tadananyatvamārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ ..2.1.14..

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SUTRA II. 1. 14.

तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः॥२.१.१४॥

tadananyatvamārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ ..2.1.14..

…Tat, therefore, from that, from Brahman, the cause of the world, …. Ananyatvam, non-difference, the identity. … Arambhana, the word Arambhana as found in the Chhandogya Upanishad … Shabdadibhyah, from the words the beginning of which is the term Arambhana.

14. The non-difference of the world from That (namely, from Brahman) is established in those verses of the Chhandogya Upanishad which commence with the word Arambhana — 150.

COMMENTARY

The word Tat means from that, namely from Brahman, the material cause of the world, and who possesses two Shaktis called the Jiva and Prakriti, the Spirit and Matter. This world is verily an effect, which is not at all anything other than its cause, namely, Brahman. How do you know this? We learn it from all those passages which commence with the word Arambhana. We give those passages below:

(i) Harih, Om. There lived once Shvetaketu Aruneya (the grandson of Aruna). To Mm his father (Uddalaka, the son of Aruna) said: «Shvetaketu, go to school; for there is none belonging to our race, darling, who. not having studied (the Veda), is, as it were, a Brahmana by birth only».

(ii) Having begun his apprenticeship (with a teacher) when he was twelve years of age, Shvetaketu returned to his father, when he was twenty-four, having then studied all the Vedas, conceited, considering himself well-read, and stern.

(iii) His father said to him: «Shvetaketu, as you are so conceited, considering yourself so well-read, and so stern, my dear, have you ever asked for that instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be known?»

(iv) «What is that instruction, Sir?» he asked. The father [replied: «My dear, as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is clay».

(v) «And as, my dear, by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is gold?

(vi) «And as my dear, by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron (Karshnayasam) is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is iron, thus, my dear, is that instruction».

(vii) The son said: «Surely, those venerable men (my teachers,) did not know that. For if they had known it, why should they not have told it to me? Do you’, Sir, therefore, tell me that». ‘Bo it so’, said the father.

«That which is Being (i.e., this world which now, owing to the distinction of names and forms, bears a manifold shape) was in the beginning one only (owing to the absence of the distinction of names and forms). He thought may I be many, may I grow forth». (Chh. Up., VI., 2. 3.)

The whole of this is thus explained by Ramanuja: For these texts prove the non-difference from Brahman of the world consisting of non-sentient and sentient beings. This is as follows. The teacher, bearing in mind the idea of Brahman constituting the sole cause of the entire world and of the non-difference of the effect from the cause, asks the pupil, ‘Have you ever asked for that instruction by which the non-heard is heard, the non-perceived is perceived, the not-known is known? Wherein there is implied the promise that, through the knowledge of Brahman, the general cause, ‘its effect, i.e., the whole Universe, will be known. The pupil not knowing that Brahman is the sole cause of the Universe, raises a doubt as to the possibility of one thing being known through another, ‘How then. Sir, is that instruction?’ and the teacher thereupon, in order to convey the notion of Brahman being the sole Universal cause, quotes an instance showing that the non-difference of the effect from the cause is proved by ordinary experience, as by one clod of clay there is known everything that is made of clay; the meaning being ‘as jars, pots, and the like, which are fashioned out of one piece of clay, are known through the cognition of that clay, since their substance is not different from it’.

In order to meet the objection that according to Kanaka’s doctrine the effect constitutes a substance different from the cause, the teacher next proceeds to prove the non-difference of the effect from the cause, by reference to ordinary experience. «Vachirambhanam vikare namadheyam mrttiketyeva satyam». Arambhanam must here be explained as that which is taken or touched (a-rabh-a-labh; and ‘alambhah sparsahinsayoh’) compare Panini, III., 3, 113, as to the form and meaning of the word. ‘Vacha’, «on account of speech», we take to mean «on account of activity by speech»; for activities such as the fetching of water in a pitcher, are preceded by speech, ‘Fetch water in the pitcher’, and so on. For the bringing about of such activity, the material clay (which had been mentioned just before) touches (enters into contact with) an effect (Vikara), i.e., particular make or configuration, distinguished by having a broad bottom and resembling the shape of a belly and a special name (Namadheya), vi., pitcher, and so on, which is applied to that effect; or, to put it differently, to the end that certain activities may be accomplished, the substance clay receives a new configuration and a new name. Hence jars and other things of clay are clay (Mrittika), i.e., are of the substance of clay, only, this only is true (Satyam) i.e., known through authoritative means of proof, only (Eva) because the effects are not known as’ different substances. One and the same substance, therefore, such as clay or gold gives occasion for different ideas and words only as it assumes different configuration, just as we observe that one and the same Devadatta becomes the object of different ideas and terms and gives rise to different effects, according to the different stages of life, youth, old age, etc., which he has reached. The fact of our saying ‘the jar has perished’ while yet the clay persists, was referred to by the Purvapakshin as proving that the effect is something different from the cause, but this view is disproved by the view held by us that origination, destruction, and so on, are merely different states of one and the same as causal substance. According as one and the same substance is in this or that state, there belong to it different terms and different activities, and these different states may rightly be viewed as depending on the activity of an ‘agent. (Dr Thibaut.)

