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All this has already been answered by the commentators, who have explained that in such cases the action of the principal agent is imposed upon (represented as belonging to) the subordinate (insentient) agent. Such imposition upon insentient objects we find in such expressions as — ‘alms-begging affords shelter,’ ‘the dry cow-dung teaches,’ and so forth. In such cases, the help accorded (in the shape of lodging and teaching) is not by the insentient things (begging and cow-dung), but by a different agent, who is the real instigator of the acts. the act of teaching, for instance, is prompted by the Injunction of having recourse to a Teacher; and when the teacher is doing this act of teaching, he is hampered by cold and such other hindrances; and this cold is removed by the dry cow-dung (being burnt as fuel); thus it is that the action of ‘teaching’ itself comes to be imposed upon the cow-dung. An ‘agent’ or an ‘instigator’ is so called because of the impelling or urging done by it; and we do find such impelling being done also by such insentient things as wind and water, in reference to the burning of fire and floating of wood (respectively). And in all such cases as there can be no directing, etc., done by the Fire, the words would have to be regarded as used in a figurative sense.

If again the character of the ‘agent’ be hold to consist in doing something conducive to the act in question, — then this could only he in accordance with the actual action of the Agent concerned, which action would be in the form of preparing for the main act; for one who arranges for an act is said to hate it done; when for instance, for a person who is going to dine, one man brings up the dish and another serves the rice and so forth; similarly when a man is going to do the act of killing, one man offers him the weapon, while another, by recounting the misdeeds of the man going to ho killed, kindles the rage of the person going to kill him. In all such cases, though each of these other abettors does not do any directing or urging, yet, in as much as he helps to bring about conditions favourable for the fulfilment of the act concerned, becomes a sort of an ‘agent’ in it, in the sense that what he actually does is conducive to the said act.

According to this view, the cow-dung and the Teacher would stand on the same footing (as agents in the act of teaching).

But in this connection also that principal instigator is the ‘Agent’ without whom the act cannot be accomplished and who does not fall within the category of any other particular case-relation. Without the readier, the cow-dung itself cannot become a prompter of the teaching; while the teacher can do the teaching, even without the cow-dung, and hence the cow-dung becomes the subordinate factor. As for those things that are definitely recognised as the ‘instrument,’ or such other factor conducive to the accomplishment of an act, — these also would he clearly subordinate. For instance, when one sees a man going to a remote village again, even on slight business, he says ‘the horse makes Devadutta go.’

Question. — “As a matter of fact, in connection with the nomenclature of the case-relations, there is no reference made to the greater or less intimacy of the determining relation; what difference then is there between the cow-dung and the Teacher (so far as the character of the nominative agent of the act of teaching is concerned)? The. distinction that you have drawn between the two is a mere gratuitous assumption of yours, and there is no reality behind it; while all Injunctions and Prohibitions refer to realities. Further, it has also been declared that ‘the exact nature of case-relations is determined by the wish of the speaker.’ Under the circumstances, if a certain speaker wishes to speak of a nonagent as the agent, the Injunctions and Prohibitions relating to the Agent could become applicable to him. For instance, when enunciating the Sins, manu himself mentions ‘the buyer, the seller, the cooker and the server’ (ns the killer of the animal whose flesh is eaten). From this it is clear that the maxim that you have propounded is meant for the purpose of lending support to the position taken up by yourself, and it does not touch the reality of things.”

It is for this very reason that the commentators have agreed that if the mere doing of something conducive to an act were the condition of being the ‘agent,’ then every kind of cause (of the act) would have to be regarded as ‘agent.’ So that when one gives food to a man, and this man, being a glutton, happens to die by over-eating, — the man who gave the food would become the agent in the act of killing. As a matter of fact, however, the action of the feeder has not been prompted by the idea of killing the man; it was prompted by the idea of a totally different act, in the form of feeding, and not in that of killing; nor was it prompted by hatred or jealousy or any such feeling. So that oven though the man may have helped to bring about the death, yet he does not become the ‘agent’ of that act. That is all that we have to say. In a case where one takes away lands or gold, etc., belonging to another person, and the latter dies through grief caused by the robbery, — it has to be considered whether the robber becomes the ‘agent’ in the act of robbing only, or in that of killing also.

