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Nārada (3.12). — ‘One quarter of the iniquity goes to the offender, one quarter goes to the witness; one quarter goes to all the members of the Court; one quarter goes to the King.’

Hārīta (Vyavahāratattva). — ‘Of injustice, one quarter falls on the perpetrator, one quarter on the witness, one quarter on all the members of the Court and one quarter on the King.’

VERSE 8.19

Section III - Constitution of the Court of Justice (continued)

राजा भवत्यनेनास्तु मुच्यन्ते च सभासदः ।
एनो गच्छति कर्तारं निन्दाऽर्हो यत्र निन्द्यते ॥१९॥

rājā bhavatyanenāstu mucyante ca sabhāsadaḥ |
eno gacchati kartāraṃ nindā'rho yatra nindyate ||19||

Where, however, the person deserving of censure is actually censured, there the king becomes sinless, the members of the court become freed, and the sin falls upon the perpetrator. — (19)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

The same idea is stated conversely.

Where the guilty person is not able to hide his guilt, and his guilt is duly exposed, then everything turns out to be right.

From verse 14 onwards we have a set of supplementary exaggerations, containing praises and condemnations indicating the good and bad results, — put forward for the purpose of forbidding the actual committing of injustice, as also the conniving at it (being committed by others).

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 604); — in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 26), to the effect that the king becomes absolved from all sin if he shows complete impartiality; — in Smṛtitattva (II, p. 200) which adds the following notes: — ‘Kartāram’ means the ‘speaker’, the perjuror, — the term ‘rājā’ here stands for the Judge, — ‘anenāḥ’ means ‘free from sin’; — in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 48); — and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, 5a).

Comparative notes by various authors:

Nārada (3.13). — ‘The King is freed from responsibility, the members of the Court obtain their absolution, and the guilt rests on the offender, — when the guilty person is punished.’

Bodhāyana (1.19.8). — ‘When he who deserves condemnation is condemned, the King is guiltless and the judges free from blame; the guilt falls on the offender alone.’

Hārita( Vyavahāratattva). — (Same as Manu.)

VERSE 8.20

Section III - Constitution of the Court of Justice (continued)

जातिमात्रोपजीवी वा कामं स्याद् ब्राह्मणब्रुवः ।
धर्मप्रवक्ता नृपतेर्न शूद्रः कथं चन ?? ॥२०॥

jātimātropajīvī vā kāmaṃ syād brāhmaṇabruvaḥ |
dharmapravaktā nṛpaterna śūdraḥ kathaṃ cana ?? ||20||

Even a so-called Brāhmaṇa, who makes a living by his caste only, may, at pleasure be the propounder of the Law for the king, — but not a Śūdra under any circumtsances. — (20)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

It has been said above (under verse 10) that the king shall decide cases helped by Brāhmaṇas and by three men well versed in council. Now, in as much as the caste of these councillors has not been specified, it might so happen that Śūdras might enter the Court, and being ‘councillors,’ it would be permissible for them to decide cases, and being possessed of cultured minds, they might pronounce their opinions on matters relating to the Law; specially in all legal proceedings a knowledge of Smṛti-texts is not essential, on account of not possessing which the Śūdra could be precluded from pronouncing judgments. As a matter of fact, grounds of victory and defeat (in legal proceedings), — such as witnesses and other kinds of evidence — are such as are amenable to the ordinary means of knowledge. For instance, a man possessed of cultivated intelligence can easily find out that ‘such and such a person is a right witness, and not related, by any relationship, to the party citing him,’ or that ‘such another person is not a right witness, having several times been found to have lied’; and such matters are not cognisable means of Smṛti-texts only.

Thus then the present verse contains the prohibition of a possible contingency.

Nor is there any definite rule regarding the caste of the ‘Councillor,’ as there is in regard to that of the ‘Priest’; e.g., having declared that ‘he shall with them (the Councillors) consider the questions, etc., etc.’ (7.56), the text does not say that ‘he shall consider these, with the Brāhmaṇas.’ Thus the the meaning of the verse comes to be this — ‘even though a Śūdra might learn up hits of Law, and be a Councillor or an officer for inflicting punishments, yet he shall not pronounce any opinion on the merits of cases being investigated in the King’s Court.’

What is said in the first half of the verse is to be explained as supplementary to the above prohibition. Because it cannot be asserted, in any case, that the Brāhmaṇa, who makes a living by his caste and is entirely devoid of learning and other qualifications, should be a propounder of the Law. Hence, when we come to examine its exact significance and form, the affirmation (contained in the first half of the verse) is found to stand on the same footing as the assertion ‘eat poison, but do not eat in his house,’ where also the affirmation (‘eat poison’) is supplementary to the prohibition, and not a real affirmation at all.

