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Kātyāyana (Do., 449). — ‘After having carried out Niyoga, one should perform the prescribed penance for expiation.’

VERSE 9.60

Section IV - Duties of Women in Times of Distress (niyoga)

विधवायां नियुक्तस्तु घृताक्तो वाग्यतो निशि ।
एकमुत्पादयेत् पुत्रं न द्वितीयं कथं चन ॥६०॥

vidhavāyāṃ niyuktastu ghṛtākto vāgyato niśi |
ekamutpādayet putraṃ na dvitīyaṃ kathaṃ cana ||60||

He who has been authorised in regard to a widow shall, annointed with clarified butter and with speech controlled, beget, at night, one son, — and on no account a second one. — (60)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

No significance is meant to be attached to the mention of the. ‘widow’; as the rule laid down here is applicable also to the case of the woman whose husband is alive, but subject to such disabilities as impotence and the like. That such is the meaning is clear from what follows later (in 63). As a matter of fact, the sole purpose underlying the practice lies in what is stated in the present verse; the restriction too pertains to persons subject to the law, and not to the observances themselves. Otherwise it would seem that the whole thing pertained to widows only. (?)

‘At night — this is meant to indicate the absence of all light, in the shape of lamps etc.; intercourse during the day having been already forbidden by another text.

Others however hold that the prohibition of intercourse during the day is with reference to the benefit of the man, while the specification of ‘night’ in the present text bears upon ritualistic purposes.

Hence what is meant is that ‘only one.’ — and never a second — ‘Kṣetraja’ son is to be begotten; but never by intercourse during the day. — (60)

An exception to this is set forth in the next verse: —

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

(verses 9.59-60)

See Explanatory notes for Verse 9.59.

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verses 9.60-68)

(See texts under 59.)

Vaśiṣṭha (17.61, et seq.). — ‘He shall approach the widow in the moment sacred to Prajāpati, behaving like a husband, without dallying with her, and without abusing or ill-treating her. She shall obtain the expenses for food, raiment, baths and unguents from the estate of her deceased husband. They declare that a son begotten on a widow not duly authorised belongs to the begetter; if she has been duly authorised, the child belongs to both the males connected with the authorisation. No such authorisation shall be made for the purpose of obtaining a living. But some people declare that an authorisation may be made through desire for wealth, after an expiatory penance has been performed.’

Yājñavalkya (1.68-69). — (See under 59.)

Gautama (18.8). — ‘She shall not bear more than two sons.’

Nārada (12.82-88). — ‘He shall approach the woman, free from passion, and without amorous desire. He must have anointed his limbs with clarified butter, or with oil which has not lost its natural condition, and must turn away his face from hers and avoid the contact of limb with limb. For this custom is practised only when the family threatens to become extinct, for the continuance of the lineage, and not from amorous desire. He must not approach a woman who is with child, or blameworthy, or not duly authorised by her relations. Should a woman procreate a son with her brother-in-law without having been authorised thereto by her relations, that son is declared illegitimate and incapable of inheriting, by the expounders of the Veda. So when a younger brother has intercourse, without authorisation, with the wife of his elder brother, — or an elder brother with the wife of his younger brother, — they are both held to have committed incest. If he has been authorised by the elders, he shall approach the woman and advise her in the manner previously stated, as if she were his daughter-in-law. He becomes purified of the sin when the son is born and his Birth-ceremonies have been performed. He shall approach her only once, — or till conception has taken place. When she has become pregnant, she is again even as a daughter-in-law to him. Should the man or woman behave otherwise, impelled by amorous desire, they shall be severely punished by the King. Otherwise righteousness would be violated.’

Yama (Vivādaratnākara, p. 446). — ‘When during her period, the woman has taken her bath, her brother-in-law, desiring an offspring for his deceased brother, may approach her during the dark night, with speech held in check, with a single cloth on, and his body anointed with clarified butter, and mind stricken with grief, avoiding the contact of his face and limbs with her face and limbs.’