“What is then to be ‘considered’ in this connection? The relation of Cause and Effect can he ascertained by infallibility; and the robbing of land or gold is not an infallible cause of death, to the same extent as striking with the, sword or starving is.”

What sort of ‘infallibility’ is meant here? It may he held that if by a certain thing, some one dies, while others do not, — then the agency or causal efficiency of that thing (towards bringing about death) would be regarded as ‘fallible.’ But any such principle would be defective, on account of the divergence in the constitution of men. One and the same medicine is found to be beneficial to a man of phlegmatic constitution, but harmful to another. In fact in the case of all men, the appearance of now forces is dependent upon such contingencies as those of disposition, place, time, nature and accessories. In fact in the eases cited also, the death is dependent upon the wealth and progeny of the man concerned, as also upon thirst and other living organisms (?). For instance, if the man robbed is of a very passionate disposition, or liable to give way to grief, the trouble caused by the robbery becomes conducive to death. And in such a case can the agency (of the robber in the net of killing) he denied? On the other hand, if the man is easy-natured, ho ignores the robbery. This same reasoning applies also to the case of the man who, being obsessed by grief, commits suicide by having recourse to starvation, falling from a precipice, taking poison, — laying the blame of it upon other persons.

“But in such cases, in as much the taking of poison and other well-known causes of death would be present, the wrong done in the shape of robbing the land, etc., could not be regarded.os the cause of the death.”

But since the man has recourse to the means of death, by reason of being stricken with grief, caused by the robbery, — the robbery becomes the indirect cause of the death.

If such be the case, then if some one happens to be aggrieved by wholesome advice given by a well-wisher and commit suicide, the person offering the advice would be a ‘murderer.’ Similarly, jealous persons, withering under the pangs of jealousy, would place the blame of their suffering upon the wealthy person of whom they are jealous. Likewise, when a man with unhinged mind dies upon the death of his son or his loved person, — these latter would have to be regarded as ‘murderers.’ In the same manner some light-hearted people, on seeing a beautiful woman, become so affected that, becoming brokenhearted, they lose all consciousness; and in this case chaste women would have to be censured. And lastly (in the event of a Brāhmaṇa dying of grief caused by the death of a loved person) the dead person would incur the sin of having killed a Brāhmaṇa.

All this would be quite true, if there were no specific injunctions and prohibitions covering special oases. As a matter of fact however, the offering of wholesome advice is enjoined, while the robbing of what belongs to another is forbidden. It has been thus declared — ‘In the case of people engaged in doing good to others, if there happen something untoward, no blame attaches to those people; as for example, in the case of physicians administering medicine.’ This does not mean that it is only in the case of medicines administered by physicians producing untoward results that there is no blame attaching to the physicians, — but in all similar cases; e.g., when a cow has become stuck in the mire, if a man exerts himself to the utmost in pulling her out with his hand, and the cow happens to die, the man, who tried to pull her out, is not open to blame. Similarly in all analogous cases.

If a man happens to carry on bis business carefully and acquires much prosperity in the shape of riches, — if some people happen to burn with jealousy, that man does not transgress any scriptural prohibition. Further, an act becomes an object of prohibition only when its causal efficiency (towards harm) is certain and unfailing; and no definite deduction can be drawn regarding the momentarily changing mental aberrations of. living beings; so that it cannot be definitely ascertained that such and such a person has died on account of the beauty of such and such a woman. And so long as we can get at well-ascertained objects of prohibition, it cannot be right to make it pertain to doubtful cases.

