows from this action’ — then it would not be true that ‘the Lord directed the man to the act’ (as the text says).

The direction by God, spoken of in the text can be admitted only on the authority of the scriptures; and in the statement — ‘that action to which the Lord directed him at first,’ — the phrase ‘at first’ is used in reference to the present, since the world is beginningless (so that ‘at first’ could not mean at the beginning of creation)’, and as regards the ‘direction’ or ‘supervision’ by the Lord, this extends over all tilings (not only to Actions), he being the efficient cause of Time and Space (within which all things have their being). [In this way the idea of God’s supervision is not incompatible with the theory that results accrue to men from their own acts.]

Other people offer the following explanation of the verse: — When a personality happens to be born in a different animal-species (from that in which it was born in its former life), it does not require the effects of its former conditions; nor is there the resultant continuity of its former nature; when, for instance, a certain personality happens to be born in the foline species, which species God originally prompted to such acts as the killing of others and the like, — it renounces the quality of mercy which it may have practised during its human existence, and acquires the quality of that species in which it is born, even though this latter quality may not have been taught by any one. What is meant is that the actions due to the nature of the personality being ordained by God are extremely potent, and make the personality forget its former habits.

The idea contained in this verse is further expanded in the following verse. — (28)

हिंस्राहिंस्रे मृदुक्रूरे धर्माधर्मावृतानृते ।
यद् यस्य सो'दधात् सर्गे तत् तस्य स्वयमाविशत् ॥२९॥

hiṃsrāhiṃsre mṛdukrūre dharmādharmāvṛtānṛte |
yad yasya so'dadhāt sarge tat tasya svayamāviśat ||29||

Hurtfulness or harmlessness, tenderness or hard-heartedness, virtue or vice, truthfulness or truth-lessness, — each of these accrued to that being in which he implanted it at creation. — (29)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘Hurtful’ is that which deprives living beings of life, such for instance, as the Serpent, the Lion and the Elephant; — the opposite of this is the ‘Harmless’; for instance, the several species of the Deer, the Ruru, the Pṛṣat and the like; — ‘Tender’ is that which is kind, which causes no suffering to any one; — ‘Hard-hearted’ is that which causes pain to others; — the rest are well known.

Out of the said pairs of the line of actions, that which ‘he,’ Prajāpati, in accordance with its previous conduct, ‘implanted,’ assigned, ordained, — in a being, — ‘at creation’ — at the beginning of creation, — that line of action the created living being acquires by itself.

No significance is meant to be attached to the past tense in ‘accrued’: for even now-a-days we find the qualities inherent in a certain class of beings coming to the individual without teaching, spontaneously. — (29)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

(verse xviii)

Medhātithi notes two explanations of this verse.

The natural meaning appeal’s to be that ‘each being continues, in each succeeding Birth, to betake itself to the same function that was assigned to it in the beginning by Prajāpati.’

But this being incompatible with the law of Karma, which has been regarded as adumbrated by Manu in I. 41, — Medhātithi has tried his best to get out of the words the meaning that the conditions and activities of each being are ordained in accordance with his past deeds; — but the only argument that he puts forward in support of assigning this meaning is that the literal meaning of the words would give rise to a number of undesirable contingencies. According to Medhātithi, creation is due to the joint action of the three causes — (1) the being’s past acts (2) God’s will and (3) Evolution of Prakṛti.

The confusion of thought in regard to the exact meaning of this and the following two verses is further shown by the fact that Medhātithi (p. 22, l, 27 under verse 30) has thought it necessary to set forth ‘another explanation’ of these texts.

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verse xviii-xix)

Mahābhārata, 12.232.16. — ‘Of the created things, whatever functions became assigned to whichever thing at the beginning of creation, that thing take to those same functions, whenever they are created again and again.’ ‘Harmfulness or harmlessness, gentleness or ferociousness, righteousness or unrighteousness, truthfulness or untruthfulness, with one or the other of these they are obsessed, and hence are they fond of just those.’

VERSE 1.30

Section XVI - Creation dependent upon ‘Karma’

यथर्तुलिङ्गान्यर्तवः स्वयमेवर्तुपर्यये ।
स्वानि स्वान्यभिपद्यन्ते तथा कर्माणि देहिनः ॥३०॥

yathartuliṅgānyartavaḥ svayamevartuparyaye |
svāni svānyabhipadyante tathā karmāṇi dehinaḥ ||30||

Just as on the approach of the turn of the Seasons, each season, by itself, acquires its own seasonal characteristics, — so in the same manner living beings take up their respective lines of action. — (30)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

In support of what has been said in the foregoing verses, an illustration is cited. Just as even inanimate things have their character fixed by the law of God, — so animate beings also do not go beyond the law laid down by Prajāpati, in accordance with the past acts of men; they have recourse to that same line of action which has been assigned to the family of beings in which they are born; any other line of action they cannot take up, even though they may wish to do so.

