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‘By offerings’ — i.e., by offerings to the Gods and Ṛṣis.

Up to this point we had the duties of the Religious Student.

Next follow the duties of the Householder.

‘By children,’ — i.e., by the act of begetting children.

‘By the great sacrifices’ — i.e., by the five ‘sacrifices,’ consisting of Brahtnayajña and the rest.

‘By sacrifices,’ — i.e., by the Jyotiṣṭoma and other Vedic Sacrifices.

The question being raised that — “if there were any useful purpose served by these acts, then alone could there be any use for the sacraments which fit a man for these acts,” — the Author says — ‘this body is made godly,’ ‘tanuḥ.’ — ‘Brahma’ here stands for the Supreme God, the Creator; and this ‘tanu,’ body, is made ‘related to God,’ ‘godly,’ — by all these acts, which are laid down in the Veda and in the Smṛtis. ‘Godliness’ meant here is that which consists in being transformed into the very essence of God; as this is the highest end of man; as for other forms of ‘relation to God,’ this is already an accomplished fact for all beings, — for the simple reason that God is the Creator of all things; and hence these other relations cannot be anything to be longed for. For this reason it is the attainment of ‘Final Release’ that must be meant here.

The term ‘brāhmī,’ ‘godly’ — as also the term ‘tanu,’ ‘body’ — refers to the personality ensouling the body; as it is the personality that is consecrated by the sacraments; and it is the personality that attains Final Release; as for the physical body, it entirely perishes.

Others have explained the phrase ‘it made godly’ to mean that ‘it is made capable of reaching Brahma as (they argue) the actual ‘becoming Brahman’ is not possible by means of acts alone; Final Release (which is what is meant by(becoming Brahman’) is'attainable only by means of Knowledge and Action conjointly. Hence what the text means is that the man, by the said acts, becomes entitled to meditate upon Ātman (Brahman). To this end we have the Vedic text — ‘O Gārgi, when anyone, without knowing the Imperishable One, sacrifices, pours oblations, performs penances, studies the Veda or gives charities, all this becomes perishable’ (Bṛha dāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 3. 8. 10).

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Objection. —

“Nowhere in the Veda is the attaining of Brahman declared to be the reward of the actions here enumerated. For instance, (A) as for the compulsory acts, they are prescribed as being without rewards. If we.were to assume rewards, such an assumption would be purely human in its source (and as such not authoritative). And since the Veda has declared them to be compulsory by means of such phrases ‘throughout one’s life’ and the like, there can be no justification for applying the principle.of the V sacrifice (and assume the reward to consist in the attaining of heaven). If it were argued that — ‘from the present verse of Manu itself we learn that the said Acts bring the mentioned rewards,’ — then it would come to this that only such persons are entitled to these acts as long for Final Release; which would deprive them of their compulsory character; and this would be contrary to what has been declared in the Veda. It may be argued that — ‘inasmuch as no one ever undertakes a fruitless act, (if no rewards were mentioned) the laying down of the acts would be futile.’ ‘But there may be no performance at all; that does not matter; the use of a ‘source of knowledge’ lies in making things known; if it has succeeded in doing this, its purpose has been served; and the present verse does clearly indicate some acts as to be done; and if this indication is accomplished (the purpose of the scriptural injunction has been served); if people do not perform those acts, they transgress the behests of the scripture, and thereby incur sin. All old writers have explained the sense of the Injunctive etc., on these lines. If a servant does not perform his duty, as he is ordered to doby his master, cither he does not obtain his wages, or he incurs sin. Now as regards the compulsory acts, since no rewards are mentioned (in the form of wages), the evil that follows is not in the form of losing the reward, but in the form of suffering pain. It is only in this manner that we can explain the fact of, all men being required to perform the compulsory acts. From all this it follows that in the case of compulsory acts there is no reward. (B) As regards the optional acts, other results have boen declared as following from them, and not Fin l Release (the one mentioned here). How then could this Final Release be such an end of man as is accomplished by the mere performance of acts?”

It is just in view of these considerations that the text has been explained as a mere ‘arthavāda,’ meant to eulogise the injunction of the Sacraments.