“But in a case where the fact of the man becoming pale and withered in body, it is definitely ascertained that the cause of his suffering lies in the beauty of a certain woman, — this woman should either renounce her chastity and meet him, or else she should be regarded as a murderess.”

Certainly not; even though the causal efficiency (of the woman’s chastity towards her lover’s sufferings) be duly ascertained, yet chastity cannot become an object of prohibition; because such a prohibition would be contrary to a definite Injunction; there is such an Injunction regarding the avoidance of unchastity; and so long as an Injunction has room for application in an objection not touched by any other Injunction, it cannot encroach upon the objective of a contrary Injunction (so that so long as the prohibition of killing has room for application in the shape of ordinary murder, etc., it cannot encroach upon the objective of the Injunction of chastity.)

Some people argue as follows: — “What the injunction of chastity prohibits is that act which is done under the impulse of sexual passion, and not that which is done under a righteous impulse sanctioned by the scriptures. Hence, if the woman has intercourse with her dying lover, solely for saving his life, being moved entirely by the consideration that the poor man may lose his life, — she does not, by the act, transgress the injunction of chastity as regards the dictum that one injunction cannot encroach upon the objective of another; as the act in question does not form the objective of any other injunction, being due entirely to passion. It might he argued that there is no scriptural injunction sanctioning the act (of the woman meeting the dying lover), because there is no Smṛti text permitting adultery in such cases, as there is one sanctioning the begetting of a child from the dead husband’s younger brother. It is true that if she did not act so, she would be encompassing the death of the man, — and it is on account of the prohibition of the act of killing that she acts in that manner. But that prohibition applies only to the killing that is done through the passion of hatred; while when the woman desists from meeting the man, it is not through hatred of him, but on account of the prohibition of adultery. The act too that one may do for benefiting another person, must be one that avoids the transgressing of all prohibitions.”

In a case where some one asks a man for a certain thing, and threatens that he would kill himself if the thing is not given to him, — and does actually kill himself, — the man who refused the request cannot be regarded as a murderer. For if men were to be so regarded, there would be an end to all worldly business. — (104)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

This verse is quoted in Prāyaścittaviveka (p. 432), which says that this is to be regarded as mere arthavāda, as expiatory rites are prescribed for this lying also; — in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 207), as an exception to the general rule regarding deposing truthfully; — in Kṛtyakalpataru (38a); — and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 58a), which explains that this verse makes silence, or even lying, better than telling the truth, under the circumstances.

Comparative notes by various authors:

Gautama (13.24-25). — ‘No guilt is incurred in giving false evidence in case the life of a man depends thereon; — but not if the man involved be a wicked one.’

Vaśiṣṭha (16.35). — ‘Men may speak an untruth in marriage, during dalliance, when their lives are in danger, or the loss of their entire property is imminent; and for the sake of a Brāhmaṇa; they declare that an untruth spoken in these five cases does not make the speaker an outcast.’

Viṣṇu (8.15). — ‘Whenever the death of any member of the four castes is involved, if witnesses give false evidence, they are not to blame.’

Yājñavalkya (2.83). — ‘When the death of a member of any caste is involved the witness may speak an untruth.’

Bṛhaspati (7.34). — ‘Let him preserve, even by telling a lie, a Brāhmaṇa who has sinned once through error, and is in peril of life, and oppressed by rogues and others.’

VERSE 8.105

Section XV - False evidence permissible in special cases

वाग्दैवत्यैश्च चरुभिर्यजेरंस्ते सरस्वतीम् ।
अनृतस्यैनसस्तस्य कुर्वाणा निष्कृतिं पराम् ॥१०५॥

vāgdaivatyaiśca carubhiryajeraṃste sarasvatīm |
anṛtasyainasastasya kurvāṇā niṣkṛtiṃ parām ||105||

They should offer sacrifices to Sarasvati with half-boiled rice dedicated to the speech-goddess, — doing the best expiation for the sin of untruthfulness. — (105)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘Speech-goddess’ — goddess in the form of speech; the rice boiled for her is said to be ‘dedicated to the speech-goddess’; — Rice not over-boiled is called ‘chant’; — with these they should offer sacrifices.