VERSE 9.61

Section IV - Duties of Women in Times of Distress (niyoga)

द्वितीयमेके प्रजनं मन्यन्ते स्त्रीषु तद्विदः ।
अनिर्वृतं नियोगार्थं पश्यन्तो धर्मतस्तयोः ॥६१॥

dvitīyameke prajanaṃ manyante strīṣu tadvidaḥ |
anirvṛtaṃ niyogārthaṃ paśyanto dharmatastayoḥ ||61||

Some people, learned in the subject, admit, on the basis of propriety, of a second procreation on women, — perceiving, as they do, that the couple’s purpose of authorisation’ is not (otherwise) accomplished. — (61)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

A second son also should be begotten; — such is the opinion of some people.

‘Learned in the subject’ — persons versed in the laws relating to the begetting of ‘Kṣetraja’ sons.

‘Perceiving that the purpose of authorisation is not accomplished’. — These people hold that the injunction, that ‘the woman on being authorised should begot a child’, is not fulfilled by the begetting of a single son.

What is the real intention of these men?

They hold that the singular number (in the word ‘son’ in the injunction ‘a son is to be begotten’) is not meant to be significant; since it is the substance that forms the more important factor, and no qualification attaches to the act, which shows that no significance can attach to the singular number; just as in the case of the word ‘cup’ (in the injunction ‘wash the cup’).

“In the case of injunctions of things not already spoken of elsewhere, even though the substance is recognised as the predominant factor, yet the significance of such specifications as those by means of number and such qualifications remains undisturbed; e.g., in such injunctions as the ‘twice-born man shall marry a woman’. Then from the indicative power of such mantra-texts as ‘Beget ten sons on this girl’, it is clear that the number one as pertaining to children is not to be observed.

“In that case the man need not rest with two sons only.” In fact it is in view of this that the text has added the term ‘second’, the use whereof lies in the precluding of the possibility of more sons than two. This same is the sense of the mantra-text also, which pertains to the ‘aurasa’ (body-born) son, the text occuring in the section on Marriage. In the present instance however, all that is intended is the exceeding of the number ‘one’; and this on the strength of the saying current, among cultured people that ‘a man with one son is as good as sonless’, or on that of the present verse containing the eulogisation of the second son.

‘On the basis of propriety’ — i.e. on the strength of the practice of cultured people. — (61)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

This verse is quoted in Vyavahāra-Bālambhaṭṭī (p. 700); — and in Smṛticandrikā (Saṃskāra, p. 225) which notes that this view has been held by some people on the ground that one son is as good as none at all.

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verses 9.60-68)

See Comparative notes for Verse 9.60.

VERSE 9.62

Section IV - Duties of Women in Times of Distress (niyoga)

विधवायां नियोगार्थे निर्वृत्ते तु यथाविधि ।
गुरुवत्च स्नुषावत्च वर्तेयातां परस्परम् ॥६२॥

vidhavāyāṃ niyogārthe nirvṛtte tu yathāvidhi |
guruvatca snuṣāvatca varteyātāṃ parasparam ||62||

But when the purpose of the ‘authorisation’ in regard to the widow has been duly accomplished, the two should behave towards each other like an elder and like a daughter-in-law. — (62)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

The ‘authorisation’ herein laid down refers to the act of ‘intercourse’, ending with the sexual act. After this act has been accomplished, their behaviour towards each other should be like that of the ‘elder’ and the ‘daughter-in-law’. If the woman is the wife of the elder brother, she shall be treated like an ‘elder’; but if she is the wife of the younger brother, she shall be treated like a ‘daughter-in-law

The use of the term ‘towards each other’ implies that the woman should behave like the daughter-in-law towards her elder brother-in-law, and like an ‘elder’ towards her younger brother-in-law. — (62)

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verses 9.60-68)

See Comparative notes for Verse 9.60.

VERSE 9.63

Section IV - Duties of Women in Times of Distress (niyoga)

नियुक्तौ यौ विधिं हित्वा वर्तेयातां तु कामतः ।
तावुभौ पतितौ स्यातां स्नुषागगुरुतल्पगौ ॥६३॥

niyuktau yau vidhiṃ hitvā varteyātāṃ tu kāmataḥ |
tāvubhau patitau syātāṃ snuṣāgagurutalpagau ||63||

If the two persons thus ‘authorised’ renounce the law and act from carnal desire, both would become outcasts, — being like one who has intercourse with his daughter-in-law and one who defiles the bed of his elder. — (63)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘Law’ — regarding ‘annointing with clarified butter’ and so forth. The transgression of the law leads to the parties becoming outcasts.