If it be held that the pot is different from the clay, there would arise objections as to their having double weight, etc., The weight of a lump of clay being one unit, and that of the pot another; when it is weighed in the balance, the weight ought to be double. (But [the jar does not show any increase of weight. Thus the substance remains the same. The jar is not the lump of clay plus jar, but the same lump). So also in other respects. (The chemical analysis of jar shows the same materials as that of the lump of clay).

The jar is not an effect like the illusion (Vivarta) of silver in the shell. For silver is found to exist separately as a distinct substance from the mother of pearl.

Thus also is answered the objection of those persons who say that the word ‘iti’ in ‘Mrittika iti eva satyam’ is useless.

Nor can you say that the theory of manifestation (Abhivyakti) has no scriptural authority for it. For we find in the Bhagavata Purana the following:

«At the end of the Kalpa, the self-luminous Lord manifested (Abhivyanak) this world which was covered with blinding darkness wrought by Time, through His self-luminous Power (Chitshakti)».

Nor is this theory open to the two objections of (i) accomplishing a thing which is already accomplished, (ii) and regressus in infinitum. For it is not acknowledged by us that manifestation existed prior to the activity of the agent Nor do we acknowledge that one manifestation requires another manifestation to manifest it and so on.

Says an objector: If so, then you are open to the objection of maintaining the theory of Asatkarya (namely, that the effect does not exist before its origination). For the activity of the agent manifests the effect which did not exist before: and thus the activity of the agent creates the effect. To this we reply, this is not so. The activity of the agent produces manifestation, but does not produce the effect — for the manifestation is not effect. The effect is that which has the power of self-manifestation.

Manifestation is proved by the substratum of which it is the manifestation. In other words, the manifestation of the substrate constitutes the manifestation of the world. But the manifestation in the form of Samsthana Yoga is a constant manifestation and thus there is no fault in the theory set out by us. On the other hand, those who maintain that an effect is the result of a cause which is Asat or non-existent (in other words, that an effect is altogether different from its cause) are wrong, because it is not capable of any proof and is self-contradictory. For if it were so, then the result will be as follows: the effect will be non-existent before the activity that manifests it, and consequently anything would be the effect of any other thing, and everything would produce the same effect and everything would come out of everything else. Since non-existence is present everywhere, and an effect before its manifestation is non-existent, according to you, therefore, an effect can be produced from anything. Thus not only oil would be extracted from sesamum, but we shall get milk from the same seeds also. Because oil being non-existent in the seed, and being the result of the activity of the agent, milk may be extracted, likewise, from the seed by the same activity. Moreover, the theory is open to another objection. If the effect wore altogether non-existent prior to its origination; then production of a thing would be agentless. Nor can you say that some energy inherent in the cause would regulate the particular effect which that cause would produce; for there can be no relationship between an existent cause and a non-existent effect.

Moreover, we have the following dilemma also: Does the origination originate itself or does it not? If the first, then there is regressus in infinitum; for one origination we require another origination to originate it, and so on. In the second alternative the effect being non-existent and non-eternal, the origination becomes impossible. Thus both these alternatives are wrong. It would follow also that we must perceive an effect always or must not perceive it at all. If you say origination being itself an origin, what is the necessity of imagining another origin for it; then we say it is the same thing as the theory of manifestation; and in that case the theory of origination and the theory of manifestation become identical.

The author now shows from further arguments that the effect Is non-different from the cause by the following aphorism:

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