We have ‘carubhiḥ,’ ‘with half-boiled rice,’ in the plural number, on account of the plural number in the verb ‘yajerau’, ‘they should sacrifice’; and it does not mean that each man shall offer several kinds of rice. Nor is this offering to be made by several persons collectively, as is done in the case of the Vrātyastoma offering. The plural number in the present case is exactly analogous to the plural number in such passages as — ‘If it rains, many Brāhmaṇas should offer sacrifices’; and it is not like that in the case of the ‘kapiñjala birds’ (where at least three are meant).

In the case in question the lie is told for the sake of helping the Brāhmaṇa or some such person; and this lying itself is a ‘sin’; — the action of lying itself being a sin. The genitive ending in the phrase ‘anṛtasyainaḥ’ ‘sin of lying’ denotes apposition; just as in the phrase ‘Dharmakriyā’ (where ‘dharma’ and ‘kriyā’ are in apposition). Some people however hold that ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’ or ‘merit’ and ‘sin’ are produced by actions (and do not consist in the actions themselves); and according to this view in the phrase ‘anṛtasya enaḥ,’ ‘sin of lying,’ the terms ‘sin’ of ‘lying’ would not be in apposition; the ‘sin’ being the effect of the lying, and hence figuratively spoken of as being in apposition with it.

The ‘niṣkṛti’ of this sin is ‘purifying,’ ‘cleaning,’ — i.e., expiation.

‘Best’ — most excellent.

“Why should there be any sin in this case — when it has been declared that there is nothing wrong in lying under the circumstances mentioned.”

Some people answer this objection by pointing out that the avoiding of untruth leads to excellent results (even when the telling of untruth may be permissible): a man may, on the basis of the scriptures, have taken the vow that throughout his life he would not tell a lie; and if such a man were to tell a lie for saving the life of a man, he would incur the sin of having boon false to his vow; and it is in view of this sin that the present text prescribes the expiation. Even though such acts as the burning of a house and killing are prohibited, yet they have been sanctioned under special conditions. Similarly we have (in the preceding verse) the sanction for lying under special circumstances; hence the mention of its ‘expiation’ must be regarded as a mere reference (to the prohibition of lying in general).

Question. — “How can a sacrifice be offered to Sarasvatī with what has been dedicated to the goddess of speech?” If the rice has been ‘dedicated’ to the Speech-goddess, how can the sacrifice be regarded as offered to Sarasvatī? Or, if the two Sarasvatīs (one spoken of by the name ‘Sarasvati, ‘while the other is referred to by the name ‘speech-goddess’) combined be regarded as the deity to whom the sacrifice is offered, — then there arises this difficulty that, as a matter of fact, the exact nature of the deity of a sacrifice can be learnt entirely from words, and the two names here used are two distinct words (so that both could not refer to the same deity); for instance, if the injunction of an offering is in the form — ‘the offering should be made to Agni,’ — people do not use the other names of Agni, — such as ‘Jvalana’ ‘Kṛśānu’ and the like — when actually making the sacrifice. Similarly when the injunction is in the form ‘one should offer to Vāyu,’ — even though it is distinctly laid down that ‘Vaya is Prāṇa’ — the name ‘Prāṇa’ — is not used when the offering is actually made.”

All this is quite true; ‘speech-goddess’ is the deity of the sacrifice, — the nominal affix in the term ‘vāgdaivatya’ being denotative of the deific character; and the deity is not denoted by the term ‘Sarasvatīm,’ which appears with the accusative ending. Because the Accusative ending denotes the objective, while the deity is the recipient, and not the objective.

“How then is the term ‘Sarasvatīm’ to be construed?”

