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In answer to this we have the third verse, which serves the purpose of pointing out what Duties are going to be expounded and also of further indicating the aptitude of Manu already mentioned.

‘Thou alone’ — without any one to help you; without a second.

‘Sarvasya vidhānasya kāryatattvārthavit.’ — The term ‘Vidhāna,’ meaning that by which acts are enjoined, stands for the scripture; — it is called ‘svayambhu’ in the sense that it is eternal, not a product, not the work of man; and its name is ‘Veda’; — ‘entire’ i.e., including the text which is directly found in the Veda, as also that the exact words of which are only inferred; for instance, (a) in the text — ‘one should perform the Agnihotra, it pertains to thousand men, — by means of this verse one should worship the Āhavanīya’ — we have the Veda directly enjoining what is to be done; the term ‘by means of this,’ ending as it docs with the instrumental case-termination, serving to point out the employment of the mantra-text directly quoted; — (b) while in the case of the injunction ‘the Aṣṭakās should be performed,’ which is found in the Smṛti, we infer, on the strength of this Smṛti, the corresponding Veda text; — similarly, when we read the Mantra-text, ‘I am chopping grass, the seat of the Gods,’ we at once infer, on the basis of the indicative power of the words of that text, the Vedic injunction that ‘the said text is to be employed in the chopping of grass this Mantra is found in that section of the Veda which deals with the Darśa-pūrṇamāsa sacrifice, and the chopping of grass is laid down as to be done in course of that sacrifice; but there is no such direct injunction as that ‘the chopping should be done with such and such a Mantra and the above-mentioned Mantra-text is found to be capable, by its very form, of indicating the chopping of grass; while as regards its being connected in a general way, with the sacrifice, this follows the fact of its occurring in the same ‘context’ as the injunction of that sacrifice; and it is by virtue of its own indicative force that it comes to be employed in the chopping of grass. The idea arising in the mind of the student (on noticing the above facts) is as follows: — ‘From the context it follows that the Mantra-text in question should be used in the performance of the pūrṇamāsa sacrifices; — how is this to be done? — well, the natural answer is that it is to be used in the manner in which it is capable of being used; the capacity of a thing, even though not directly mentioned, always help., in determining its use; — what then is the Mantra-text capable of doing? — it is capable of indicating the chopping of grass; — hence from the context, and from the capability of the Mantra itself, it follows that it should be employed in the chopping of grass’; — as soon as this idea has been arrived at, the corresponding words, ‘by this Mantra the chopping of grass should be done,’ present themselves to the mind; because as a matter of fact, every concrete conception is preceded by the corresponding verbal expression. The said verbal expression, thus presenting itself to the mind, is called the ‘inferred Vedic text.’ The Text thus inferred is regarded as ‘Veda,’ by virtue of the fact that it owes its existence to the force of two other Vedic texts — viz., the text laying down the Darśapūrṇamāsa and the Mantra-text referred to above. Such is the opinion of Kumārila.

Or, the term ‘vidhāna’ may be taken as equivalent to ‘vidki’, meaning actual operation, the accomplishment of purpose; this is called ‘svayambhu’ in the sense that it is eternal, i.e., handed down by beginningless tradition, — or that it is prescribed in the eternal Veda; — ‘entire’ — i.e., what is prescribed in the directly available verbal texts, and what is only implied by the force of what is directly expressed by the words of the texts. The Vedic injunction is of two kinds: — (a) There is one kind of injunction which is directly expressed by the words; e.g., ‘desirous of Brahmic glory, one should offer the Saurya-Caru’; here what is expressed is that one who desires Brahmic glory is the ñt and proper person to offer the Saurya-Caru; and when one proceeds to secure Brahmic glory by means of the said offering, he learns that the procedure of the offering is analogous to the Āgneya offering (which is the archetype of all Caru-offerings). In both these cases the idea got at, being derived from the words of the texts, is regarded as ‘derived directly from words;’ though the former is derived directly from the words and the latter from what is ‘expressed by the worlds,’ yet, this difference, due to the removal of the latter by one step, does not deprive it of the character of ‘being derived from words.’ For instance, when the water in the pool is struck by the hand, and it in its turn strikes against some other place; and yet this latter place is regarded as being struck by the hand, though not directly; similarly when pieces of rubber are thrown down, they rise and fall, and all the subsequent acts of rising and falling are the indirect effects of 'the first downward impulse imparted to them. Exactly analogous is the case of the injunctions in question: Every ectypal sacrifice is related to a particular form of procedure (borrowed from its archetype). Similarly when we meet with the injunction ‘one should perform the Viśvajit sacrifice,’ we argue that no injunction is possible except in reference to a fit and proper person capable of (and having a motive for) performing it, and hence come to the conclusion that the person so capable is one who desires Heaven; this idea being thus implied by the force of what is directly expressed by the words of the text. It is in view of this two-fold character of injunctions (and enjoined acts) that we have the term ‘entire.’ In fact the purpose of adding the epithet ‘entire’ is to indicate that Smṛtis have their source in the Veda. This we shall explain under Discourse II.