It is for this reason that the author has added the term ‘kāmam,’ ‘may, at pleasure;’ the very use of this term deprives the sentence of its injunctive character.

Other people offer the following explanation: — “Inasmuch as the Brāhmaṇa has been specifically declared to be employed as the Propounder of the Law, in such texts as — ‘the learned Brāhmaṇa shall be appointed, etc.,’ — this in itself excludes all the other three castes, the Kṣatriya and the rest; so that what the prohibition of the Śūdra in the present verse means is that in the absence of Brāhmaṇas, the Kṣatriya and the Vaiśya may he appointed (hut never the Śūdra).” The rest of it they explain, as above.

‘Who makes a living by his caste only;’ — the term ‘mātra,’ ‘only,’ has a restrictive force; the meaning being ‘he who lives only on the strength of his Brāhmaṇa-caste, and not by learning and other qualities, being absolutely devoid of all Brāhmaṇical qualifications.

The term ‘bruva,’ ‘so-called,’ is deprecatory. — (20)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

‘Brāhmaṇabruvaḥ’ — ‘One whose origin is doubtful, but who calls himself a Brāhmaṇa’ (’Kullūka and Rāghavānanda); — ‘despicable Brāhmaṇa’ (Medhātithi and Govindarāja); — ‘an initiated Brāhmaṇa who does not study the Veda’ (Nārāyaṇa).

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 601); — in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 22); — in Smṛtitattva (II, p. 200), which supplies the definition of ‘brāhmaṇabruvaḥ’ as ‘the Brāhmaṇa who neither studies nor teaches (the Veda) — in Kṛtyakalpataru (9a); — and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 11a).

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verses 8.20-21)

Śukranīti (4.5.27). — ‘If the Brāhmaṇa he not learned enough, the King should appoint a Kṣatriya or Vaiśya learned in the legal law; — but he shall always avoid the Śūdra.’

Kātyāyana (Aparārka, p. 601). — (Same as Manu.)

Vyāsa (Vyavahāratattva). — ‘If the King, leaving the twice-born, tries law-suits with the assistance of Śūdras, he falls.’

VERSE 8.21

Section III - Constitution of the Court of Justice (continued)

यस्य शूद्रस्तु कुरुते राज्ञो धर्मविवेचनम् ।
तस्य सीदति तद् राष्ट्रं पङ्के गौरिव पश्यतः ॥२१॥

yasya śūdrastu kurute rājño dharmavivecanam |
tasya sīdati tad rāṣṭraṃ paṅke gauriva paśyataḥ ||21||

The kingdom or that king for whom the investigation of Law is done by a Śūdra, while he himself is looking on, suffers, like the cow in a morass. — (21)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

This is a supplementary declaration to the foregoing Injunction.

The construction is — That king for whom the ‘investigation of law’ — i.e., decision on legal cases — is made by a Śūdra duly qualified by learning, etc., — his kingdom, — people, subjects — ‘suffers’ — is destroyed — ‘like the cow in a morass;’ — ‘paśyataḥ’ — ‘while he is looking on.’ — (21)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 601); — in Kṛtyakalpataru (9b); — and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 11a).

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verses 8.20-21)

See Comparative notes for Verse 8.20.

VERSE 8.22

Section III - Constitution of the Court of Justice (continued)

यद् राष्ट्रं शूद्रभूयिष्ठं नास्तिकाक्रान्तमद्विजम् ।
विनश्यत्याशु तत् कृत्स्नं दुर्भिक्षव्याधिपीडितम् ॥२२॥

yad rāṣṭraṃ śūdrabhūyiṣṭhaṃ nāstikākrāntamadvijam |
vinaśyatyāśu tat kṛtsnaṃ durbhikṣavyādhipīḍitam ||22||

That kingdom where there is a majority of Śūdras, which is infested with non-believers and destitute of twice-born people, quickly perishes entirely, becoming afflicted by famine and disease. — (22)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

Like the preceding verse this also is a supplementary declaration.

From the context it is clear that ‘the majority of Śūdras’ is meant with reference to the persons pronouncing judgments upon disputed cases; and the meaning is that — ‘where among persons deciding cases there is a majority of Śūdras, such a kingdom perishes quickly, through sufferings caused by famine and disease’; and it follows that from the destruction of the kingdom follows that of the king also.