The present passage is only a hortatory exaggeration, just like the assertion ‘one should make au offering to Agni, Agni is all deities;’ and what the present statement means is that ‘speech-goddess is Sarasvatī herself, and hence when the offering is made to the former she is pleased, and it reaches the other also.’

The character of the ‘deity’ is ascertained only through sacrifices; as in the case of sacrifices offered to Agni, to Prajāpati and so forth (where the fact of Agni or Prajāpati being the deity is ascertained only by the sacrifice being offered to them).

Some people explain that what is meant is that the deities are to be worshipped, the root ‘yaji’ (in ‘yajeran’) signifying the act of worshipping; and the deity worshipped forms the objective of the ‘worship’; so that the use of the Accusative in ‘Sarasvatīm’ is only right and proper. There are several such assertions as ‘he worships the deity’ (where the deity is the object of the verb to worship).”

This however is not right. As under this view the deific character of Sarasvatī will have to be deduced from somewhere else; and such an interpretation would be contrary to the dictum that ‘the deific character consists in being the recipient of a sacrificial offering.’ This dictum however, being self-sufficient, is highly authoritative.

The real explanation is that the deity to whom a sacrifice is offered is to be made the recipient of the offering, and also to be meditated upon, — according to the injunction, ‘One shall think in his mind of the deity for whom the offering is held up’; so that the deity is also the object of the act of meditating; and the accusative ending (in ‘Sarasvatīm’) actually denotes the objective itself. — (105)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

‘Kapiñjalaiḥ’ (Medhātithi, p. 937, l. 11) — This refers to a case dealt with in Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, where it is said that whenever the plural number is used, we should understand it to mean three; for instance, when ‘Kapiñjala birds’ are spoken of as to be sacrificed. Medhātithi says that this principle should not be applied to the present case of the plural in ‘Charrubhiḥ’.

Nandana does not read the verse differently as asserted by Hopkins.

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 682), which adds that the plural number in ‘Carubhiḥ’ is due to the plurality of the persons referred to here — ‘te’, ‘they’; — in Prāyaścittaviveka (p. 432), which says that this refers to the three higher castes only.

It is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Prāyaścitta, p. 390); — in Smṛtitattva (II, p. 355), which adds that ‘Vāgdevatā’ here must be taken as standing for Sarasvatī, the terms ‘Vāk’ and ‘Sarasvatī’ being synonymous, specially as it is only thus that the offering shall be consistent with its name ‘Sacrifice to Sarasvatī’; it proceeds to add that the pronoun ‘te’ here stands for those witnesses who tell a lie for saving a Brāhmaṇa or a Kṣatriya from death; — in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 207); and in Kṛtyakalpataru (38b).

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verses 8.105-106)

Yājñavalkya (2.83). — ‘For expiating the sin involved in deposing falsely for saving the life of a man, twice-born persons should offer the cooked rice dedicated to Sarasvatī.’

Viṣṇu (8.16-17). — ‘In order to expiate the sin committed (by deposing falsely for saving the life of a man), the witness, if he is a twice-born person, must pour an oblation into the fire, consecrating it with the Mantra-texts called Kūṣmāṇḍī; if he is a Śūdra, he must feed ten cows for one day.’

Baudhāyana (1.19.16). — ‘Let him who has given false evidence (for any reason) drink hot milk during twelve days and nights, and pour oblations into the fire with the mantras called Kūṣmāṇḍī.’