An objection is raised: —

“As a matter of fact, Vidhi is something in the form of what should be done, expressed by the injunctive and such other verbal expressions; and this, in all cases, must be directly expressed by actual words; under the circumstances, what do you mean by saying that there are two kinds of injunction, — that the term ‘one should offer’ denotes something to be done, and the procedure of the offering is indicated by implication in the manner described above?”

There is no force in this objection. As a matter of fact, in the case of the injunctive words ‘nirvapet,’ ‘should offer,’ ‘yajeta,’ ‘should sacrifice’ and the like, even though what is expressed by the verbal root itself may be comprehended, the full conception of what is to he done is not obtained until we have comprehended the other factors, — such as the character of the person fit for the performance, the procedure to be adopted, and the actual details of the act to be performed; it is only as equipped with all these factors that the Injunction becomes comprehended in its complete form. In view of this fact, there is nothing incongruous in regarding the said factors also as denoted by the Injunctive word.

This is what the text means by the epithet ‘achintya,’ ‘inconceivable’ — which means ‘not directly perceptible.’ What is directly perceived is said to be ‘apprehended,’ and not ‘conceived,’ or ‘remembred’ [so that if the Veda were something directly perceived, the epithet ‘inconceivable’ would have no force; things like the Veda can only be conceived of, and the Veda isnot even that].

‘Not directly cognisable;’ — i.e., that which has got to be assumed or inferred, as forming the source of several assertions made in the Smṛti;as a matter of fact, such Vedic texts are not perceived, hence it is called ‘not directly cognisable.’ — Or ‘not directly cognisable’ may he taken in the sense of incapable of having its extent exactly defined, by reason of its being very extensive; the Veda being divided into several rescensions, cannot be exactly defined by all persons; and on this account also it may be called ‘inconceivable;’ even in ordinary parlance, people are found to say — ‘what to say of others; this cannot be even conceived of.’ The mind can conceive of all things; but the Veda is so extensive that it cannot be conceived of even by the mind. Thus the two epithets (‘inconceivable’ and ‘not directly cognisable’) serve to indicate that the Veda is beyond the reach of the internal as well as the external organs of perception; i.e., it is very extensive; and this mention of the extensiveness of the Veda serves as an inducement to the Teacher; the meaning being — ‘it is you alone who have learnt the Veda which is so extensive, hence you alone are conversant with what ought to be done, which forms the true import of the said Veda.’

The term ‘Kārya,’ ‘what ought to be done,’ stands for the act to be performed; in reference to which the man is prompted to be the performer, (in such terms as) — ‘this should be done by you,’ ‘this should not be done by you,’ ‘the Agnihotra should be performed’ ‘the eating of the flesh of an animal killed by a poisoned arrow should not be done.’ Avoidance also is a kind of ‘acting;’ e.g., the ‘non-doing of Brāhmaṇa-murder’ constitutes the ‘performance’ or ‘acting’ of the avoidance (of Brāhmaṇa-murder). Activity is ‘acting;’ so is also ‘desisting from activity;’ and the name ‘acting’ is not restricted to only that which is accomplished by means of instruments and agents set in motion; in fact, when such ‘acting’ is possible, if one desists from it, this desisting also is ‘acting.’ For instance, when it is asserted that ‘the man who takes wholesome food lives long,’ what is meant is that the man who takes his food at the proper time, and who does not eat at the improper time; as desisting from eating is also ‘wholesome.’