The ‘authorised’ elder brother being ‘one who has intercourse with his daughter-in-law’, and the younger brother being ‘one who defiles the bed of his elder’. — (63)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

This verse is quoted in Vyavahāra-Bālambhaṭṭī, (p. 523); — and in Dattakamīmāṃsā.

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verses 9.60-68)

See Comparative notes for Verse 9.60.

VERSE 9.64

Section IV - Duties of Women in Times of Distress (niyoga)

नान्यस्मिन् विधवा नारी नियोक्तव्या द्विजातिभिः ।
अन्यस्मिन् हि नियुञ्जाना धर्मं हन्युः सनातनम् ॥६४॥

nānyasmin vidhavā nārī niyoktavyā dvijātibhiḥ |
anyasmin hi niyuñjānā dharmaṃ hanyuḥ sanātanam ||64||

By twice-born persons the widow shall not be ‘authorised’ in regard to another person; by ‘authorising’ her in regard to another, they would violate the eternal law. — (64)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

This is the prohibition of the practice of ‘authorisation’, which has been sanctioned in the foregoing texts.

In this connection, some people have held the following view: — “Inasmuch as the text contains the term ‘widow’, it prohibits the practice only with reference to the woman whose husband is dead; so that the impotent husband should still ‘authorise’ his wife; both the sanction and the prohibition would thus have distinct spheres of application.”

Others, however, have held the following opinion: — “The text, that sanctions the practice mentions the failure of issue as the occasion for it; and as a matter of fact, this occasion is equally present in both cases, — in the case of the husband being impotent or invalided, as also in that of his being dead. So that as the sanction, so the prohibition also, must be accepted as free from restrictions. Then again, a woman is called ‘vidhavā’ (widow) when she ceases to have any intercourse with her ‘dhava’ or husband; and this condition is equally present in both cases.”

It is this latter view that has to be accepted; as otherwise, the rules regarding ‘anointment with clarified butter’ and other details would not be applicable to the case of ‘authorisation’ by the impotent or invalided husband; because the text that lays down that rule uses the term ‘widow’ — “He who has been authorised in regard to the widow, etc.’ (Verse 60). For these reasons, just as the preceding sanction, so the subsequent prohibition also, should be taken as free from all limitations. And thus the sphere of application of both being the same, we must take the case as being one of option. This option is possible only in view of the obligatory character of the injunction regarding the begetting of children; the case being analogous to the option bearing upon the ‘holding’ and ‘not holding’ of the Śoḍaśi Cups. If, on the other hand, the injunction of begetting a son were regarded as consisting in such assertions as ‘by means of a son one wins heaven’, and so forth, (where the act of begetting a son is put forward as loading to a certain desirable result), the effect of one having no children would only be the non-performance of the after-death rites. So that the results of the two acts (begetting of a child by ‘authorisation’ and not begetting a. child by that method) would be totally distinct; and under the circumstances, whence could there he any option? It is only when the sanction and the prohibition both hear upon the same object that there can be option; as is the case with the ‘holding’ and ‘not holding’ of the Śoḍaśi Cups.

It has already been pointed out that when an act is done along with all its subsidiary details, its results are fuller than what they are when it is done without those details; but so far as the accomplishment of the main act itself is concerned, there is no difference. So that, in this case the only effect would be that the man not having recourse to the practice would fail to obtain the benefits that would he conferred by the son; and if he has recourse to the practice with a view to obtaining those special benefits, then he would he transgressing the prohibition, and his act would stand on the same footing as the performance of the Śyena sacrififie (which is performed for the special purpose of obtaining the death of the enemy, and involves the transgression of the prohibition of all hilling).

“In connection with this object, the following point deserves to be considered in regard to the man who is ‘authorised’ (to have connection with the ‘widow’) — Why does he have recourse to the act? There is no such injunction for him as that ‘when one is authorised he should have intercourse with the widow’; as there is for the woman, in the form of the text (59) — ‘the woman, being duly authorised, etc.’ It would not be right to argue that — “since the ‘authorisation’ of the woman can he accomplished only when her younger brother-in-law or some other male relation would also ad, the action of these latter also is implied by that same injunction (which prescribes the‘authorisation’ of the woman), — since what is desired by the women is the Kṣetraja son (and this cannot be obtained without the action of the male).”