Some people have taken the expression ‘godly’ figuratively — on some basis or other — to mean ‘capable of reciting the Veda and of performing the acts prescribed in the Veda’; ‘brahma’ being taken as equivalent to ‘Veda.’

“How is it then that Gautama (8. 8) has spoken of ‘forty sacraments’? There the Soma-sacrifice also has been mentioned as a sacrament; and certainly a primary sacrifice (as the Soma-sacrifice undoubtedly is) can never have the character of a mere consecratory sacrament. Nor is it possible to take this part of Gautama’s Sutra as an arthavāda; as all the forty sacraments are spoken of as being on the same footing.”

As a matter of fact, the statement of Gautama is purely commendatory, the Soma-sacrifice being spoken as a ‘sacrament’ in the sense that it brings about in the performer’s soul a peculiar aptitude.

Similarly in the present context real Sacraments have been mentioned along with non-sacraments with a view to indicate that both equally lead to the same result; and the purpose served by this is to show that the performance of all of them is necessary. It is thus not necesary to take the verse as apart from the section dealing with Sacraments.

Then again, the term ‘is made’ is meant to be commendatory, as is shown by the fact that we have the present tense, and not the injunctive affix. So that there is nothing to justify the idea that ‘the attaining of Brahman’ is the reward (of what is enjoined). In fact the present verse does not enjoin any actions; and hence there cannot arise any desire on our part to know their result, which could justify the assumption that the present tense has the force of the Injunctive; as has been done in the case of the Rātrīsatra, in connection with which even though we have the present tense in the term ‘pratit ṣṭhanṭi’ (‘obtain a standing’), yet it is taken as laying down the result following from the Bātrisatra.

From all this it follows that all that is said in the verse is for the eulogising of the Sacraments.

Some people interpret the verse by breaking it up into two parts — taking it to mean that ‘the attaining of Brahman is the reward of the compulsory acts, and of the optional acts the rewards are such as are actually mentioned in the Veda along with these acts.’

But there is no authority for this; because the entire verse is purely commendatory: specially as it has been already explained that the compulsory acts are performed without the idea of any rewards. It is in view of this that our Author has said (under 2.2) that ‘it is not right to be absorbed in desires.’ — (28)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

‘Vrataiḥ’ — (a) ‘The particular observances kept by the student while studying particular portions of the Veda (Medhātithi, Govindarāja and Nārāyaṇa); — ‘the voluntary restraints, such as abstention from honey, meat and such things’ — (Kullūka and Rāghavānanda) — ‘such observances as the Prājāpatya penance’ (Nandana).

‘Traividyena’ — ‘By learning the meaning of the three Vedas’ (Medhātithi and Nandana); — ‘By undertaking the vow to study the three Vedas in thirty-six years, as mentioned under 3.1 (Govindarāja, Kullūka and Rāghavānanda).

‘Ijyayā’ — ‘Ijyā’ here stands for ‘the offering to the gods, sages and Pitṛs’ (Medhātithi, Govindarāja, Kullūka and Rāghavānanda); — or ‘the Pākayajñas’ (Nārāyaṇa and Nandana).

‘Brāhmīyam kṛyate tanuḥ.’ — ‘Related to Brahman;’ i. e. ‘united with the Supreme Spirit’ — according to Medhātithi, who also notes that according to ‘others,’ the meaning is that ‘the body is made fit to attain Brahman.’ As the reference is to the ‘tanuḥ,’ ‘body,’ Burnell understands that ‘Brahman’ stands here for the ‘world-substance, not as a spiritual, but as a physical force’. This however is entirely off the mark.

This verse is quoted in the Mitākṣarā (on 1. 103, p. 76) as setting forth the desirable results acruing to the man who offers the Vaiśvadeva offerings, which latter, on this account, cannot be regarded as sanctificatory of the food that has been cooked.

This verse is quoted in the Vīramitrodaya (Saṃskāra, p. 140), where the words are thus explained: — ‘Svādhyāya’ stands for the learning of the Veda; — ‘Vrata’ for the Sāvitrī and other observances; — ‘Traividyā’ for the knowledge of. the meaning of the three Vedas; — ‘Ijyā’ for the worshipping of the gods and others; — ‘Brahmā’ for related to Brahman, through the knowledge of that Supreme Being.