Or, the word ‘Kārya’ may be taken as indicating the Injunction and the Prohibition; as these alone form the essence of the Veda; the other parts of it, which are merely descriptive of certain happenings, — such passages for instance as ‘he wept, and because he wept, he became known as Rudra,’ — are not true; they are not meant to be taken in their literal sense, they are meant to be construed along with an injunctive passage and serving the purpose of commending what has been laid down in that injunctive passage. For instance, the descriptive passage just quoted — beginning with ‘he wept’ and, ending with ‘there is weeping in his house within a year’ — is to be construed with the injunctive passage — ‘Therefore silver should not be placed on the grass;’ and being deprecatory of the placing of silver, it serves the purpose of commending the prohibition of that placing of silver. This is what is meant by the dictum — ‘the Veda is an authoritative source of knowledge in regard to what has to be accomplished, and not what is already accomplished and what is mentioned in the Arthavāda or Descriptive Passages is what is already accomplished; and what is already accomplished cannot be cognised as something to be done; what however is cognised is that the description is supplementary to some injunction; if then it were taken to be true in its own literal sense, it could not be supplementary to any injunction; and this would militate against the syntactical connection between the two passages — descriptive and injunctive; and so long as two passages can be taken as syntactically connected and constituting a single compound sentence, it is not right to take them as two distinct sentences. [The reverse process of taking the injunction as supplementary to the description would not be right; for] as a matter of fact, what is yet to be accomplished could not be subservient to what is already accomplished; specially because, if this were so (and the in junction itself were not literally true), then the Veda would contain no injunction of anything at all; and it would thereby cease to be an authoritative source of knowledge. This would involve the further incongruity, that we would have to deny the well-recognised fact of the injunctive and other words denoting injunction. It is with a view to all this that the revered Manu has declared ‘something to be done’ as the ‘essence’ of the Veda. Jaimini also in the Pūrvamīmānsā-Sūtra (1.1.2) — ‘Duty is that desirable tiling which is prescribed by the Vedic injunction’ — has distinctly declared that the Veda is an authoritative source of knowledge in regard to what is to be done.

The term of address ‘Lord’ has been used on the understanding that the personage addressed is well-known to be possessed of the capacity to expound duty, — such capacity being due to his being endowed with a high degree of knowledge of all things. The meaning thus is — ‘O Lord, may you, who are fully able to expound Duty, explain the Duties to us.’

Being thus questioned by means of the first three verses, he promised, in the following verse, what he was asked to do. (3)

Explanatory notes:

‘Vidhānasya svayambhuvaḥ’ — Buhler has translated this phrase to mean ‘the ordinance of the self-existent’, — evidently taking ‘Svayambhuvaḥ’ as standing for God. This, however, is incompatible with the interpretation of all the commentators, according to whom ‘Svayambhuvaḥ’ is in apposition to ’Vidhānasya’, — the phrase meaning the ‘self-existent ordinance’, ‘the Eternal Law’ (the Veda). Burnell is more to the point when he renders it as ‘self-existent system.’ Medhātithi (p. 5) has suggested another explanation — ‘activity handed down by immemorial tradition.’

‘Aprameyasya’ — Though other commentatoss are satisfied with rendering this epithet as meaning ‘unfathomable,’ Medhātithi imparts to it a special significance by explaining it as ‘not directly knowable, but to be inferred, as the foundation of the Smṛti.’

‘Kāryatattvārtha’ — ‘the purport and nature of the soul’ (Kullū.) — ‘the true purport’ (Medhātithi, Govinda and Nandana)

It is noteworthy that Medhātithi has supplied, under verse 11 below, a totally different explanation of this verse.