“This cannot be right, because the action of tin; male might proceed from carnal desire also.

“If the injunction did not imply the action of the male, there would be no sense in the rules laying down anointing with clarified butter and other details.

“These rules would not he meaningless; as their meaning would he that the son can he called ‘Kṣetraja’ only when he is born in the manner prescribed, and in no other circumstances.

“Some people have leld that the general injunction that ‘one must obey the injunction of his elders’ is what prompts the male in question.

“But if this were allowed, then one would he justified in drinking wine and doing such forbidden ads, by the wish of his elders to do so. As a matter of fact, one who would prompt the man to have recourse to such acts would not be an ‘elder’ at all. Then again, there is the law — ‘The abandoning of the elder is enjoined, if he is vain or ignorant of what should and what should not be done, or has recourse to the wrong path’; and the ‘abandoning’ meant here can only consist in ceasing to work for the elder.

“This same reasoning does away with the following view also: — ‘The assertion, (in 63) that by acting contrary to the rules relating to the details of the practice of ‘authorisation,’ the parties concerned become outcasts, implies the sanctioning of the action of both, in accordance with those rules. Otherwise, if the action of the man involved the penalty of outcasting in all kinds of intercourse, there would be no point in the declaration that he becomes an outcast under the special circumstances (of acting contrary to the rules).’

“Then again, the idea, that — ‘in the case of there being no transgression of the rules the man alone becomes an outcast, whereas, when there is transgression of them, both parties become outcasts’ — is also derived from the indicative power of the texts themselves.

“Thus then, the action of the youger brother in-law and other male relations has got to be explained (and justified).”

Our explanation is as follows: — Judging from the instance of Vyāsa and others, it has to be admitted that, in the begetting of the ‘Kṣetraja’ son, if one acts according to the behests of his elders, there can be nothing wrong in it In the case of Vyāsa and other great men, their action can never be regarded as having been prompted by carnal desire.’ Then, as for the argument that “the assertion that the parties become outcasts if they transgress the rules, is indicative of the act of the male”. — this cannot be right; for, if the male became an outcast, then, the son born of him would not be entitled to the performance of any rites; so that the begetting of the child would be absolutely futile. From all this, it follows that there is just a semblance of an injunction for the action of the younger brother-in-law or other male relations. — (64)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

“Verses 64-68 flatly contradict the rules given in the preceding ones. But it by no means follows that they are a modern addition, as held by Hopkins. For the same view is expressed by Āpastamba, 2.27.2-6, and was held, according to Baudhāyana, 2.3.34, by Aupajandhani. Moreover, Bṛhaspati Smṛti states expressly (Colebrook Dig. CLVII) that the contradictory statement occurred in the Mānava Dharmaśātra as known to the author.” — Buhler.

This verse is quoted in Mitākṣarā (2.136), as prohibiting niyoga; — again under 2.127, to the same effect, where Bālambhaṭṭī adds that ‘anyasmin’ means ‘other than the husband.’

It is quoted in Vīramitrodaya (Saṃskāra, p. 737), which remarks that the term ‘vidhavā’ here stands for the woman, whose husband has died after the marriage has been performed; — then it seeks to reconcile the apparent contradiction between verses 59 and 60 (permitting Niyoga) on the one hand, and verses 64-68 (forbidding it) on the other; the sanction is meant for the girl who is widowed after verbal betrothal, before marriage; while the prohibition applies to one who is widowed after marriage; this, it adds, is made clear by verse 65, which refers to the ‘mantras recited during the marriage-ceremony.’ It concludes therefore that there is no room for any doubts regarding the opinion of Manu, adumbrated in Mitākṣarā.

It is quoted in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, 38a); — in Smṛticandrikā (Saṃskāra, p. 226), which says that this prohibition is meant for the Kali-age; — and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 186a).

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verses 9.60-68)

See Comparative notes for Verse 9.60.