‘Infested with non-believers,’ — i.e., inhabited by such persons as are materialists, denying the existence of other worlds.

‘Destitute of twice-born people’; — ‘non-believers’ cannot be regarded as a class distinct from that of Brāhmaṇa and the rest; as that would lead to a cross-division; as has been declared thus — ‘Brāhmaṇas and the rest come to hear the titles of physicians, traders and so forth.’ Or, the expression ‘destitute of twice-born people’ may be taken to mean ‘where twice-born persons are not consulted and trusted in connection with difficulties relating to the Law.’ — (22)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

‘Śūdrabhūyiṣṭham’ — ‘Where Śūdras form a majority among judges’ (Medhātithi); — ‘where Śūdras, i. e., disbelievers, form the majority of inhabitants’ (Kullūka); — ‘where Śūdras form the majority among holders of high office’ (Nandana).

Medhātithi does not explain ‘Śūdra’ here as ‘unbelievers’; he has been misrepresented by Hopkins.

VERSE 8.23 [The Commencement of Trials]

Section IV - The Commencement of Trials

धर्मासनमधिष्ठाय संवीताङ्गः समाहितः ।
प्रणम्य लोकपालेभ्यः कार्यदर्शनमारभेत् ॥२३॥

dharmāsanamadhiṣṭhāya saṃvītāṅgaḥ samāhitaḥ |
praṇamya lokapālebhyaḥ kāryadarśanamārabhet ||23||

Having occupied the Judgment-seat, with his body covered and mind collected, he shall salute the Guardian-Deities, and then proceed with the investigation of suits. — (23)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘Judgment-seat,’ — that seat upon which the pronouncing of judgments is the principal work done. When he is seated upon his royal throne, the king regards ‘wealth’ as conducive to the prosperity of the kingdom, to be the most important matter, even in preference to ‘morality’; but when he is engaged in deciding suits, he regards ‘morality’ or ‘Justice’ as the most important thing; — this is what is implied by the name ‘judgement-seat,’ which does not mean that ‘morality’ or ‘Justice’ is a quality of the ‘scat.’

‘With his body covered,’ — i.e., having his body covered up with cloth and such other things.

‘He shall salute the guardian-deities,’ — how down to the eight ‘Guardians of the People, Indra and the rest’; — ‘he shall proceed with the investigation of suits.’

These two acts — covering up of the body and saluting the Guardian deities — are laid down with a view to some transcendental result.

‘With mind collected,’ — with his mind concentrated, hot turning towards any other thing. This serves a visible purpose.

Or, the phrase ‘with collected mind’ may be taken as modifying the verb ‘salute.’

Though what is asserted here appears to have been already said before, yet, in as much as the treatise is a metrical one, repetition cannot he very strongly objected to.

In ‘Lokapālebhyaḥ’ ‘to the Guardian Deities,’ the Dative ending denotes the recipient of a gift; since under the Sutra dealing with the Dative, it has been held (by the Vārtika) that that also is a ‘recipient’ for whose sake a certain act is done; e.g., ‘śrāddhāya nigṛhṇate’ (‘He keeps himself in check for the sake of the performance of Śrāddhas’), ‘patye shete’ (‘Lies down for the sake of her husband’). Nor can the said assertion he regarded as restricted to the two roots here mentioned (in the two examples); as no such restriction is mentioned in the Bhāṣya. — (23)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 41) in Smṛtitattva (II, p. 200); — in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Vyavahāra, pp. 2a and 5b); — in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 70); — and by Jimūtavāhana (Dāyabhāga, p. 4a).

Comparative notes by various authors:

Bṛhaspati (1.21-23). — ‘The King having risen early in the morning and performed ablutions according to rule, and having shown due honour to elders, astronomers, physicians, deities, Brāhmaṇas and domestic priests, — should enter the Court-room, decorated with flowers, ornaments and fine clothes, with a cheerful countenance. Having entered the Court in the forenoon, together with the elders, ministers and attendants, he should try cases and listen to the exposition of Purāṇas, Law-Codes and Rules of Policy.’

Śukranīti (4.5.85-87). — ‘The King should enter the Court modestly, together with the Brāhmaṇas and the Ministers versed in state-craft, with the object of investigating cases. He should proceed with the work after taking the seat of justice.’

Saṃvarta (Smṛticandrikā-Vyavahāra). — ‘Bowing to the Guardians of the Regions, the King shall enter the splendid Court and carry on the work of protecting the people by looking into their suits.’