Comparative notes by various authors:

(Verses 27 and 28)

See Comparative notes for Verse 2.27.

VERSE 2.29 [The ‘jātakarma’ sacrament]

Section IX - The ‘jātakarma’ sacrament

प्राङ् नाभिवर्धनात् पुंसो जातकर्म विधीयते ।
मन्त्रवत् प्राशनं चास्य हिरण्यमधुसर्पिषाम् ॥२९॥

prāṅ nābhivardhanāt puṃso jātakarma vidhīyate |
mantravat prāśanaṃ cāsya hiraṇyamadhusarpiṣām ||29||

For the male child, before the cutting of the umbilical cord the performance of the Jāta-karma (Birth-rite) has been ordained: (it consists of) the feeding of him with gold, honey and butter, to the accompaniment of Mantras. — (29).

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):

‘Vardhana’ is cutting.

‘Jātakarma’ is the name of the particular rite. The exact form of this rite is to be learnt from the Gṛhya-sūtras, In answer to the question as to which is the act to which the name ‘Jāta-karma’ is applied, the author adds — ‘the feeding with gold, honey and butter?.’ ‘Of him’ refers to the child; or, it may refer to the rite; the sense being that ‘of rite’ of Jāta-karma, the principal part consists in the feeding of the child to the accompaniment of mantras.

‘To the accompaniment of mantras’, — i.e., the act should be done along with the reciting of mantras. Though the present text does not specify the mantras, yet, since all Smṛtis have the same end in view, we must accept those same mantras that are prescribed in other Smṛtis. Hence it follows that the mantras that should be recited are those that have been mentioned in the Gṛhya-sūtras.

“If it is necessary to call in the aid of the Gṛhya-sūtras, the substances (Gold, Honey and Butter) also need not have been mentioned here; as in the Gṛhya-sūtra we find the following words (in Apastamba’s Gṛhya-sūtra, 1.15.1). — ‘The child should be made to eat butter, honey and the essence of gold with a golden ladle, with the mantra, Prati dadāmi madhuno ghṛtaṣya etc.’ Further, there are many Gṛhya-sūtras; the mantras also that are prescribed in the various Gṛhyaṣūtras are different; the very procedure of the rite is variously prescribed; so that (if we were to seek for information from the Gṛhyas) we would fail to know which one of these we should adopt. It might he argued that the name of the particular Vedic Rescension (which the performer has studied and with which a particular Gṛhyasūtra is connected) would help to determine the exact procedure to be adopted. But in that case, there can be no use in Manu laying down the ‘Birth-rite’ and the other sacraments; as these also could be learnt from the Gṛhyasūtras themselves. Every sūtra is named after a particular Vedic Rescension, — e.g., ‘Gṛhya of the Kaṭhas,’ ‘Gṛyya of the Āśvalāyanas’ and so forth; so that a man would naturally adopt that procedure which is laid down in the Gṛhya that is named after the Rescension to which he belongs.”