VERSE 9.65

Section IV - Duties of Women in Times of Distress (niyoga)

नोद्वाहिकेषु मन्त्रेषु नियोगः कीर्त्यते क्व चित् ।
न विवाहविधावुक्तं विधवावेदनं पुनः ॥६५॥

nodvāhikeṣu mantreṣu niyogaḥ kīrtyate kva cit |
na vivāhavidhāvuktaṃ vidhavāvedanaṃ punaḥ ||65||

Nowhere in the mantra-texts bearing upon marriage is ‘authorisation’ mentioned; nor again is the marriage of the widow mentioned in the injunction of marriage. — (65)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘Udvāha,’ ‘marriage,’ is a rite; and the sacred texts used at that rite — such as; (a) ‘Aryamaṇannu devam kanyā agnimayakṣata,’ (b) ‘Mayā patyā jaradaṣṭih,’ (c) ‘Mayā patyā prajāvatī,’ and so forth, — in all these, it is clearly stated that ownership over the woman belongs to the person that marries her; and nowhere among them is there any such assertion as ‘beget a child from a man in regard to whom you are authorised by me.’

What the text means by mentioning the ‘mantra-texts’ is that even Mantra-texts and Declamatory Texts do not contain any indications of the injunction of the practice. This is further explained. — ‘The marriage of widows is not mentioned in the injunction of marriage.’ ‘Marriage’ here stands for intercourse. If the act of the brother-in-law having intercourse with his widowed sister-in-law were a regular ‘marriage,’ then, the practice of ‘niyoga,’ ‘authorisation’, would be the same as ‘Marriage’; and as such, it would be fully enjoined by some such injunction as ‘the brother-in-law shall marry his sister-in-law.’ As a matter of fact, however, there is no such injunction at all.

This is a declamatory supplement to what has gone before. — (65)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

This verse is quoted in Vīramitrodaya (Saṃskara, p. 737, which notes that this verse supplies the reason for what has been asserted in the preceding verse; — in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, p. 38a), — and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 186a).

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verses 9.60-68)

See Comparative notes for Verse 9.60.

VERSE 9.66

Section IV - Duties of Women in Times of Distress (niyoga)

अयं द्विजैर्हि विद्वद्भिः पशुधर्मो विगर्हितः ।
मनुष्याणामपि प्रोक्तो वेने राज्यं प्रशासति ॥६६॥

ayaṃ dvijairhi vidvadbhiḥ paśudharmo vigarhitaḥ |
manuṣyāṇāmapi prokto vene rājyaṃ praśāsati ||66||

During the time that King Vena was ruling over his kingdom, this reprehensible bestial practice was introduced by ignorant twice-born men among men also. — (66)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

This also is a declamatory supplement to the prohibition of ‘authorisation.’ The ‘ignorant’ men, who do not know the scriptures, and who do not understand that the indicative power of the texts points to something entirely different, — ‘introduced’ ‘this bestial practice,’ which is most ‘reprehensible,’ ‘among men also’; and this was done not during modern times, but ‘during the time that Vena’ — (he first king — ‘was ruling over his kingdom’ — looking after his realm.

“It has been said that there are no sacred texts indicative of prevalence of this practice.”

Not so; what was said was that there was no such indicative in the texts recited at marriage; in other texts there certainly are words indicative of it; for instance, there is the mantra — ‘Ko vā sa putro vidhaveva deraram mayā nu doṣo kṛṇute sadhastha’ (Ṛgveda, 10.40.2), — which means ‘who is the woman that invites you Aśvins to her bed in the manner in which the widow invites to her bed her younger brother-in-law, — that you do not come up?’

“But what peculiarity is there in the mantras used at marriage (that capital is made of there being no indication in them of the practice in question)?”

What is meant is that the texts connected with marriage are more nearly connected with the subject of the begetting of children.

Others read ‘vidvadbhiḥ’ (for ‘avidvadbhiḥ’); and the meaning of this would be — ‘This practice, of having intercourse with the brother’s wife, which is fit for beasts, has been declared by the learned to be reprehensible, for men, — and it was introduced during the reign of King Vena.’ — (66)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

This verse is quoted in Vīramitrodaya (Saṃskāra, p. 738); — and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 186a).

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verses 9.60-68)

See Comparative notes for Verse 9.60.

VERSE 9.67

Section IV - Duties of Women in Times of Distress (niyoga)

स महीमखिलां भुञ्जन् राजर्षिप्रवरः पुरा ।
वर्णानां सङ्करं चक्रे कामोपहतचेतनः ॥६७॥

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