VERSE 8.24

Section IV - The Commencement of Trials

अर्थानर्थावुभौ बुद्ध्वा धर्माधर्मौ च केवलौ ।
वर्णक्रमेण सर्वाणि पश्येत् कार्याणि कार्यिणाम् ॥२४॥

arthānarthāvubhau buddhvā dharmādharmau ca kevalau |
varṇakrameṇa sarvāṇi paśyet kāryāṇi kāryiṇām ||24||

Understanding both ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ to be only ‘Justice’ and ‘Injustice,’ he shall look into all the suits of the suitors, according to the order of the castes. — (24)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘Justice and Injustice’ alone are desirable and undesirable. It is not that the ‘desirable’ consists in the obtaining of cattle, gold and other things, or that the ‘undesirable’ in the reverse thereof; in fact it is ‘Justice’ that is ‘desirable’ and ‘Injustice’ that is ‘undesirable’; — ‘understanding’ this — i.e., having come to this conclusion in his mind, — ‘he shall look into the suits.’

Or, the text may mean that the king shall examine what is ‘desirable,’ and what is ‘undesirable,’ — and also what is ‘Justice’ and what is ‘Injustice.’ That is, he should realise the importance of ‘Justice’ and the unimportance of what is merely ‘desirable;’ or that when the element of ‘undesirability’ is very large, and that of ‘Injustice’ very small, — there he shall avoid the former; because it is possible for a slight ‘Injustice’ to be set aside by the larger ‘desirable’ factor through gifts and expiatory rites.

In the event of several suitors coming up at the same time, he shall take them up in the order of their castes; but this order of investigation based upon castes is to be observed only when the troubles of all the suitors are of the same degree; when, on the other hand, the business of the lower caste is very urgent or very important, then this should he taken up first, in accordance with the maxim ‘he whose trouble is urgent, etc., etc.’; and in this case the order of the castes is not to be strictly observed. It has already been said that the investigation of cases is for the purpose of maintaining order in the kingdom; so that the rules laid down need not always be followed literally. — (24)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

‘Arthānarthāvubhau buddhvā dharmādharmau ca kevalau’ — Medhātithi has given three explanations of this (See Translation): — ‘Fully realizing the wordly evils and advantages, but paying due heed to Dharma and Adharma as alone conducive to spiritual results’ (Kullūka); — ‘discriminating the righteous and the unrighteous, and taking up the righteous first’ (Nārāyaṇa and Nandana); — ‘knowing what will please and what displease the people and understanding what is just and what is unjust’ (Govindarāja).

This verse is quoted in Parāśaramādhava (Vyavahāra, p. 46), as laying down the order in which the king is to take up the cases, when several come up at the same time; — in Smṛticandrikā (Vyavahāra, p. 80); — in Kṛtyakalpataru, (16b); — and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 19a).

Comparative notes by various authors:

Śukranīti (4.5.113-117). — ‘The King with the Ministers after receiving the plaintiff duly should first console him and then commence the trial, he should then enquire of the plaintiff standing submissively before him — What is your business? What is your complaint? Do not be afraid — by what ruffian and under what circumstances hare you been molested?’

Bṛhaspati (1.24). — ‘Let the King, or a member of the twice-born caste officiating as Chief-Judge, try causes, acting on principles of equity, and abiding by the opinion of the judges, and by the doctrine of the sacred law.’

Nārada (1.31, 31, 35). — ‘A King who acts justly must reject error when brought forward, and seek truth alone; because prosperity depends on the discharge of duty. Therefore let a King, after having seated himself on the seat of judgment, be equitable towards all beings, discarding selfish interests and acting the part of Yama Vaivasvata. Attending to the dictates of the Law, and adhering to the opinion of the Chief-Judge, he should try causes in due order, exhibiting great care.’

Bṛhaspati (Parāśaramādhava- Vyasa, p. 46). — ‘Where two complainants arrive accusing each other and claiming the first hearing, the King shall admit them, either in the order of their castes, or in accordance with the comparative seriousness of the complaints.’

Kātyāyana (Do.). — ‘Between two mutual complainants, that man should be treated as the plaintiff whose hurt or complaint is more serious, — and not necessarily the man who appears first before the court.’

Nārada (Do.). — (Same as Kātyāyana.)