To the above our answer is as follows: — The fact that the substances (Honey, etc.) mentioned in the text are just those prescribed in the Gṛhyas in connection with the ‘Jātakarma,’ shows that the rites mentioned (here and in the Gṛhya) are the same. This is what leads us to the recognition that — ‘the rite ordained here having the same name and the same substances as those found in the Gṛhyas, this must be the same as that.’ In several cases we recognise a thing through its qualities. And when the rites are one and the same, if a certain detail is not mentioned in one text, it has to be brought in from the other text, specially when there is no inconsistency between the two. It has been decided that th e act (of Agnihotra) prescribed in the several rescensional Vedic texts is one and the same; and the analogy of this leads us to conclude that the act (of the sacrament) as prescribed in the several Smṛtis (of Manu and of the Gṛhya-sūtras) must be one and the same. As regards the uncertainty that has been urged by the objector as to the exact procedure to be adopted, in face of there being many, Gṛhyas laying down diverse procedures, — our answer to that is that all the Gṛhyas being equally authoritative, what one has got to do is that when the details varying in them are those relating to the end, he may adopt any one of them optionally, while if the details varying relate to different purposes, he should employ them all. The name of the Vedic Rescension can never form the determining factor. Because the name of the Vedic text in relation to a particular individual is not such an invariable factor as his ‘yotra and pravara’ are; for a man is called after that Vedic Rescension which he happens to study: if he has studied the ‘Kāthaka’ rescension he is called ‘Kāṭhaka,’ and if he has studied the Ṛgveda, he is called ‘Bahvṛca’; and in regard to studying there is no such hard and fast rule as that ‘such and such a man should study only such and such a rescensional text.’ Then again, a man very often studies several Vedic texts, as is ordained (by Manu, in 3.2) — ‘Having studied the Vedas &c. &c. and one has studied all the three Vedas comes to be known by all such names — as ‘Ka?thuma’ (Sāmavedin) ‘Kāṭhāka’ (Yajurvedin) and Bahvṛca’ (Ṛgvedin); and in this case one must have recourse to option. For the man however who studies a single Vedic text, it is only right that he should adopt the procedure prescribed in the Gṛhya that is named after that Vedic text; in fact, he can follow only that procedure; as he has studied only the mantras occurring in that particular text; and these alone he can recite (properly). In fact the only knowledge that he possesses of the Rite is what is derived from that particular text.

“As for the man’s knowing the mantras, since the Veda is studied only for the performance of the rites, the man would read up just those mantras (also of the other texts) that might be used in a certain performance.”

Our answer to this is that the study of the Veda is undertaken in virtue of the Injunction of ‘Vedic study;’ and until one has studied the Veda, he is not entitled to perform any religious act; it is not (as the objector thinks) that the Veda is studied only for the performing of the acts. In fact, the name that has been applied to the various Gṛhyas — as ‘this is the Gṛhya of the Kaṭhas,’ ‘this is the Gṛhya of the Vājasaneyins’ and so forth — is simply for the purpose of indicating what particular mantras have to be employed by certain persons; and when the majority of mantras prescribed in a certain Gṛhya happen to be those that have been read in a particular Vedic text, that Gṛhya comes to be named after that text. Further, when Gṛhya Smṛti is a trustworthy source of knowledge, even though it may be named after the ‘Kaṭhas,’ it cannot fail to make its purport known to the Ṛgvedins also; and what forms the purport of the Vedas and the Smṛtis is that ‘such and such an act should be done.’ So that when one has come to know that ‘this should be done,’ there can be nothing to limit the performance of that act to any particular class of persons, unless there is a Vedic text specifying any particular performer; — as for instance, when the performance of the Tanūnapāt Prayāja is restricted to the ‘Vaśiṣṭha’ clan, — or a distinct prohibition sets aside the said ‘performability.’ Neither of these two circumstances is present in the case in question. Nor can it presumed that the Ṛgveda is not an authority for the Kaṭhas, or vice versa. Because until a particular Vedic text has been actually studied, there is no difference between the ‘Kaṭha’ and the ‘Non-Kaṭha.’ As regards the ‘Gotra’ (the Clan-name), this is fixed for each man (being determined by his birth). So that the ‘Gṛhya’ of a man does not stand on the same footing as his ‘Gotra.’

This [that the Gṛhya of the man is that connected with the Vedic text that he has studied] is what is meant by the assertion — ‘He who renounces his won Gṛhyaṣūtra and acts according to another Gṛhyasūtra &c.’ In fact the man can carry into practice the precepts of that text only which he h as studied. Consequently if one were to give up the rules of his own Vedic text to perform a rite in accordance with the Vedic text studied by his forefathers, and adopt the procedure laid down in the Gṛhyas belonging to this latter, he would incur the sin of ‘renouncing his own Vedic text’; or in this case the sin of ‘renouncing the text’ will have been committed by the father who did not teach the boy that particular text which had been continually studied in his family; and no blame attaches, in this, to the boy himself. In a case where the boy has lost his father and betakes himself to the teacher, as Jābāla is described as having done, it would be right for the Teacher to teach him that Text which had been studied in the boy’s family, — in accordance with the law ‘one should proceed by the path by which his father and grandfather have proceeded’ (Manu, 4.178); ‘and the renouncing of the hereditary Vedic text’ would be justifiable only in the event of its study being absolutely impossible.