‘The seasons’ — Spring and the rest; — ‘its own seasonal characteristics’ — in the form of leaves, flowers, cold, heat, rain and so forth. — ‘at the approach of the turn’ — when the turn, the occasion for functioning, of a particular season arrives, — that season acquires its character, by itself; and it does not stand is need of any act of man. For instance, at the advent of spring, mango-blossoms bloom forth by themselves, and they, do not stand in need of watering at the roots. In the same manner the ‘lines of action’ of men — which exist in their ‘unseen’ or latent form — [operate by themselves]. As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as is not affected by the ‘acts’ (of men); for instance, it is in the nature of the Rainy Season that there should be rain, and yet on account of the faulty action, either of the king or kingdom itself, there is sometimes drought. From all this it follows that the force of ‘action’ is irrepressible.

The frequent repetition of the term ‘ṛtu’ season,’ is due to the exigencies of metre.

VERSE 1.31 [Creation of the Brāhmaṇa and other castes]

Section XVII - Creation of the Brāhmaṇa and other castes

लोकानां तु विवृद्ध्यर्थं मुखबाहूरुपादतः ।
ब्राह्मणं क्षत्रियं वैश्यं शूद्रं च निरवर्तयत् ॥३१॥

lokānāṃ tu vivṛddhyarthaṃ mukhabāhūrupādataḥ |
brāhmaṇaṃ kṣatriyaṃ vaiśyaṃ śūdraṃ ca niravartayat ||31||

With a view to the development of the (three) regions, He brought into existence the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣatriya, the Vaiśya and the Śūdra, from out of His mouth, arms, thighs and feet (respectively). — (31)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘With a view to the development of the regions.’ terrestrial and the rest; — ‘development’ stands for Nourishment and expansion; it is only when the four castes, Brāhmaṇa and the rest, are there that there is development of the three regions; for the Gods live upon offerings made by these castes, — these castes alone being entitled to the performance of sacrifices; so that the action done by these nourishes the two regions (celestial and subterranean); then again, the Gods also are prompted by men’s action to act; from the Sun-God comes rain; and thus the said creation (of the Brāhmaṇa) tends to the nourishment of this (terrestrial) region also.

‘He brought unto existence,’ — i.e., produced, the Brāhmaṇa and other castes, — ‘from out of his mouth, arm’, thighs and feet’ respectively; i.e., the Brāhmaṇa from out of his mouth, the Kṣatriya out of his arms, the Vaiśya out of his thighs and the Śūdra out of his feet. — The affix ‘tasi’ (in ‘mukha bāhārupādataḥ’) has the sense of the Ablative; the effect is, as it were, drawn out of the cause; and this implying a sort of separation, the use of the Ablative becomes fully justified.

It was only a certain primeval Brāhmaṇa whom Prajāpati produced, by his divine power, out of the component particles of his own mouth; because so far as the Brāhmaṇas of the present day are concerned, they are all actually found to he produced by intercourse between human couples, out of the material principles.

In reality however, what is stated here is merely commendatory, intended to show the relative superiority and inferiority of the castes; — the meaning being — ‘of all beings Prajāpati is the highest, — among all the limbs of Prajāpati, the mouth is the highest, — similarly the Brāhmaṇa is the highest, most praiseworthy, of all the castes;’ and on the basis of this similarity the Brāhmaṇa is described as produced out of Brahma’s mouth.

Or, the description of the Brāhmaṇa coming out of Brahma’s mouth may be due to the fact that the work of the mouth, such as teaching and the like, belongs preeminently to the Brāhmaṇa; to the Kṣatriya belongs the work of the arms, lighting; to the Vaiśya the work of the thighs, such as wandering about with the cows, when tending cattle, and also travelling for trade on land and water; and to the Śūdra belongs the work of the feet, i.e., service. — (31)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

‘Lokavivṛddhyartham’ — ‘in order that the inhabitants of the worlds might multiply (or prosper)’ — (Medhātithi, Govindarāja and Kullūka); — ‘in order to protect the world by means of the castes, and to make it prosperous’ (Nārāyaṇa).

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