VERSE 1.4 [Manu’s Answer]

Section II - Manu’s Answer

स तैः पृष्टस्तथा सम्यगमितोजा महात्मभिः ।
प्रत्युवाचार्च्य तान् सर्वान् महर्षींश्रूयतामिति ॥४॥

sa taiḥ pṛṣṭastathā samyagamitojā mahātmabhiḥ |
pratyuvācārcya tān sarvān maharṣīṃśrūyatāmiti ||4||

Being thus questioned by the high-souled Great Sages, he, possessed op illimitable vigour, received them with reverence, and with proper courtesy answered them — ‘listen.’ — (4)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘He’ — Manu — ‘possessed of illimitable being thus questioned by the high-souled Great Sages, answered them — “Listen.”’

‘Thus’ — in the aforesaid manner; the word ‘thus’ which denotes method, includes the matter as well as the manner of the question; hence ‘thus questioned’ means ‘thus questioned, i.e., questioned about Duties — he answered.’

Or, the word ‘thus’ may be taken as denoting manner only. As a matter of fact, however the word ‘questioned’ already brings to the mind the details (matter as well as manner) of what has been questioned about; hence the meaning is — ‘what he was questioned about, that he answered thus the question and the answer come to have the same objective.

Under this explanation the word ‘thus’ become super fluous, and only serves the purpose of filling the gap in the metre. Under the former explanation however, the word ‘thus’ itself serves the purpose of showing that the ‘questioning’ and the ‘answering’ have both the same objective.

The word ‘Samyak,’ ‘with proper courtesy,’qualifies the answering: ‘he answered with proper courtesy’ — i.e., gladly, not with anger or any other form of displeasure.

‘Possessed of inimitable vigour’ — with undiminished power of speech; he whose vigour,’ power, capacity of exposition, is ‘illimitable,’ infinite.

The epithet ‘high-souled,’ serves to show that there is no incompatibility in the persons being ‘Great Sages,’ and at the same time ‘questioners’ (as if they themselves did not know what they were asking about); hence it is said ‘he answered the Great Sages.’ It is the philanthropic person that is called ‘high-souled,’ hence the meaning is that though they themselves knew all about Duties, — otherwise they would not be ‘Great Sages,’ — yet they questioned Manu for the benefit of other people; the idea in their minds being as follows — ‘Manu is a Sage whose authoritative character is better known, — what he says is always respected by people, — he is always approached with trust and confidence, — hence for the expounding of the treatise, we shall make him our Teacher’, — and when he is questioned by us, he will be regarded by the people as still more trustworthy.’

It is this explanation that justifies the statement in the text regarding Manu having ‘received them with reverence.’ If it were not as we have explained, what would be the meaning of the ‘reverence’ shown by the Teacher to the Pupil? The word of the text which means ‘having received with reverence’ must be explained as a participle formed of the root ‘arc’ (to worship) with the prefix ‘ā’ and the participial affix ‘lyap’ [as without the prefix, the form would be ‘arcayitvā’]. Another reading (which removes the difficulty) is ‘tān.’

In connection with the present verse, the following question has been raised — “If the whole of this Treatise has been composed by Manu himself, it is not right to attribute it to another person, as is done in the statement — ‘being questioned by them, he answered’; the proper form would have been — ‘being questioned by them, I answered.’ If, on the other hand, someone else is the author of the Treatise, then why should it be called ‘Mānava’ (of Manu)?”

There is no force in this objection. In the first place, it is a well known fact that in most cases the authors of Treatises state their own views as if emanating from other persons, — making use of such expressions as — ‘in this connection they say’ or ‘they meet this argument thus,’ and so forth; and the form ‘being questioned by them I answered’ would not be in keeping with such usage; the reason underlying this fact is that the older the person the more authoritative he is regarded to be by the people; it is for this reason that we find Jaimini (1.1.5) stating his own view as emanating from ‘Bādarāyaṇa.’

Or (another explanation is that) the Treatise is a compilation made and related by Bhṛgu; and since the original Smṛti [which is, in the present Treatise related by Bhṛgu] was compiled (from teachings received directly from Prajāpati) by Manu, — it is styled ‘Manava’ (of Manu).

He answered the great sages; — what was the answer? — ‘Listen to what I have been questioned about.’ (4).