From all this we deduce the following conclusion: — All the sacraments — ‘Jātakarma’ and the rest — have been prescribed in all the Smṛtis; and where they lay down different details pertaining to diverse purposes, they should all be employed; but when any such details pertain to the same end and are mutually inconsistent, then there should be an option as to the particular detail to be employed.

‘Of the male child’ — is added with a view to exclude the female and the sexless child.

Others however have held that there is no special significance attaching to the masculine gender of the word; because the context refers to all ‘twice-born’ persons in general as to undergo the sacramental rites. That which is meant to be ‘consecrated’ forms the principal factor; and it has been decided that no significance attaches to any such qualifications gender, number and the like, when applied to the principal factor; e.g., even though the washing of the cups is laid down in the words — ‘one should wash the cup’ (in the singular), — yet all the cups are washed. Similarly when it is laid down, that ‘the man who is feverish, or just free from fever, should be fed at the close of the day,’ — the feverish woman also is fed at that same time; and it is because the present verse affords the idea of the sacrament being performed for females also that the Author has added the interdict (in 2.66) that ‘the whole of this is to be done for women without Mantras’ [otherwise, if the present verse itself had excluded the women, there would be no point in this further interdict]. Then again, marriage (which is also a sacrament) is actually spoken of (in 9. 203) in connection with Eunuchs.

Our answer to the above is as follows: — The word ‘male’ does not denote the ‘human’ genus in general, in the way that the word ‘man’ does; and it is only if it did have that denotation that there might he some ground for not attaching any significance to the gender expressed by the particular case-ending. What the word ‘male’ denotes in all cases is a particular gender in the form of masculinity, as pertaining to all things, moving and unmoving, corporeal and incorporeal. In the present case the gender is denoted by the basic noun (‘pumān’ in ‘puruṣaḥ’) itself; and it is only in connection with what is denoted by the case-ending, that the question of significance or non-significance can arise; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the denotation of number (or gender) is not the only function of the case-ending, — it may have its use simply in the denoting of any one of several such factors as the ‘accusative character’ and so forth [so that if no significance is attached to any one of these several factors, it does not matter]. In the present case however (where the gender is denoted by the basic noun itself), if no significance were attached to the gender, then the word ‘pumān’ would become absolutely meaningless. As in the very instance cited above, full significance is actually attached to the denotation of the basic noun ‘Cup’; and this is done simply because the sentence would, otherwise, become absolutely meaningless.

The following argument might be urged — “It is not only what is signified by the case-ending that may be non-significant; as a matter of fact, the denotation of the entire word, if it qualifies the subject, is regarded as non-significant. For instance, in the case of the text which lays down an expiatory rite in the case of one for whom ‘both offering materials have been spoilt.’ — though we have the word ‘both,’ yet the expiatory rite is performed even on the spoiling of even one of the two materials, milk and curd; and no significance is attached to the denotation of the entire word ‘both’ (which qualifies the subject.)”

To this objection some people offer the following answer: — The present case is not analogous to the case just cited. In the latter, the ‘Pañcaśarāva rite’ (which is the expiatory rite referred to) is not done for the sake of the offering-material; all that is meant is that the spoiling of the materials provides the occasion for the performance of the rite; — while in the case in question, the sacraments are done for the sake of the Boy.

This difference (between the two cases) however is of no consequence at all. Because as a matter of fact, it is only with a view to avoid a syntactical split that significance is not attached to qualifications; and even though the Rite were for the sake of the material, that would not prevent the said syntactical split.

Hence the real answer to the objection is as follows: — The passage beginning with ‘vaidikaiḥ karmabhiḥ, etc.,’ (Verse 26) is what constitutes the original injunction of the ‘Jātakarma’ sacrament; and throughout this passage it is the male that is indicated as the person to be ‘consecrated.’ So that if no significance were attached to this male-character, the whole passage would become meaningless. It is this same consideration which leads us (in the case of the passage cited by the objection) to attach due significance to the denotation of the word ‘offering-material’ (even though none is attached to its qualification ‘both’).

“Well, then the sacraments would be performed for the Śūdra also; as the passage does not specify any particular caste.”