VERSE 8.25

Section IV - The Commencement of Trials

बाह्यैर्विभावयेत्लिङ्गैर्भावमन्तर्गतं नृणाम् ।
स्वरवर्णैङ्गिताकारैश्चक्षुषा चेष्टितेन च ॥२५॥

bāhyairvibhāvayetliṅgairbhāvamantargataṃ nṛṇām |
svaravarṇaiṅgitākāraiścakṣuṣā ceṣṭitena ca ||25||

He shall discover the internal disposition of men by external signs: by variations in their voice, colour and aspect, as also by means of the eye and by gestures. — (25)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

What the verse means is that in course of the investigations the veracity or otherwise of witnesses should he found out by means of Inference also; — and the mention of ‘voice,’ etc., is only by way of illustration; what the meaning therefore is, is that it shall be ascertained by means of such sure indiations as may be possible, and not necessarily only by ‘voice’ and other things mentioned here; for the simple reason that these latter are not always infallible; e.g., in many cases persons who are not used to the presence of great men become flurried, even though they be quite truthful; while those that are pert manage to hide their real feelings.

The compound ‘svaravarṇeṅgitākāraiḥ’ is to be expounded as — by the ākāra — variations in — their ‘svara,’ ‘voice’ — ‘varṇa’ ‘colour’ — and ‘iṅgita,’ ‘aspect’; — the ‘change’ referred to being modifications undergone by men’s ordinary ‘voice’ and the rest.

By means of these he shall ‘discover’ — ascertain — the ‘internal disposition’ — intention — ‘of men’ — of suitors and witnesses.

The ‘change of voice’ occurs in the form of faltering, being choked with tears and so forth; — that of ‘colour’ in the form of sudden changes of complexion and so forth; — that of ‘aspect’ in the shape of perspiration, trembling, thrilling of hairs and so forth.

‘By means of the eye’; — i.e., by suddenly casting on them an angry look.

‘By gestures,’ — i.e., by the movement of the hands, the eye-brows and so forth.

It is a fact of common experience that voice and the rest, if carefully watched, disclose the most hidden feelings; — the fact of these being indicative of hidden feelings being well known among men, as we find in ordinary experience. — (25)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

‘Iṅgita’ — ‘Perspiring, trembling, horripilation and so forth’ (Medhātithi, Govindarāja and Rāghavānanda); — ‘casting down the eyes &c,’ (Kullūka); — ‘aimlessly moving about the arms &c.’ (Nārāyaṇa).

‘Ākāra’ — ‘Manner’ compounded with ‘svara-varṇa-iṅgita’ collectively, (Medhātithi and Rāghavānanda); — ‘aspect, e.g., pallor, horripilation, sweating’ (Govindarāja, Kullūka, and Nārāyaṇa) who take the term independently — copulatively compounded with ‘svara’ &c.

This verse is quoted in Aparārka (p. 620); — in Smṛtitattva (p. II, 218),... which adds the following notes: — ‘Svara,’ such as choking voice, — ‘varṇa,’ abnormal pallor and so forth, — ‘iṅgita,’ i. e., sweating, trembling and horripilation — ‘ākāra,’ disfigurement, — ‘cakṣuṣ,’ timid, or piteous look, — ‘ceṣṭita,’ the manner of standing and moving. It adds that all these, being uncertain indications, have to be regarded as inferior to witnesses and other kinds of direct evidence; — in Kṛtykalpataru, (21b), which has the following notes: — ‘Vibhāvayet,’ determine, ascertain, — ‘bhāvam,’ motive, intention, ‘nṛṇām,’ of the two parties and of the witnesses, — ‘ākāra’ transformation in the natural voice and other things, — that of ‘svara’ appears in the form of trembling and so forth, that of ‘varṇa’ in the shape of paleness and so forth; — and in Vīramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 30a), which adds the following notes: — ‘Svara’ stands for the choking of the voice and so forth, — ‘varṇa’ for the ‘darkness of complexion,’ and so forth, — ‘iṅgita’ for perspiration, trembling and the like, — ‘ākāra’ for the raising of the eye-brows and so forth — ‘cakṣu’ for the timid look, — ‘ceṣṭita’ for the listless changing of position. — (25)

Comparative notes by various authors:

(verses 8.25-26)

Nārada (6.10-11). — ‘When the face changes colour, or the voice falters, or the features look suspicious, when they do not give evidence in public, when they make impossible statements as to place and time, when there are doubts regarding their place of residence, when they indulge in expense for bad purposes, when they have been previously convicted of larceny, when they keep bad company, or when documents speak against them, — they may be convicted as thieves, — not by the possession of stolen goods alone.’

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