Comparative notes:

The injunctions and prohibitions in the Institute are the work of Prajāpati himself; — He taught them to Manu, who composed the ‘ordinance’, and taught it to the sages, among whom was Bhṛgu, who was commissioned to relate it to the sages; and the ‘ordinance’ in its present form is what was related by Bhṛgu to the sages at a later time — Vide Bhāṣya on 1.1 and l.56.

VERSE 1.5 [Origin of the World]

Section III - Origin of the World

आसीदिदं तमोभूतमप्रज्ञातमलक्षणम् ।
अप्रतर्क्यमविज्ञेयं प्रसुप्तमिव सर्वतः ॥५॥

āsīdidaṃ tamobhūtamaprajñātamalakṣaṇam |
apratarkyamavijñeyaṃ prasuptamiva sarvataḥ ||5||

This (World) was in existence in the form, as it were, of dense Darkness, — unperceived, undifferentiated, incogitable, (hence) incognizable; as it was wholly merged in deep sleep. — (5).

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

At the very outset there arises an objection —

“Where we began and whereto we are carried! Manu was asked to expound the duties laid down in the scriptures, and he promised to expound them; under the circumstances, the description of the world in its undifferentiated state (with which the present verse begins) is wholly irrelevant and purposeless. In fact it becomes a true case of the well-known proverb — ‘ Being questioned about mangoes, he describes the Kovidāra tree.’ Further, there is no authority in support of what is here described; nor is any useful purpose served by it. So the whole of this First Discourse need not be studied at all.”

Our answer to the above is follows: — What the First Discourse does is to describe the fact of the Treatise having an extensive scope; so that what is described here is the whole range of the cosmic process, beginning with Brahman down to the inanimate objects, as forming the basis of Dharma and Adharma, Right and Wrong; for instance, verse 49 describes the vegetable objects as ‘wrapped in manifold Darkness, the result of their own acts’ [which shows that plants also are related to, and affected by, Right and Wrong]; and later on, again in Discourse 1, verse 23, it will be stated that ‘having recognised, by means of his intellect, these transitions of the individual soul, through merit and demerit, (Right and Wrong), one should fix his attention upon the Right.’ From all this it follows that Right is the cause of superiority (in the scale of existence) and Wrong of the reverse; thus the present treatise, expounding the exact nature of Right and Wrong, serves an extensive purpose, and as such should be studied. Such is the purport of the First Discourse.

The authority for what is declared in the present verse consists of Mantra, Arthavāda and Inference. As for the Mantra we have the following (in Ṛgveda, 10.129.3) — ‘Darkness existed, enveloped in darkness, uncognised in the beginning; this whole existed in a fluid state; the gross was contained in the subtile; the one entity that existed came to lie born, by virtue of austerities.’ The meaning is as follows: — ‘At the Universal Dissolution, the Sun, the Moon, the Fire and other sources of light having been destroyed, there existed Darkness alone; — this (subtile) Darkness was ‘enveloped,’ wrapped, in Darkness in the gross form; at this time there was no cogniser; hence, there being no one to cognise things, there was no cognition of anything; therefore Darkness is described as enveloped in darkness; — ‘in the beginning,’ i.e. before elemental creation, it was ‘uncognised,’ unknown; ‘this whole existed in the fluid state,’ i.e. every active or mobile object was motionless; the ‘gross,’ the larger, ‘was contained in the subtile,’ the smaller; i.e. every differentiated object was resolved into its original evolvents; this indicates the undifferentiated state of the world; and the last foot of the Mantra describes the earliest stage of evolution; that ‘one entity’ which ‘existed’ ‘came to be born, by virtue of austerities,’ i.e. by the force of austerity it became manifested in differentiated forms; i.e. under the influence of past acts, it came into existence again; or, it may mean that under the conditions described, Hiraṇyagarbha, came into existence by himself, by virtue of his austerities; as described later on (verso 6) — ‘Thereupon the self-born &c. &c.’