Certainly there is no possibility of the sacraments for Śūdras, because sacraments are performed to the accompaniment of Mantras. Or, we may take the term ‘of the twice-born persons,’ occurring in a supplementary passage, as providing the necessary restriction. Nor does the term ‘of the twice-born persons’ in the said passage pertain (as a qualification) only to what is therein enjoined; so that it cannot be urged that, “in as much as the necessity of their consecration has been mentioned in that passage, no significance can attach to the term ‘male’ in the present passage; just as none is attached to the term ‘both’ in the passage referred to above.”

As for the fact of a later text (Verse 66) speaking of the Rites for females being ‘without mantras,’ this could be taken as an independent injunction; without necessarily depending upon the fact of the ‘sacrament with mantras’ being possible for women also (under the present verse; of which the later verse has been regarded as an exception, by the objector above).

As for the ‘marriage of sexless persons’; — ‘sexless’ persons are of various kinds — e.g., (a) those whose semen is ‘airy,’ (Impotent), (b) those who have the signs of both sexes (Hermaphrodite), and (c) those whose organs are inactive. All these people cannot be excluded from all the ‘sacraments’; because, in the first place their impotence, etc., cannot be detected at the time (during infancy) when the ‘Jātakarma’ and the other (earlier) sacraments are performed; and secondly (even when detected) the said impotence, etc., may be such as might be cured, and certainly a characteristic that is not of a permanent character can never serve as a disqualification. For instance, absence of wealth; this is not a permanent characteristic, like the caste of a person; for the man who has no wealth comes to acquire wealth; having remained poor for a long time, a man becomes very rich in a single day. It is on the killing of such a (confirmed and permanent) eunuch that one becomes purified (of the sin) by the giving of a load of dry grass; and the reason for this lies in the fact that he has had no ‘sacraments,’ he has not been ‘initiated,’ and his life is of no use to any person.

From all this it follows that the present text prescribes the sacraments for males only, — the later Verse (66) prescribes them for females as to be done ‘without mantras,’ — and for eunuchs there are no sacraments at all. — (29)

Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha:

‘Hiranya-madhu-sarpisām’ — Though the text clearly says that the child is to be fed with gold, honey and butter, it appears from the Gṛhya Sūtras that the last two substances only are to be given to the child, after they have been touched with a piece of gold.’ — Buhler.

‘Mantravat.’ — The mantras are those used by his own sect or his gurus.

Hopkins has the following note here: — “This commentator’s (Medhātithi’s) use of ‘some think’, ‘some explain’ is such, as in this passage, to suggest that they are occasionally used hypothetically, a possible view being set up and overthrown rather than actual statement that other commentators explain the passage so and so; a modification of meaning that would somewhat affect the amount of criticism devoted to the text before Medhātithi’s day.”

Though this may be true, to a certain extent, regarding the references in the form of ‘kechit’, it cannot be so regarding those in the form ‘anye tu’ or ‘anyevya cakṣate’ and such other moṛe definite references to other explanations.

This verse has been quoted by Raghunandana in his Smṛtitattva (Jyotiṣ, p. 648) — dealing with the Jātakarma Sacrament; — also in the Madanapārijāta (p. 353).

This verse is quoted in the Puruṣārthacintāmaṇi (p. 433) as laying down the time for the ‘Birth-sacrament’; — in the Saṃskāramayūkha (p. 23) which adds the following notes — ‘Vardhana’ is cutting; some people have held that no significance attaches to the masculine gender of ‘puruṣaḥ’; but Medhātithi has held that it is meant to be significant, there being no such rite in the case of the child without gender-signs, and for the woman it is performed without mantras in accordance with another text; — it is quoted in Nṛsiṃhaprasāda (Saṃskāra, p. 31 b); — in Hemādri (Pariśeṣa, p. 583), where‘Vardhana’ is explained as cutting; and again on p. 736, where the same is repeated; — in the same work (Śrāddha, p. 326); — in Saṃskāraratnamālā (p. 831) to the effect that the rite is to be performed before the cutting of the umbilical cord; — and in Smṛticandrikā (Saṃskāra, p. 49) to the same effect; it reads ‘puruṣam’ for ‘puruṣaḥ’

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