VERSE 8.106

Section XV - False evidence permissible in special cases

कूष्माण्डैर्वाऽपि जुहुयाद् घृतमग्नौ यथाविधि ।
उदित्य् ऋचा वा वारुण्या तृचेनाब्दैवतेन वा ॥१०६॥

kūṣmāṇḍairvā'pi juhuyād ghṛtamagnau yathāvidhi |
udity ṛcā vā vāruṇyā tṛcenābdaivatena vā ||106||

Or he shall offer according to rule, clarified butter into the fire, with the ‘kuṣmāṇḍa’-texts or with the verse ‘ut, etc.’ sacred to varuṇa, or with the three verses sacred to the waters. — (106)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

The mantras called ‘kūṣmāṇḍā’ are found in the Yajurveda; with these he shall offer clarified butter into the fire. The root ‘hu’ (in ‘juhuyāt’) signifies the act of giving away to a certain deity; and as the term ‘agnau’ mentions Agni only as the receptacle into which the offering is to be poured, the deity of the offering should be deduced from the words of these Mantras themselves. In those cases where the words of the mantras are not found to be indicative of any deity, — e.g., in the mantra ‘devakṛtasyainasovayanamasi, etc.’ (Yājurvedā, 8.13) Prajāpati is to be accepted as the required deity, — so say the people learned in sacrificial lore. The other alternative view is that the offering in such cases is to be associated with those that have already been found to be the ‘deity’ of other offerings. The author of the Nirukta also has declared — ‘what others could be the deity?’ Though there is no deity common to all offerings in general, each sacrifice has its own materials as well as deity clearly indicated, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly through mantras.

What we say however is that the mantra ‘devakṛtasyainasovayajanamasi,’ itself contains the term ‘yajana’; and as ‘yajana’ is the same as ‘yājana,’ it is the latter that is the required deity; and as in the case of every mantra, there is hound to be something that is denoted by it, there will always be some words of the mantra that would indicate the required deity.

The verse ‘ut, etc.,’ refers to the verse ‘Uduttamam varuṇa pāśamasmat, etc.’ (Ṛgveda, 1.24.15); and the epithet ‘sacred to Varuṇa’ has been added in order to exclude the other verse beginning with ‘ut’, — vis., “Ut-tvā madantu stomā,’ etc. (Ṛgveda, 8.64.1).

‘With the three verses sacred to the waters.’ — The term ‘daivata’ is synonymous with ‘devatā’; and the three verses of which the Waters are the deity are ‘Āpohiṣṭhā mayobhuvaḥ, etc’ (Ṛgveda, 10.9.1). In this case there is one oblation with each of these three verses and one with all the three collectively.

The terms ‘clarified butter’ and ‘into the fire’ have to be construed with every clause.

‘According to rule,’ — i.e., in accordance with the practice of cultured people. Hence, in as much as the offering being that of butter, all the details of the primary sacrifices could not be transferred to it, — this phrase sanctions the adopting of only such details as the brushing of the place, sprinkling it with water, examining of the butter, pouring the oblations with the sruva and so forth.

The particle ‘vā’ shows that all the offerings mentioned are to be regarded as optional alternatives. — (106)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

Kūṣmaṇḍaiḥ’ — i.e ., Vājasaneya Saṃhitā, 20.14-16, or Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, 10.3-5.

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 682), which adds that ‘uditi’ refers to the opening word of the mantra ‘Uduttamamvaruṇa pāśamasmat &c.’ (Ṛgveda, 1.24.15); — in Parāśaramādhava (Prāyaścitta, p. 390); — in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 207); — and in Kṛtyakalpataru (38b).

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verses 8.105-106)

See Comparative notes for Verse 8.105.

VERSE 8.107 [Abstaining from giving evidence]

Section XVI - Abstaining from giving evidence

त्रिपक्षादब्रुवन् साक्ष्यं ऋणादिषु नरोऽगदः ।
तदृणं प्राप्नुयात् सर्वं दशबन्धं च सर्वतः ॥१०७॥

tripakṣādabruvan sākṣyaṃ ṛṇādiṣu naro'gadaḥ |
tadṛṇaṃ prāpnuyāt sarvaṃ daśabandhaṃ ca sarvataḥ ||107||

The man, who, without being ill, does not give evidence for three fortnights, in regard to debts and other matters, should hear that entire debt, as also a penalty of the tenth part in all cases. — (107)

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