The possibility of Universal Dissolution is proved by Inference: That which has been found to bo destroyed in one part is also found to be destroyed in its entirety; e.g. at one time a single house is found to be burnt, and at another time the entire village is burnt (this is the Major Premise); all such things as are produced by active agents, — such for instance, as houses, palaces and the like are found to be liable to destruction (this is the second step in the inferential process); — this world, consisting of rivers, oceans, mountains &c., is the work of an active agent (this is the third step); — hence it follows that, like the house &c., the whole world will come to destruction (this is the final conclusion). It will not be right to argue that the fact of the world being the work of an active agent is itself not yet established; — for that fact also is deduced from the fact of the world having, like the house and such things, a particular shape; — all this constitutes the Inference (upon which the statements in the present verse are based).

We do not make any attempt either at clarifying (discussing and strengthening) the said proofs, or at refuting (the counter-arguments); because the present treatise does not deal with proofs and reasonings; and reasonings could not be fully grasped until they have been fully stated and examined; and if all this were done, the work would become a treatise on ‘Reasonings,’ not on ‘Law;’ and further, it would become too prolix.

This subject (of Creation and Dissolution) in its details shall be found described (in verses 7 et seq.) and the process described shall be in some places in accordance with the Purāṇas and sometimes in accordance with the Sāṅkhya doctrines. But the knowing or not knowing of those details does not make any difference in Right and Wrong; hence we are not going to deal with it in detail. If any person stands in need of the detailed account of the process, be should search for it in the said sources of information. What we undertake to do is to construe and explain the words of the text, and this is all that we shall do. A brief exposition of the purport of the Discourse we have already given.

‘This,’ world, ‘was in exitence,’ ‘in the form of dense Darkness’ — i.e. as if it were dense darkness; the term ‘which has several meanings, is here used to denote similarity; just as in the statement ‘yat tad bhinneṣvabhinnam chinneṣvachinnam sāmānyabhūtam sa śabdaḥ’ (‘that which remains the same even though the things denoted by it are diverse; which remains undestroyed even when the things denoted are destroyed, which is, as if it were, a Generality, this is the Word’), the word ‘samānyābhūtaḥ’ means ‘as if it were a generality.’ “What is it that constitutes the similarity of the World to Darkness?”

The answer is given by the next word ‘unperceived;’ in as much as all the products with their diverse differentiated forms are at the time resolved in the Evolvent Original, the world is not p erceived.

It might have been cognised by means of Inference; but that also is not possible; as it is ‘undifferentiated’; the ‘differential’ meant is that character which distinguishes one thing from another; and this also is dissolved at the time; for the simple reason that all products, with their distinguishing features, have been destroyed.

‘Incogitable’ — that form in which the World existed was not capable of being even thought of, in that form; ‘cogitation’ here stands, for all forms of Inference; the meaning being that at the time there was no kind of Inference — neither from generals to particulars, nor from particulars to generals — available, by means of which the World could be cognised. — For these reasons it was also ‘incognizable.’

From all this it might follow that the World did not exist at all, and it was only a non-existent World that came into existence (subsequently); with a view to preclude this, the text adds — ‘as if wholly merged in deep sleep.’ As a matter of fact, the existent can never come into existence out of the non-existent; it has been declared in the Upanisads (the Chāndogya) — ‘O dear one, this was, in the beginning existent; how could the existent be born out of the non-existent?’ — All that is meant is that the World is incognizable by the instrumentality of the ordinary means of cognition, which operate through, and bear upon, only differentiated things; that such is its condition is known from the scriptures, which also are as transcendental in their character as the ante-natal condition of the World.

‘As if merged in deep sleep,’ — ‘deep sleep’ stands for that condition of repose which is beyond the conditions of waking and dreaming; and it has been cited only by way of illustration; the meaning being — ‘just as the soul, in the condition of deep sleep, remains entirely unconscious of any thoughts or sufferings, and free from all notions of diversity, — and yet it cannot be said to be non-existent, because on waking, it is recognised as being the same that was asleep, as shown by the idea I have slept soundly, — exactly the same is the case with the World, as is shown by the scriptures that describe things as they have actually existed, and also proved, for those who depend upon reasonings, by what appear to be sound Inferences.’

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